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At the beginning of Donald Trump's second administration, one of his most important goals announced during his 2024 campaign was his plan to expand the influence of the United States by annexing strategic and or mineral rich countries such as Panama, Greenland and or Canada – notwithstanding that the latter two countries belong to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
Historically such rhetorical threats from our largest trading partner and benign ally, is not a “new thing”.
The underpinnings of our relations with the USA, is not a marriage but like some marriages, is for the most part, predicated on mutual security requirements and economic prosperity. Deeply entrenched in the United States national security psyche lives an ideology that over the years has promoted the acquisition of and or the annexation of neighbouring countries and territories - as a strategy by which to control the political narrative of the Western Hemisphere thereby solidifying its position in the future “world order”.
Manifest Destiny: The term manifest destiny was coined by newspaper editor John O’Sullivan in 1845 who used the term to justify the USA’s territorial expansion across North America asserting that it was a God given right to spread democracy and American ideals from the Atlantic to the Pacific.
In 1783, following the Treaty of Paris, the United States was composed of 13 former colonies stretching from Canada (British colony) in the north to Florida (Spanish colony) in the south and to the Mississippi River in the west. Over the next 115 years, the United States acquired twenty-nine (29) large and small territories. Today, the USA is composed of fifty (50) states and 14 territories. The following is a short list of the more significant acquisitions / annexations.
War of 1812: Canada’s first taste of imperial expansionism occurred in the early 1800’s - a biproduct of a greater conflict in Europe between Great Britain and Napoleonic France which would ultimately determine dominance over Europe. Post 1783 (American Independence) Great Britain remained dominant over the world’s oceans and the British Royal Navy’s encroachment on American maritime rights had a serious impact on American trade and commerce. With Great Britain tied up in a war with France, President Madison decided to seize the opportunity and declare war on Great Britain on June 18, 1812. Hoping to get a quick win in their fight with Great Britain, America decided to invade Canada and use its conquest as a bargaining chip to win concessions from Great Britain especially as it relates to maritime issues. At the time, the population of Canada was approximately 500,000 compared to 7.7 million people in America. Former President Thomas Jefferson assumed the conquest of Canada would be “a mere matter of marching”. Most Americans believed that they would be welcomed as liberators from British rule.
In 1812 American armies invaded Canada at three points and all three attempts ended in failure. A similar prolonged invasion occurred in 1813 with America achieving some success in the West (Lake Erie).
In 1814, the United States armies found themselves on the defensive following Napoleon’s defeat. Great Britain quickly shifted attention to its protracted conflict with America. The Royal Navy started transporting battle hardened troops to Canada while at the same time increasing its blockade of American ports. Battles were won and lost on the great lakes and at key forts along a joint frontier.
With the cost of the war wearing thin on Great Britain and the American economy teetering on ruin both sides eventually agreed to a cessation of the conflict. On December 24, 1814 Great Britain entered into a treaty with America. On February 17, 1815 both sides ratified the treaty (Treaty of Ghent) with the provision (quo ante bellum) that all conquered territory must be returned as it existed before the conflict.
A costly skirmish for both sides. America suffered 15,000 casualties and Great Britain suffered 8,600 casualties (British Regulars and Canadian militia). An unknown number of indigenous people also perished in the conflict as warriors or the result of starvation and disease.
Not prepared to repeat the War of 1812 with Great Britian, the United States started to search for a national strategy to deal with incursions from their imperial neighbours…
The Monroe Doctrine: President Monroe, a close ally of President Madison, was president for two terms from 1817 to 1825. James Monroe and two other statesmen were Secretaries of State and War during the War of 1812. James Monroe, more specifically, was Secretary of State and War between 1814 and 1815.
A veteran of the War of 1812, Monroe was no stranger to European hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. The Monroe Doctrine was enacted on December 2, 1823 in an annual message to Congress warning European powers (especially Great Britain, France and Spain) against further colonization or interference in the Western Hemisphere.
According to Monroe, “European powers are obligated to respect the Western Hemisphere as the United States’ sphere of interest.” (The Westen Hemisphere comprises half the earths surface including a sizeable chunk of the North Pole and Antarctica).
The Monroe Doctrine originated as a “statement of intent” not a formal law supported by the US Congress. Its implementation is arbitrary and has historically been the responsibility of the President visa vis the conduct of foreign affairs. The Monroe Doctrine has no standing in international law. (Smaller indefensible countries within the Western Hemisphere have little or no recourse if invaded by the USA).
For example, the Monroe Doctrine was first invoked in 1865 when the U.S, government exerted diplomatic and military pressure in support of the Mexican President Benito Juarez. This support enabled Juarez to lead a successful revolt against the Emperor Maximilian, who had been placed on the throne by the French President Napoleon.
Again in 1940 European creditors from a number of Latin American countries threatened armed intervention to collect debts. Citing the Monroe Doctrine, President Theodore Roosevelt promptly proclaimed the right of the United States to exercise international police powers to curb such chronic wrong doing.
The U.S. also has a long history of interventions in South America - called the Banana Wars 1898 – 1934. Santo Domingo 1904, Nicaragua 1912 and 1933, Dominion Republic 1916 and 1924, Haiti 1915 and 1934, Guatemala 1954, The Bay of Pigs (Cuba) 1961, Chile 1973, Grenada 1983, Panama 1989… and now Venezuela 2026.
Although the Monroe Doctrine was essentially established to keep European powers out of the Western Hemisphere, Roosevelt strengthened and expanded its meaning to justify the sending of American troops into any country or territory within the Western Hemisphere. Invoking the Monroe Doctrine to enable the annexation of a friendly territory or nation for hegemonic purposes is totally contrary to the purpose for which the Monroe Doctrine was created in the first place and is a violation of the principles of “rules based” order.
Comment:
The threat environment to which we have become accustomed has shifted significantly provoking serious change in the world order.
Given the emerging threats to our sovereignty, how does our intelligence community navigate its way through these unprecedented times while protecting the nation from both former allies one day and adversaries the next. (Should we be preparing for a NATO minus the USA). We need to rethink some of our legacy relationships and retool our intelligence collection strategy to include emerging threats to our sovereignty. Expediting the formation of a foreign intelligence capability, whether inside or outside the Service, should be a priority and would certainly send a message to trusted partners that we are indeed serious players within the global intelligence community.
Norm Killian - Pillar Member
Published: Australian Strategic Policy Institute - Chris Taylor
Organization: Australian Security Intelligence Organization
The Australian Parliament’s Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS) is reviewing legislation confirming the reality of an extraordinary, rarely used intelligence capability that has been part of national security law for 22 years: the Australian Security Intelligence Organization's compulsory questioning powers. The bill also hones and configures the powers for Australia’s security environment, both current and foreshadowed.
ASIO’s questioning warrants (QWs) require a person to appear before the organization and answer questions truthfully for the purpose of gathering intelligence—including by detaining that person for up to seven days. They also restrict that person’s ability to alert others to ASIO’s interest or destroy relevant material. (Questioning detention warrants, which allowed ASIO to per-emptively detain a person for questioning, were available until 2020.)
The bill currently under review, the ASIO Amendment (no. 2) Bill 2025, makes three principal changes. First, it makes the powers permanent, though this will be reviewed by the PJCIS in three years. It also expands their scope beyond the grounds of politically motivated violence, espionage and foreign interference to include all seven of ASIO’s areas (‘heads’) of security. As a result, sabotage, promotion of communal violence, attacks on Australia’s defence system, and protection of territorial and border integrity will also be grounds for QWs. Finally, it bolsters associated oversight protections, such as further limiting who can be a prescribed authority overseeing questioning.
These changes raise two key questions: Should the powers be retained permanently? And should the powers apply to all elements of security?
These powers, first instituted in 2003, have often been described publicly as a temporary measure only. However, they have been regularly prolonged—in 2006, then 2014, 2018, 2019, and 2020. Their application has also been expanded, from politically motivated violence alone to include espionage and foreign interference.
The ASIO Amendment Act (no. 1) 2025 again extended the sunsetting date for the powers to March 2027. Otherwise, they would have ceased on 7 September.
The powers are rarely used: according to the public record, ASIO has only requested a compulsory questioning warrant five times since 2006. In 22 years, 20 warrants in total have been sought and issued.
When the powers were introduced, the rationale was that terrorism presented an unprecedented and extraordinary threat to Australia, and that responding required similarly extraordinary powers. The temporary nature of the powers was an acknowledgement of this and ensured passage through the Senate. But as time has passed, it’s become increasingly clear that the adverse security circumstances in question have become the norm as threats facing Australia have broadened and been entrenched.
Importantly, since 2006, the parliament has consistently acted to retain the powers, despite calls for repeal. This demonstrates that, rather than temporary powers, these are de facto permanent powers. Rather than continue to pretend otherwise, their status should be definitively addressed.
That the powers have only been used sparingly does not invalidate them or make them redundant. Rather, they are tools for use in extraordinary circumstances where other means for intelligence collection are inapplicable. This continues to reflect the original argument for the powers, ‘as a measure of last resort’ to be ‘used rarely and only in extreme circumstances’. In addition, authoritative accounts of the use of the powers suggest that ASIO exercises the powers judiciously and sensitively.
The powers will remain subject to a robust warrant regime, even absent a sunset clause. ASIO’s annual reporting regime—mandated by the ASIO Act—requires their use to be reported publicly. This is in addition to public testimony, for example at Senate estimates.
The nature of the security environment and ongoing developments means the compulsory questioning powers should be applicable to a broad range of security threats.
Application to promotion of communal violence—‘activities that are directed to promoting violence between different groups of persons in the Australian community so as to endanger the peace, order or good government of the Commonwealth’—is apt given ongoing attempts by extremists to fracture social cohesion in Australian society. That this has included covert interference efforts by a hostile foreign actor (Iran) underscores the blurred lines between the heads of security.
But it is two other aspects of security that are particularly appropriate to be included within the potential exercise: attacks on Australia’s defence system, and sabotage.
These two security threats are closely related and increasingly pertinent. As I noted last year following Israeli intelligence’s audacious sabotage of Hezbollah’s communications network, sabotage—destroying, damaging or obstructing for military and/or political advantage—is back. This point is only reinforced by ongoing Russia-backed attacks on military capabilities and stores in Europe.
As Australia’s investment in the AUKUS program grows and as the prospect of major power conflict in our region becomes ever more concerning, the implications of this international resurgence in sabotage as a coercive tool—potentially applied to Australia’s often niche and concentrated defence capabilities—are greatly concerning. ASIO being able to respond with the same suite of intelligence collection capabilities that are available against other security threats, including extraordinary powers used only in extraordinary circumstances, will be vital.
This article is based on the author’s submission to the PJCIS inquiry into ASIO Amendment (no. 2) Bill 2025.
It has been corrected to say that questioning detention warrants were available until 2020 and to delete a reference to the ASIO Amendment (no. 2) Bill 2025 applying to them.
The ConversationPublished: April 30, 2024
Prime Minister Justin Trudeau tours a quantum technology company in January 2023
The recent release of the Department of National Defence’s policy update, Our North, Strong and Free, outlines the progress being made by the federal government on two major security issues facing Canada: the warming Arctic and cyber warfare.
A major focal point of the policy update is the need to develop cutting-edge, quantum-based defence technology that will help Canada address these two threats.
Quantum technology uses the sensitivity of sub-atomic particles to create increasingly precise measurements of an environment. This provides Canada the ability to better track environmental changes, potential trespassers in sovereign territory and the beginnings of cyberattacks before they become real threats. It’s a game-changer in both physical and cyber domains.
The Arctic and climate change are a major focus of the policy update due to melting polar ice that will make it easier for competitive states to traverse the area and reap economic benefits.
Of particular concern are ships coming from Canada’s top two adversaries, Russia and China. To combat the threat, Canada says it intends to develop improved quantum sensing technology, in which light sources are able to produce more sensitive and accurate sensing of their environment over a period of time.
A Russian icebreaker makes the path for a cargo ship near Nagurskoye, Russia, in May 2021.
Over the next seven years, Canada will mobilize research teams with its allies to fine-tune the technology. It’s currently in the first year of the strategy that calls for continuing research into quantum technology. The ensuing years will focus on the goals of Our North, Strong and Free.
Quantum sensing has been specialized and applied to radar technologies that will be used to chart and monitor Arctic territory. Furthermore, with support from its Five Eyes allies, Canadian information is being made quantum-safe through extensive investment into cryptography.
This means that Canadian intellectual property produced through dozens of national funding projects could be further protected from competitive, hostile entities like China and Russia.
The Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces unveiled their first major quantum strategy, the Quantum Science and Technology Strategy, in 2021.
The strategy acted as the foundation for Canada’s quantum industry and its goal was to ensure quantum can apply to defence. This was the first time Canada linked quantum technology, climate and the Arctic.
These promising proposals led to the development of an official quantum-focused strategy entitled the National Quantum Strategy in 2023. It has allocated $360 million to address existing gaps in knowledge in quantum development.
There has been direct collaboration with both academic institutions and private industry on quantum technology. The aim is to invest in a diverse quantum portfolio to protect information, process data through quantum computing and to detect new threats in Canadian and allied territory.
Sensing technology is a significant component of each of these quantum technology strategies.
The technology is vital for future climate change detection and can play a key role in Canada’s pursuit of innovative, new and useful technology that will benefit its scientific leadership among its allies.
The latest defence policy update expresses an aim to improve search-and-rescue procedures in the North, increase Arctic charting and improve monitoring of shared NORAD airspace. The heightened sensitivity of quantum sensors will allow Canada to make these contributions.
A Canadian icebreaker in Allen Bay near Resolute, Nunavut
Our North, Strong and Free also called for the development of proper countermeasures against potential cyberattacks. Canada has been pursuing protections against state-sponsored hackers through quantum cryptography.
Quantum-based cyberspace protections prevent incredibly efficient computers from cracking codes by radically slowing their ability to process information.
The policy update’s focus on the cyber domain — which includes any aspect of the digital sector, public or private — is fuelled by the global increase in grey-zone conflicts, actions taken by a state that don’t necessarily warrant a declaration of war.
Usually, this involves a cyberattack, such as the widespread Russian disinformation campaign during the 2016 American election.
Canada has stated in the policy update that it will look not only into quantum computing to combat cyber threats, but also artificial intelligence, machine learning and other technological advances to secure Canadians online. Protecting Canadian information could safeguard Canada from potential grey-zone attacks, like intellectual property theft.
On Canada’s top security priorities — cybersecurity and Arctic safety — the federal government has been moving quietly but purposefully, with support from its allies.
The update also pledged an increase in funding to NORAD and NATO to 1.76 per cent of Canada’s GDP from its previous 1.33 per cent.
While not yet at the two per cent NATO guideline, these increases also suggest Canada is taking its security seriously.
Gangster Lawrence Bishnoi is surrounded by heavy police security as he exits court on Oct. 31, 2022, in Amritsar, India. Canada listed the Bishnoi gang as a terrorist entity in September, 2025.
Published January 2, 2026
A formal review of Canada’s processes for designating terrorist groups is needed, say national security experts, warning that recent decisions to list organized crime groups could distract counterterrorism officials from their core work of preventing mass attacks.
Law experts further warn that any findings of a lack of rigour in Canada’s listing process could potentially expose the entire federal Anti-Terrorism Act to significant court battles.
Created in the wake of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, Public Safety Canada’s designated list initially included mostly Islamist extremist groups such as al-Qaeda. Over the past five years, federal cabinet ministers responsible for the list have also added several violent white-supremacist groups and nihilistic online entities.
Then, in 2025,Canadian notions of what is legally considered terrorism appeared to change. On Feb. 20, both Canada and the United States designated the same seven drug cartels,predominantly from Mexico, as terrorist entities. U.S. President Donald Trump had just returned to office and was mounting a trade war against Canada, citing unsubstantiated allegations that fentanyl was flowing into his country over its northern border.
In October, Ottawa listed the India-based Bishnoi Gang after regional politicians, including Brampton Mayor Patrick Brown, pressed the federal government to take this step. Mr. Brown said in an interview that he did this hoping such a listing might curb the group’s alleged violent extortion rackets within Canada’s South Asian communities.
The federal government’s power to designate an entity as a terrorist organization under the Criminal Code is a significant measure. In Canada, it gives banks the power to immediately seize a group’s assets. Listings can also encourage law-enforcement, intelligence and border agencies to redirect resources, launch probes or step up scrutiny of suspected members.
Experts say, however, that there has been little public explanation from officials in Ottawa as to precisely why they appear to be altering a national-security power in order to take aim at organized-crime groups.
“I am concerned that it has become what I would call ‘vibes-based policy,’ as opposed to the process that has traditionally existed,” says Carleton University professor Stephanie Carvin, who specializes in national-security issues.
Intelligence watchdogs in Ottawa should scrutinize the federal government’s most recent listings of terrorist groups, Prof. Carvin said. “This does, at the end of the day, still need to be an evidence-based process,” she said. “What those review bodies are good at is pointing out is where there’s a lack of standards.”
Brian Phillips, a former U.S. Marine who teaches security at the University of Essex in England, said that expansions of the legal definition of terrorism can have unpredictable, or even dangerous, consequences.
“If Canada loses its focus on more traditional terrorists, like Islamist terrorists or white supremacists, this could have serious implications for Canada’s national security,” he said.
Prof. Phillips said in an interview that counterterrorism measures are often ineffective against crime gangs. He added that Canada’s cartel-listing measure appears to have been purely intended to ward off the Trump administration’s tariff threats.
Along with Britain, New Zealand and Australia, Canada and the United States are part of what’s known as the Five Eyes intelligence alliance – an exceptionally close security partnership forged after the Second World War. However, Canada and the U.S. are the only two countries in this group to have designated Mexican cartels as terrorist organizations.
Government officials in Ottawa say that the new designations of organized-crime groups are justified. “The decision to list an entity under the Criminal Code follows a rigorous, evidence-based process,” said Simon Lafortune, spokesman for Public Safety Minister Gary Anandasangaree.
“Public statements accompanying listings are necessarily limited in detail due to national security and privacy considerations,” he added.
The February decision to list seven drug cartels, including the notorious Sinaloa Cartel, was made under then-prime-minister Justin Trudeau. The public safety minister at the time, David McGuinty, issued a statement alleging these cartels “facilitate terrorist activity by taking hostages, attacking civilian and critical infrastructure, and working to diminish the ability of local governments.”
Mr.Anandasangaree issued a statement in October saying he was designating India’s Bishnoi Gang because it “generates terror through extortion and intimidation.”
One independent watchdog that has the power to review the federal government’s counterterrorism measures is the National Security Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA).
“Terrorism listing is not something that we’ve scrutinized thus far,” said Craig Forcese, NSIRA’s vice-chair. In an interview, he said that while his agency has the mandate to look at Public Safety’s designated list, it is struggling with a substantial workload and looming budget cuts.
Michael Nesbitt, a law professor at the University of Calgary, says it is important that politicians adhere to the strictures surrounding the listing process.
One reason for that is because the list is an important thread in the overall fabric of the federal Anti-Terrorism Act, a broader statute passed in 2001 that enables a variety of criminal, border and intelligence actions today.
The listing process “is now very vulnerable to constitutional challenge, which I think should be a huge national security concern,” Prof. Nesbitt said.
He explained that courts would start to ask hard questions if a cartel member ever appeared in a Canadian court to try to reclaim a seized asset or to fight a terrorism charge.
If that happened, the government would be forced to try to prove its anti-terrorism actions are reasonable and constitutional, Prof. Nesbitt said. And if it could not, then “you’re left with a civil-liberties concern that groups are being listed based on political imperatives.”
Security officials in Ottawa say they are assessing the changes to the terrorism list.
“Assets have been seized as a part of investigations into listed entities,” said Marie-Eve Breton, an RCMP spokeswoman. She said federal officials are assessing how the listing of transnational organized crime groups will affect enforcement.
Public Safety Canada spokesman Max Watson said that it is a legal prerequisite that any group that is on the list must be found to have carried out “terrorist activities, as defined by Canada’s Criminal Code.” He said federal Justice Department lawyers independently review listings to ensure they meet this threshold.
Ottawa added 12 new groups to the designated list in 2025, which now comprises 90 entities.
Authored by Chris Bockman - BBC News
The course attracts both typical early 20s students and French government spies on day release
University professor Xavier Crettiez admits that he doesn't know the real names of many of the students on his course.
This is a highly unusual state of affairs in the world of academia, but Prof Crettiez's work is far from standard.
Instead, he helps train France's spies.
"I rarely know the intelligence agents' backgrounds when they are sent on the course, and I doubt the names I'm given are genuine anyway," he says.
If you wanted to create a setting for a spy school, then the campus of Sciences Po Saint-Germain on the outskirts of Paris seems a good fit.
With dour, even gloomy-looking, early 20th Century buildings surrounded by busy, drab roads and large, intimidating metal gates, it has a very discreet feel.
Where it does stand out is its unique diploma that brings together more typical students in their early 20s, and active members of the French secret services, usually between the ages of 35 and 50.
The course is called Diplôme sur le Renseignement et les Menaces Globales, which translates as Diploma of Intelligence and Global Threats.
It was developed by the university in association with the Academie du Renseignement, the training arm of the French secret services.
This came following a request from French authorities a decade ago. After the 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, the government went on a large recruitment drive within the French intelligence agencies.
It asked Sciences Po, one of France's leading universities, to come up with a new course to both train potential new spies, and provide continuous training for current agents.
Large French companies were also quick to show an interest, both in getting their security staff onto the course, and snapping up many of the younger graduates.
Prof Xavier Crettiez says that fighting financial crime is a now key job for spies
The diploma is made up of 120 hours of classwork with modules spread over four months. For external students – the spies and those on placement from businesses – it costs around €5,000 ($5,900; £4,400).
The core aim of the course is to identify threats wherever they are, and how to track and overcome them. The key topics include the economics of organized crime, Islamic jihadism, business intelligence gathering and political violence.
To attend one of the classes and speak to the students I had to be vetted first by the French security services. The theme of the lesson I joined was "intelligence and over-reliance on technology".
One of the students I speak to is a man in his 40s who goes by the name Roger. He tells me in very precise, clipped English that he is investment banker. He adds: "I provide consultancy across west Africa, and I joined the course to provide risk assessments to my clients there."
Prof Crettiez, who teaches political radicalisation, says there has been a huge expansion in the French secret services in recent years. And that there are now around 20,000 agents in what he called the "inner circle".
This is made up of the DGSE, which looks at matters overseas, and is the French equivalent of the UK's MI6 or the US's CIA. And the DGSI, which focuses on threats within France, like the UK's MI5 or the US's FBI.
But he says it's not just about terrorism. "There are the two main security agencies, but also Tracfin an intelligence agency which specializes in money laundering.
"It is preoccupied with the surge in mafia activity, especially in southern France, including corruption in the public and private sectors mainly due to massive profits in illegal drug trafficking."
Other lecturers on the course include a DGSE official once located in Moscow, a former French ambassador to Libya, and a senior official from Tracfin. The head of security at the French energy giant EDF also runs one module.
The private sector's interest in the diploma is said to be continuing to grow. Big businesses, especially in the defence and aerospace sector, but also French luxury goods firms, are increasingly keen to hire the students as they face relentless cybersecurity and spying threats as well as sabotage.
Recently graduates have been snapped up by the French mobile phone operator Orange, aerospace and defence giant Thales, and LVHM, which owns everything from Louis Vuitton and Dior to champagne brands Dom Perignon and Krug.
Twenty eight students are enrolled in this year's class. Six are spies. You can tell who they are, as they are the ones huddled together during class breaks, away from the young students, and not too overwhelmed with joy when I approach them.
Without saying their exact roles, and with arms crossed, one says the course is considered a fast-track stepping stone for a promotion from the office to field work. Another says he gets fresh ideas being in this academic environment. They signed the day's attendance form with just their first names.
One of the younger students, Alexandre Hubert, 21, says he wanted a deeper understanding of the looming economic war between Europe and China. "Looking at intelligence gathering from a James Bond viewpoint is not relevant, the job is analysing risk and working out how to counteract it," he tells me.
Another class member, Valentine Guillot, also 21, says she was inspired by the popular, fictional French TV spy drama Le Bureau. "Coming here to discover this world which I didn't know anything about except for the TV series has been a remarkable opportunity, and now I am very keen to join the security services."
Students Alexandre Hubert and Valentine Guillot were happy to be photographed
Nearly half of the students in the class are in fact women. And this is a relatively recent development according to one of the lecturers, Sebastien-Yves Laurent, a specialist on technology in spying.
"Women's interest in intelligence gathering is new," he says. "They are interested because they think it will provide for a better world.
"And if there is one common thread amongst all these young students it's that they are very patriotic and that is new compared to 20 years ago.
If you are keen to apply to get on the course, French citizenship is an essential requirement, although some dual citizens are accepted.
In a recent class photo some students chose to stand with their backs to the camera
Yet Prof Crettiez says he has to be wary. "I regularly get applications from very attractive Israeli and Russian women with amazing CVs. Unsurprisingly they are binned immediately."
In a recent group photo of the class you can immediately tell who the spies are - they had their backs to the camera.
While all the students and professional spies I met are trim and athletic, Prof Crettiez is also keen to dispel the myth of James Bond-like adventure.
"Few new recruits will end up in the field," he says. "Most French intelligence agencies jobs are desk bound."
On January 3, 2026, the Government of Canada published the proposed Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Regulations in the Canada Gazette, Part I. This triggers a 30-day public consultation period, ending on February 2, 2026.
These regulations provide the necessary technical and administrative details to implement the Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act (FITAA), which creates a mandatory registry for individuals or entities acting on behalf of foreign powers.
Transparency: To move foreign influence activities out of the shadows and into a public-facing registry.
National Security: To help security agencies distinguish between legitimate diplomatic/trade influence and covert, "malign" interference.
Public Trust: To reassure Canadians that efforts to influence their democratic and governmental processes are being monitored.
Safety Clause: The Commissioner can withhold information from the public registry if there are reasonable grounds to believe its disclosure would pose a threat to an individual's personal safety.
Data Retention: Information in the registry must be retained for 20 years after an arrangement ends.
Compliance Agreements: The regulations allow the Commissioner to enter into agreements with non-compliant parties to correct issues, potentially reducing or waiving fines.
The government estimates the system will cost approximately $25.9 million over ten years to maintain. About 1,000 small businesses are expected to be affected, primarily those involved in government relations or advocacy for foreign clients.
You have until February 2, 2026, to submit your feedback. The government is specifically looking for input on:
The definition of "Public Office Holder."
What specific information should be visible to the public.
The fairness and structure of the enforcement and penalty system.
https://gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p1/2026/2026-01-03/html/reg1-eng.html
Jody Thomas retired in 2024 as national security and intelligence adviser to the Prime Minister. She is now a senior adviser with Counsel Public Affairs.
Patrick Lennox is an associate fellow of the Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary, and a former national security practitioner.
The 2025 federal budget seeks to prepare us for a more Machiavellian world. That’s evident in its historic investments in national defence and security – an additional $81.8-billion over the next five years – and its pledges to push us to the NATO target of devoting 2 per cent of GDP to defence spending in 2025-26.
But spending big is one thing. Spending wisely and with a clear purpose beyond reaching an arbitrary benchmark is another.
The stewards of this investment must ensure that it makes Canada significantly more self-reliant and resilient in the face of a deeply destabilized world. There are many elements to this, but an essential one appears missing from the government’s plans: the establishment of a foreign human intelligence service for Canada.
Opinion: Canada needs a foreign human intelligence service
Historically, Canadian governments have resisted calls to create such a service. The prevailing view on the matter is that Canada hasn’t suffered from a lack of a foreign intelligence capability to date, so there’s no obvious need to build one. It would be a costly, difficult and risky endeavour. The juice, in other words, wouldn’t be worth the squeeze.
But if we’ve never had the juice, how would we know? That’s the problem with the dominant view on this. We don’t know what Canada has been missing when it comes to a foreign intelligence capability because we never took the steps necessary to find out.
It’s true that Canada has been able to coast along without this capability to this point. We have relied on our Five Eyes partners to share their products collected and analyzed for their own purposes with us. Our diplomats have filled gaps through their reporting. We’ve excelled at foreign signals intelligence and allowed CSIS to collect security intelligence abroad. But in the storm of the current geopolitical environment, this approach is quickly becoming a glaring vulnerability. Our sovereignty and resilience demand that we discover and know for ourselves what’s happening to us in the world.
As the budget notes in its introductory paragraph, the “nexus between energy security, economic security, and national security is clearer than ever before.” This complex national security landscape, the economic and hybrid warfare our adversaries are waging, and the unstable relationship we have with the United States – whose foreign intelligence capability we have long been reliant upon – leave us exposed like never before. Sticking our heads in the sand and hoping the storm passes is not an acceptable strategy.
In a world as fluid, noisy and unstable as we are in now, not having an all-source intelligence capability to support crucial policy decisions is a major disadvantage. It risks undermining the government’s entire generational investment by leaving us vulnerable to blind spots, deception and manipulation by both our adversaries and allies alike.
Opinion: I, spy: Does Canada need a foreign intelligence service?
Therefore, establishing a foreign human intelligence capability should be a priority. The government could build a stand-alone agency or expand the capabilities and mandates of existing ones. Both would be costly and time-consuming, especially the former; both would be disruptive for a bureaucracy that’s facing deep cuts. But as the government has said about major projects and defence investments, the fact that a challenge is hard should not be an excuse for inaction or complacency.
Canadians have had this conversation before, and both Liberal and Conservative governments have entertained the idea in the past. This time, however, must be different. The budget’s talk of “generational investments” to “meet the moment” and “build Canada strong,” as well as its large increases to defence spending, signal a level of ambition required to finally break through our past indecision. We hope that the bureaucracy is already considering the issue, putting viable options on the table for the government to pursue. If they aren’t, the Prime Minister should insist they do. We shouldn’t let this question fade away again without serious consideration.
Setting up a foreign human intelligence capability would be a massive undertaking. It would test the limits of Canadian ingenuity and guile. It would be one of the hardest things this country has ever done. It would be fraught with risk and put us in uncomfortable moral territory. And it would necessitate a fundamental rearchitecting of Canada’s security and intelligence community. But it would prepare Canada for our fast-changing, increasingly self-interested world, which is ultimately what the Carney government’s generational investment is all about.
Pillar Society's new Canadian Espionage Cases section under Intel Briefs offers a comprehensive history of major public Canadian spy cases, from the Gouzenko Affair to the most recent ongoing CAF Matthew Robar case.
This curated resource delivers exclusive timelines and insights for national security enthusiasts.
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Called ‘I, Spy: An intelligent take on national security’, this 20-30 minute video will delve into some of the most urgent issues in national security around the world. Whether it is terrorism, espionage, sabotage, foreign interference, transnational repression or other threats to global stability, Phil will go where necessary to provide reliable, accurate data, pick apart mis- and disinformation and discuss why this matters. This podcast will be available to subscribers only and there will be a very modest fee attached.
Master Warrant Officer Matthew Robar arrives to court in Gatineau, Dec. 15
Globe and Mail Dec 19, 2025 Mark MacKinnon Robert Fife Steven Chase
The arrest of a Canadian Armed Forces intelligence operator on espionage charges appears to have its origins in another murky episode that has vexed the country’s military establishment for more than a year. The operator, Master Warrant Officer Matthew Shawn Robar, was arrested and charged Dec. 10 with multiple offences related to passing highly sensitive government secrets to what court documents released this week refer to as a “foreign entity.” He was released from custody Monday under strict conditions. The court documents show that the allegations relate to events that began in late 2023 and 2024. At the time, the documents say, MWO Robar was assigned to interview “several individuals who wanted to report concerns related to the CAF,” meaning the Canadian Armed Forces. During one of those meetings, the documents say, “one of these individuals told Robar that he should speak with the Foreign Entity.”
The Globe and Mail reported this week, citing a source, that the country MWO Robar is accused of leaking information to is Ukraine. The court documents do not identify the foreign entity or the foreign intelligence service that had allegedly been engaged in conversations with MWO Robar. Three separate sources with direct knowledge of the initial events have told The Globe that in 2023 MWO Robar was assigned to interview and assess the concerns of a group of Canadian military officers who said they were targeted for threats after making internal allegations that Postmedia reporter David Pugliese was serving the interests of the Russian state via his coverage of the war in Ukraine – an assertion he denies. The CAF members were specifically concerned about Mr. Pugliese’s reporting on alleged mismanagement inside a pair of charities, Mriya Aid and Mriya Report. The charities were set up by a group of pro-Ukrainian volunteers that included several serving members of the Canadian Armed Forces. Mriya Aid raises money online that it uses to purchase and deliver non-lethal military aid, as well as humanitarian assistance, to Ukraine. It was chaired by Lieutenant-Colonel Melanie Lake, a former commander of Operation Unifier, the Canadian military mission to train the Ukrainian armed forces, an effort that ended at the start of the Russian war. The affiliated Mriya Report, which raised money to provide medical assistance to Ukraine and also operated a pro-Ukrainian YouTube channel, was founded by Captain Joe Friedberg. Both Lt.-Col. Lake and Capt. Friedberg declined to comment when contacted for this article. Sources say the soldiers involved with Mriya Aid asserted that the reporting on their charity was just the latest example of what they alleged was a years-long trend in which Mr. Pugliese’s articles suited the Kremlin’s aims – in this case, by undermining Canadian support for Ukraine.
That assertion is based largely on a controversial seven-page file – which appears to have been handpicked from a larger dossier – purportedly showing that the Soviet-era KGB had considered recruiting Mr. Pugliese in the late 1980s. The purported KGB documents are the focus of a fierce but whispered debate in Ottawa over the authenticity and provenance of the files. The sources who talked to The Globe say that as early as 2023, at least two CAF members had endured death threats, suspected home break-ins, or other forms of harassment after receiving copies of the alleged KGB dossier. MWO Robar was assigned to interview the officers and assess the level of risk they were facing, the sources said. The Globe is not naming its sources out of concern they could face repercussions for speaking about the case. Mr. Pugliese is a veteran defence writer, whose in-depth reporting and relentless coverage of mismanagement and spending controversies involving military commanders and bureaucrats has made him an unpopular figure within Ottawa’s defence and security establishment. Nothing in seven pages that have been made public proves that Mr. Pugliese accepted any tasks from the Soviet embassy or was even aware of the KGB’s apparent interest in him. Mr. Pugliese has said the claims that he is “some kind of Russian agent” are fabricated and that the dossier is full of “factual errors and falsehoods” that were used to smear him. “I understand my articles anger the Canadian Forces and DND leadership, but it is the role of journalists to hold those in power to account,” he said in a statement to The Globe Thursday. “If what you have determined is true, then yes, I believe there needs to be a full public accounting, not one hidden behind the secrecy that can shield the actions of the federal government, the Canadian Forces and the foreign intelligence service.” Among those interviewed by MWO Robar in connection with the case was former Conservative cabinet minister Chris Alexander, who used parliamentary privilege to make the alleged KGB dossier public during an Oct. 24, 2024, appearance before the Commons committee on public safety and national security. Mr. Alexander told The Globe this week that he was contacted by MWO Robar on Oct. 8, 2024, shortly after he first received the dossier naming Mr. Pugliese. “My only contact with MWO Robar was a single conversation in which he made it clear he was looking into threats and other hostile activities that had been undertaken against those who had received the documents … and those people included members of the Canadian Armed Forces,” Mr. Alexander said. “Everyone involved in the case assessed these threats and this harassment to have been orchestrated by Russia,” Mr. Alexander said. He added that MWO Robar “100 per cent” shared the assessment that Moscow was behind the threats allegedly directed at the Canadian officers making assertions against Mr. Pugliese. In his statement, Mr. Pugliese said MWO Robar never contacted him. Neither CAF or the Department of National Defence reached out to “inform me” that the intelligence officer had been asking questions about him, he said. “I believe that the allegations that are being made against me are designed to specifically discredit me and prevent my further investigation into the alleged misuse and misappropriation of Canadian Forces/DND funds and resources,” he said. On Oct. 21, 2024, MWO Robar was temporarily relieved of his duties at the Canadian Forces National Counter-Intelligence Unit pending an internal investigation. The court documents made public this week say MWO Robar repeatedly sought permission to co-operate with the unnamed foreign entity on an unspecified “Project.” His requests were refused, but MWO Robar allegedly proceeded to co-operate with the foreign entity anyway. It is unclear whether controversy surrounding Mriya Aid, Mriya Report and Mr. Pugliese is related to the “Project” that is the source of the main charges against MWO Robar, but they do seem to be what brought him into contact with Ukrainian officials. A series of messages seen by The Globe show that senior staff at the Ukrainian embassy in Ottawa were aware of the alleged KGB dossier and were aiding efforts to prove its veracity. Neither the military prosecutor, Major Max Reede, or Major Carlos Da Cruz, the defence counsel for MWO Robar, responded to requests for comment on whether the case against the accused is related in any way to Mr. Pugliese. On Monday, the military prosecutor and defence counsel told the court that the actions of the accused do not amount to the serious national-security threat posed by former Canadian Armed Forces intelligence staffer Jeffrey Delisle. Mr. Delisle was charged in 2012 with passing secrets to Russia and sentenced to 20 years in prison.
Maj. Reede told the court that Mr. Robar is not a flight risk and was “not motivated by personal or financial gain or to cause harm.” Maj. Da Cruz said Monday that the Delisle case was “serious,” and “We are not dealing with something like this here.”
The Globe asked Ukraine’s ambassador to Canada, Andrii Plakhotniuk, for comment on whether embassy staff had ever talked to MWO Robar, whether it shared the alleged KGB dossier with any Canadians, what role it played in trying to verify the dossier and how the Ukrainian government viewed the charges against the intelligence operator. The Globe also asked him about media reporting that Ukraine was the recipient country of the allegedly leaked information.
In response to queries from The Globe, embassy press officer Marianna Kulava did not address the specific questions.
“With respect for the important work of the mass media, we would like to note that the Embassy of Ukraine in Canada does not comment on allegations or information attributed to anonymous or unidentified sources,” Ms. Kulava wrote in an e-mailed statement Thursday.
“As the Embassy has not received any official information or requests from the relevant Canadian authorities on the issues raised in your articles and e-mails to us, we will not make any statements or comments.”
The seven pages of alleged KGB files, dated between 1984 and 1990, purport to show the Soviet KGB taking an interest in a young Mr. Pugliese, who was then just beginning his journalism career.
In the first document – a handwritten note on yellowed paper dated Aug. 7, 1984, and signed by A.V. Merezhko – Mr. Pugliese is assigned the code name “Stuart.” The paper says “Stuart” is to be “studied with the perspective of possible operative use.”
One of the most recent documents, dated April 6, 1990, notes that Mr. Pugliese had by then started working at the Ottawa Citizen. The author, V. I. Semeniuk, was seeking permission from Moscow for Stuart “to be made the subject of a series of operative agent measures towards additional study and verification of the possibility of use in interests of Directorate ‘S’.” Directorate S was a KGB program that managed long-term, deep-cover sleeper agents in the West.
The file also includes a $600 expense claim “for work on the Stuart case.”
There are no documents dated later than 1990. The Soviet Union collapsed in December, 1991.
Andriy Kogut, the director of archives for Ukraine’s SBU security service, the successor agency to the KGB in independent Ukraine, told The Globe this week that the names and dates on the documents corresponded with serving KGB officers at the time.
He said that while it would be “wrong to assert anything” regarding the authenticity of the file, the documents would have been difficult to forge without “real documents or perfect and deep knowledge from within the KGB.”
Handwritten numbers atop each of the seven documents suggest that the complete file was at least 33 pages long, leaving open the question of what happened to the other 26 pages.
In his statement Thursday, Mr. Pugliese said there needs to be an accounting of what transpired.
“If what your sources are saying about MWO Robar is accurate, then this is outrageous and undemocratic and further proof that the Canadian Forces needs more, not less, journalistic scrutiny.”
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