Part I: Early Intelligence Operations (1812--1920)

Laura Secord - War of 1812

Laura Secord served as a civilian informant during the War of 1812, overhearing American soldiers' plans for an ambush and trekking 32 km through Niagara wilderness to warn British Lieutenant James FitzGibbon on June 22, 1813. Her intelligence enabled a decisive British and Indigenous victory at the Battle of Beaver Dams two days later, capturing over 500 U.S. troops without British casualties.

FitzGibbon's 1827 and 1837 certificates directly credit Secord's timely warning, corroborated by captured American Colonel Boerstler's confirmation of the plot details. Petitions by Secord and her husband, plus her 1860 land grant from Queen Victoria, affirm her espionage role despite no mention in initial battle reports to protect sources.

Historians classify her actions as classic wartime spying by leveraging her civilian status to evade suspicion, aided briefly by Mohawk guides. She remains a Canadian heroine symbolizing civilian intelligence contributions, with memorials and trails commemorating her feat.

The Fenian Raids and Canada's First Counter-Intelligence Challenge (1866--1870s)

When Irish-American revolutionaries calling themselves the Fenian Brotherhood launched invasion attempts across the Canadian border throughout the 1860s, they triggered Canada's first organized counter-intelligence operations. British and Canadian authorities infiltrated Fenian cells operating from Buffalo, Detroit, and other U.S. border cities. Canadian militia mobilized thousands of soldiers, including the famous Queen's Own Rifles regiment.

However, institutional weaknesses were exposed at the Battle of Ridgeway on June 2, 1866. Canadian militia under Colonel Booker marched toward Fenian positions with outdated intelligence. Despite local warnings that Fenian forces had shifted location, Booker dismissed the reports, trusting stale intelligence from overnight camps. The Fenians ambushed his column in corn fields near Garrison Road, routing the Canadians in their first engagement. Though reinforced Canadian forces eventually regrouped and the Fenians retreated across the Niagara River, the battle exposed a critical vulnerability: Canada's intelligence-operations gap, where commanders ignored field intelligence.

The Fenian threat contributed directly to Canadian Confederation in 1867. Britain and Canada recognized they needed unified national defense structures. The Dominion Police Force, established May 22, 1868—just days after the assassination of Irish-Canadian MP Thomas D'Arcy McGee by Fenian radicals—became Canada's first federal intelligence agency.

Dominion Police and Early Intelligence Operations (1868--1920)

Canada's first permanent intelligence apparatus emerged as a direct response to internal security crises. Reporting to the Minister of Justice, the Dominion Police protected federal buildings (Parliament Hill, the naval yards at Halifax and Esquimalt), provided bodyguard services for government leaders, and conducted secret service operations tracking Fenian threats.

Gilbert McMicken, a pioneering intelligence director, developed Canadian counter-intelligence tradecraft through personal investigation of Fenian Brotherhood cells. His methods, transferred to the Dominion Police upon its formal establishment in 1868, established institutional memory and protocols for intelligence operations that would persist for decades.

The Dominion Police operated primarily in Eastern Canada until 1920, while the North-West Mounted Police (established 1873) covered Western territories. On February 1, 1920, these forces merged to create the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), which would dominate Canadian intelligence for the next 64 years until CSIS's 1984 establishment.

World War I German Sabotage: The Peabody Overall Bombing (1914--1917)

As World War I raged in Europe, Germany's Foreign Office orchestrated a sophisticated sabotage network in North America. Operating through U.S. diplomats posted in Washington—Ambassador Count Johann von Bernstorff, Military Attaché Franz von Papen, and Naval Attaché Karl Boy-Ed—the Germans aimed to disrupt the flow of Allied supplies through Canadian ports and railways to Britain.

Albert Kaltschmidt, a Detroit machine shop owner and secretary of the Deutscher Bund, became Berlin's sabotage coordinator for North America. The Foreign Office authorized approximately $35,200 initially, with Berlin eventually approving up to $150 million for North American sabotage campaigns.

Karl Respa, a Hamburg-born immigrant who had briefly attempted a Canadian homestead in Alberta before settling in Detroit, became Kaltschmidt's field operative. Motivated by patriotism, false financial promises, and the promise of military service exemption, Respa recruited German immigrants for targeted bombings.

The Peabody Overall Company in Walkerville, Ontario—a British Army uniform contractor—became Respa's first target. On June 21, 1915, at 3:00 AM, Respa planted a suitcase containing a time bomb beneath the factory walkway. The device detonated successfully, causing moderate damage but no major casualties. That same night, Respa planted a second bomb at Windsor Armoury, a Canadian military training center. This device mysteriously failed to detonate. Respa later claimed he deliberately sabotaged the second bomb to avoid mass casualties.

Investigators discovered dynamite caches at three other Canadian locations, suggesting German planners had coordinated a follow-up campaign. Police investigation moved swiftly. William Lefler, a night watchman at Peabody Overall with inside knowledge, was arrested in late June 1915 and confessed, implicating Respa. Respa's arrest followed on August 19, 1915, after he inadvertently crossed into Canadian territory for a picnic at Bois Blanc Island.

In February-March 1916, Respa faced trial in Sandwich, Ontario, before Judge Sir Glenholme Falconridge. The jury deliberated less than 30 minutes before returning a guilty verdict. Falconridge sentenced Respa to life imprisonment, declaring from the bench:

"I can find nothing in your case to excite any sympathy... In planting those devilish devices... you were acting as a hired assassin... If the engine of destruction which you placed at the Windsor Armories had not failed you would have been the murderer of hundreds of sleeping men."

Kaltschmidt faced trial in Detroit in 1917 for violating U.S. neutrality laws. Convicted on three counts, he received only 4 years at Leavenworth federal prison plus a $20,000 fine. Canadian officials sought his extradition for harsher punishment, but the U.S. refused.

After the war, German Consul Ludwig Kempff lobbied for Respa's release. Respa was released in January 1924 after serving 8.5 years and immediately deported to Germany.

The Respa case became Canada's template for understanding foreign sabotage operations. When World War II loomed, Canadian authorities examined this case and others like it. The lessons learned directly informed RCMP protocols for rapid detention of suspected enemy agents in September 1939.

Part II: Cold War Intelligence Operations (1945--1984)

The Gouzenko Affair (1945--1946): Atomic Research Compromised and the Birth of Cold War Canada

On September 5, 1945, Igor Gouzenko, a GRU cipher clerk stationed at the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa, made a fateful decision that would reshape Canadian security and initiate the Cold War in North America. Born in Rogachev near Moscow in 1919, Gouzenko had trained as a military cipher specialist and arrived in Ottawa in June 1943. He excelled academically but became increasingly disillusioned with Soviet authoritarianism while experiencing Canadian freedoms.

Facing recall to Moscow in September 1944—a fate that typically meant imprisonment or execution—Gouzenko planned his defection meticulously. He spent months smuggling 109 classified documents from the Embassy, accumulating approximately 250 pages of secrets. On the night of September 5, 1945, with documents in hand, he walked out of the Soviet Embassy into the Ottawa night.

Gouzenko's initial attempts to contact Canadian authorities met with bureaucratic dismissal. The Department of Justice turned him away. Desperate, he eventually connected with the RCMP.  Soviet agents raided his apartment on September 7, but RCMP officers arrived in time and took him into protective custody.

What followed was Canada's first major Cold War intelligence operation. The RCMP Security & Intelligence Branch conducted the investigation and debriefing. Between October 1945 and January 1946, Gouzenko provided extensive debriefing to RCMP, MI5 (British intelligence), MI6, and the FBI.

The revelations were stunning. Gouzenko had exposed a major Soviet GRU spy ring operating across Canadian government, military, and atomic research sectors. A royal commission led by Justices Kellock and Taschereau convened in February 1946, gathering 6,000 pages of testimony (declassified in 1981). The investigation identified 26 agents, including 18 Canadians, operating in sensitive positions across the country.

Key Convictions (11 Total):

Name	Role/Access	Sentence
Fred Rose	Communist MP; recruiter and GRU coordinator	6 years; lost seat and citizenship
Sam Carr	Communist Party National Organizer; principal recruiter	7 years (convicted 1949)
Gordon Lunan	Canadian Army Captain; espionage cell handler	5 years + 15 months contempt
Alan Nunn May	British physicist; atomic research	10 years hard labour (tried in UK)
Raymond Boyer	McGill chemistry professor; RDX secrets	2 years
Edward Mazerall	NRC engineer; air navigation and radar	4 years
Emma Woikin	External Affairs cipher clerk; diplomatic cables	2.5 years + 6 months contempt
Durnford Smith	NRC engineer; radar systems documentation	5 years
Kathleen Willsher	British High Commission secretary	3 years
Harold Gerson	Military technology and weapons systems	4 years + 3 months contempt
John Soboloff	Physician (non-spy; passport fraud accessory)	$500 fine

 Table 1: The Gouzenko Affair: Major Convictions (1946-1949)

Notable acquittals or charges withdrawn included Israel Halperin (Queen's University mathematics professor), Henry Harris, and David Shugar (RCN sonar specialist). Many of these acquitted individuals lost jobs and careers despite lack of conviction due to the stigma of accusation during the paranoid early Cold War period.

The Gouzenko Affair marks a pivotal moment in Canadian history, beginning with Igor Gouzenko's defection from the Soviet Union in 1945, which revealed a Soviet spy ring in Canada and is often considered the start of the Cold War.

Igor Gouzenko, Soviet intelligence officer (born 26 January 1919 in Rogachev, Russia; died 25 June 1982 in Mississauga, ON). Igor Gouzenko was a Soviet cipher clerk stationed at the Soviet Union’s Ottawa embassy during the Second World War. Just weeks after the end of the war, Gouzenko defected to the Canadian government with proof that his country had been spying on its wartime allies: Canada, Britain and the United States. This prompted what is known as the Gouzenko Affair. Gouzenko sought asylum for himself and his family in Canada. His defection caused a potentially dangerous international crisis. Many historians consider it the beginning of the Cold War.

Background: Canada-Soviet Alliance

Canada and the Soviet Union became allies after Nazi Germany invaded the USSR in June 1941. The governments in Ottawa and Moscow agreed in June 1942 to open diplomatic relations. The Soviets soon established their first embassy in Ottawa. From that base, they built a network of espionage and intelligence-gathering agencies. They used and expanded upon assets they already had in the small Communist Party of Canada.

Before the war, there was little about Canada that was of interest to the Soviets. But during the war, Canada played an important role in the Allied war effort. Canadians in sensitive positions were privy to diplomatic, scientific and military secrets. This included highly classified information concerning research on radar, code-breaking and the atomic bomb.

Ottawa had also become a strategic site for the GRU, the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet General Staff. One of the agents Moscow sent to Ottawa in the summer of 1943 was Lieutenant-Colonel Nikolai Zabotin. He had orders to keep his espionage activities secret from Soviet ambassador Georgi Zarubin.

Early Life and Intelligence Career

Igor Sergeievitch Gouzenko was born in Rogachev, Russia, on 26 January 1919. His father died fighting for the Red Army during the Russian Civil War. Gouzenko met his wife, Svetlana Gouseva, while studying architecture at the University of Moscow. He was still a student when the Germans invaded the USSR. He was conscripted into the Red Army.

Soviet Embassy in Ottawa

Gouzenko was trained as an intelligence officer. He was assigned to GRU headquarters in Moscow, where he worked as a cipher clerk (someone who codes and decodes messages). He had been there for about a year when he was ordered to accompany Zabotin to Ottawa. There, he would handle transmissions to and from Moscow. Svetlana, who was pregnant with their first child, joined him in Canada in October.

The Gouzenkos were stunned to discover that life in Canada was much better than in the Soviet Union. Canadians, even in wartime, enjoyed material comforts that were

scarce in the USSR. Gouzenko and his family had their own small apartment at 511 Somerset Street. He later said of it, “In Moscow a place that size would have been shared by four or five families.”

The civil liberties Canadians took for granted — such as freedom of speech, freedom of the press and the right to free and open democratic elections — contrasted sharply not only with the repressive nature of life under Soviet rule, but also with the secretive, oppressive atmosphere of the embassy. Gouzenko later explained that he became disenchanted with his own government as he learned that the GRU and another secret intelligence organization, the NKVD (People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs) were using the embassy as a headquarters from which to spy on their allies. He had also heard people in the embassy talk about the inevitability of war between the Soviet Union and the Western powers.

Gouzenko kept his misgivings to himself. Then in early September 1944, Zabotin suddenly informed Gouzenko that he was being recalled to Moscow, along with his wife and baby son. Gouzenko was alarmed. He still had almost two years to go on his tour of duty. The unexpected recall could only mean that he was in trouble because of some mistake. If he returned home, he feared he could face internment in a labour camp, or even execution. Zabotin was able to have his departure delayed, but Gouzenko knew that sooner or later he would have to return to the Soviet Union and an uncertain fate.

511 Somerset Street

The apartment in Ottawa where Soviet spy Igor Gouzenko lived.

(courtesy Wikimedia Commons)

Defection

According to Gouzenko, he and Svetlana, who was pregnant with their second child, decided to defect from the USSR. He said he felt loyalty to Russia, but not to the Communist regime, which he believed had betrayed the Russian people and its Canadian allies. Gouzenko planned the defection carefully. Over time, he copied or stole documents he believed would be of great interest to Canadian authorities. Often, he hid the documents in his clothing as he left the embassy.

On 5 September 1945, he walked out of the Soviet embassy for the last time. That evening and the following day, Gouzenko tried offices of the Minister of Justice, the Ottawa Journal and the Ottawa Magistrate’s Court. But he either could not make himself understood or his story was not taken seriously. The USSR, after all, was still perceived to be Canada’s ally.

Svetlana accompanied Gouzenko as he moved about the city on 6 September. She had their toddler under one arm and in her other hand a bag full of embassy documents. That night, they hid in a neighbour’s apartment, while the NKVD raided their unit across the hall.

The Gouzenkos’ quest for asylum hadn’t gone unnoticed. Word of it was passed from the justice department to Norman Robertson, the undersecretary of state for the Department of External Affairs. He informed Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King that Gouzenko claimed to have documentation proving Soviet espionage activity in Canada and the United States.

King initially was suspicious of the would-be defector’s motives. He did not want the Canadian government to take any action that the Soviets might deem unfriendly. However, three other officials had also been informed of the situation: William Stephenson, the Canadian head of British Security Co- ordination (BSC); Peter Dwyer, the MI6 representative in Washington; and MI6 director Sir Stewart Menzies. One of those men — likely Dwyer, according to Soviet and Cold War historian Amy Knight — advised King to get Gouzenko and his documents at once.

Early on 7 September, RCMP officers took Gouzenko and his family into protective custody.

Gouzenko Affair

While Gouzenko was interrogated at RCMP headquarters, his documents were being translated. They revealed the existence of a large-scale Soviet espionage system that Robertson told King was, “much worse than we would have believed.” The Soviet embassy was a home to several spies connected to agents in Montreal, the United States and the United Kingdom. They had been providing Moscow with classified information ranging from cyphers to atomic research.

Gouzenko’s defection and the contents of his documents caused enormous concern for the security of Canada and its American and British allies. Leaders at the Soviet embassy were also anxious. Zarubin demanded that the Canadians hand Gouzenko over to him, on the grounds that he was a thief who had stolen money. Canadian authorities claimed not to know where he was and released an RCMP bulletin to RCMP offices across the country.

For their protection, the Gouzenko family was moved to Camp X, a top-secret spy training school near Whitby, Ontario. Representatives of the RCMP, FBI, BSC, MI5 and MI6 continued questioning Gouzenko.

On 29 September 1945, King went to Washington, DC, to confer with President Harry Truman. In October, he went to London for meetings with Prime Minister Clement Attlee and officers of the British secret service agencies MI5 and MI6. The American, British and Canadian leaders faced a delicate situation. They couldn’t tolerate Soviet espionage, but they also did not want to endanger diplomatic relations with Moscow in the uncertain atmosphere of post-war Europe.

News of the discovery of the Soviet spy operation was withheld from the public until 3 February 1946. American journalist Drew Pearson broke the story. The next day, King informed his Cabinet of the Gouzenko Affair for the first time. He also appointed two justices of the Supreme Court of Canada to head a Royal Commission on the matter.

Using the War Measures Act as legal justification, the RCMP arrested 39 suspects; 18 were convicted. Among them were MP Fred Rose and Sam Carr of the Labor-Progressive Party / Communist Party of Canada, and Canadian Army captain Gordon Lunan. In the United Kingdom, nuclear physicists Alan Nunn May and Klaus Fuchs were convicted and sent to prison.

The Gouzenko Affair sparked investigations in the United States that eventually led to the controversial 1953 executions of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg for treason.

The Soviet government admitted that “certain members” of its Ottawa embassy staff had obtained “certain information of a secret character” from Canadian nationals, but implied that the information was worthless. The Canadian government expelled embassy staff members who were implicated in the affair. Zabotin was recalled to the USSR and sent to a labour camp in Siberia. He was released in 1953.

The Iron Curtain (1947)

In 1948, Twentieth Century-Fox released The Iron Curtain. The film is based on articles Gouzenko published in Cosmopolitan magazine in 1947 about his defection. The movie was shot on location in Ottawa and filmed at many of the locations mentioned in Gouzenko’s telling of events. Timed with the release of the film, Gouzenko published a collection of his magazine articles under the title The Iron Curtain: Inside Stalin’s Spy Ring in the US. The book was published in Canada under the title This Was My Choice.

Later Life

Igor and Svetlana Gouzenko were given Canadian citizenship. They raised eight children. Even though their home in Port Credit, Ontario, was under constant RCMP guard, Gouzenko lived in fear of assassination by Soviet agents.

Gouzenko wrote This Was My Choice (a.k.a. The Iron Curtain), a book about his defection published in 1948. He also wrote The Fall of a Titan, a novel about life in Stalinist Russia. It won the Governor General’s Literary Award for fiction in 1954.

Gouzenko made public appearances from time to time, always wearing a hood over his face to protect his identity. The hood became almost a trademark feature.

Gouzenko died of a heart attack in Mississauga, Ontario, on 25 June 1982.

Gouzenko's Tombstone

Igor Gouzenko's tombstone in Spring Creek Cemetery in Mississauga, Ontario. Picture taken on 13 August 2013.

Significance and Legacy

Gouzenko’s exposure of the Soviet spy network in the West is considered by several historians and critics to mark the beginning of the Cold War era. It is seen to have set the stage for the “Red Scare” of the 1950s.

Two plaques, erected in 2003 and 2004, commemorate Gouzenko’s defection. Both are in Dundonald Park, across the street from Gouzenko’s Ottawa apartment. One of them was approved by the federal Historic Sites and Monuments Board.

Yevgeni Brik: KGB Deep-Cover Operative and RCMP Betrayal (1951--1992)

This story is best told by Donald Mahar in his best selling book "SHATTERED ILLUSIONS:

KGB Cold War Espionage in Canada

In June 1951, a man presenting himself as a Canadian photographer named "David Soboloff" arrived in Halifax with a forged Canadian passport. In reality, Yevgeni Brik was a Soviet KGB "illegal"—one of the elite deep-cover operatives selected by Moscow for the most prestigious and dangerous assignments. Born in Novorossiysk on the Black Sea, Brik had grown up fluent in English and Russian in Brooklyn, New York, raised by Soviet Communist Party officials. The KGB identified him as ideal material for deep-cover work in North America.

Brik spent two years traveling throughout Canada, establishing his photographer cover legend. Then, in a dramatic reversal, he fell in love with a Canadian woman who convinced him to defect to the RCMP in June 1953. The RCMP recruited him as a double agent with the codename "Gideon." He provided extensive intelligence on Soviet handler meetings, dead drop locations, radio transmission codes, operational tradecraft, and recruitment methods.

The Betrayal and Imprisonment: In 1954, Brik was recalled to Moscow under the pretext of routine retraining and family visits. Upon arrival, KGB officers arrested him immediately. What Brik didn't know was that James Morrison, an RCMP officer assigned to guard him, had betrayed him to Soviet intelligence in exchange for a promised bribe. Morrison's treason—perhaps driven by personal debt—had undone Brik's defection.

Brik was imprisoned in Soviet gulags for approximately 15 years. The RCMP assumed he had been executed, following standard Soviet practice with failed agents. No one expected to hear from him again.

The Extraordinary Return: In December 1992—nearly four decades after his betrayal—Brik miraculously reached out to the Canadian government through the British embassy in Lithuania. He was alive. The Canadian government, recognizing the profound injustice, arranged his repatriation. For the remaining years of his life until 2011, Brik received a government pension.

This case exposed a critical vulnerability: the RCMP Security Service itself could be infiltrated and compromised by its own personnel. Morrison was later charged with treason in the 1980s, decades after his crime. The Brik case demonstrated both Soviet sophistication and institutional weakness in Canada's premier law enforcement agency.

Konon Molody: Soviet Illegals and Stolen Canadian Identity (1953--1961)

See video on this case

Konon Trofimovich Molody, a Soviet deep-cover operative, was assigned by the KGB to assume the identity of a deceased Canadian citizen named Gordon Lonsdale. The real Gordon Lonsdale was born in Canada to a Canadian mother and Russian father; his father emigrated to the Soviet Union, taking the family with him. The child died in adolescence.

The KGB opportunistically obtained his vital records and created a legend for Molody using this deceased identity. In 1953, Molody arrived in Canada as "Gordon Lonsdale" to establish his cover, moving through Vancouver and Toronto between 1953 and 1961 to gain familiarity with Canadian geography and culture.

Operational Expansion: Between 1956 and 1961, Molody relocated to the United States and then Britain, where he became a KGB contact handler for the Portland Spy Ring, involving British naval intelligence officer Harry Houghton and others. He was arrested in London on January 7, 1960.

RCMP Exposure of False Identity: The RCMP played a critical counterintelligence role in exposing Molody's false identity. When Polish defectors provided information to Western intelligence in January 1961, the RCMP investigated the real Gordon Lonsdale's background. Through meticulous research, they discovered that Lonsdale's father had documented his son's circumcision in Ontario records.

However, when Molody was arrested in London and subjected to medical examination, he was found to be uncircumcised—providing irrefutable proof of his false identity. MI-5 confirmed this finding on January 30, 1961. This case demonstrated sophisticated Soviet tradecraft in stealing Canadian identities for deep-cover operations and exemplified the RCMP's sophisticated counterintelligence capabilities.

Molody was eventually exchanged for British spy Greville Wynne in 1964.

Morris and Lona Cohen: American Illegals and Canadian Atomic Research (1940s--1969)

Morris Cohen (1910--1995) and Lona Cohen (1913--1992) were American communist illegals who operated a courier network across North America including Canada. Lona, born Leontine Theresa Petka in Adams, Massachusetts, had joined the Communist Party in the late 1920s. Morris, born in Harlem to Eastern European Jewish immigrant parents, was a communist organizer.

Both operated as Soviet illegals through ideological commitment to communism rather than through recruitment. Lona served as a key Soviet courier and asset, traveling to Canada to collect sensitive documents and materials from Chalk River, the Canadian atomic research center. She was involved in smuggling atomic bomb diagrams from Los Alamos and uranium samples from Canadian research facilities.

Morris conducted espionage operations throughout North America under the Soviet alias "Peter Kroger," operating alongside his wife in clandestine intelligence activities.

Both were arrested in Britain in 1961 and convicted of espionage in 1962. Rather than face lengthy imprisonment, they were exchanged by the British government in 1969. They relocated to Moscow, where they lived the remainder of their lives teaching spy tradecraft and training new Soviet intelligence operatives until their deaths.

John Watkins: Ambassador Blackmail and Cold War Paranoia (1954--1964)

John Watkins served as Canada's ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1954 to 1956. During his posting in Moscow in 1956, he was targeted by a Soviet KGB "honeytrap" operation. KGB officers, posing as academics, orchestrated an operation in which Watkins was photographed with a male lover in a Moscow hotel room in a carefully staged "honeytrap." The KGB then attempted to blackmail Watkins, demanding he support Soviet interests through backchannel communications.

Upon returning to Canada, Watkins reported the blackmail attempt to External Affairs Minister Lester B. Pearson, claiming he had resisted Soviet demands and maintained Canada's interests throughout.

RCMP Interrogation and Death: The RCMP Security Service, upon learning of the incident in the early 1960s, subjected Watkins to intensive and aggressive interrogation in a Dorval motel room, pressing him to confess to betraying Canada under Soviet duress. 

On October 12, 1964, Watkins died of a heart attack following an RCMP interrogation session without having confessed to any wrongdoing. Subsequent declassified documents and analysis found no credible evidence that Watkins had compromised classified information or betrayed Canada. 

​Gerda Munsinger (1956-1966): East German seduced Defence Minister; scandal, unproven Soviet ties.

Gerda Munsinger, an East German immigrant with a criminal record for prostitution and theft, arrived in Canada in 1956 despite prior espionage suspicions. She became romantically involved with Pierre Sévigny, the Associate Minister of National Defence under Prime Minister John Diefenbaker, around 1960, raising alarms due to unproven claims of her ties to Soviet intelligence. The affair stayed hidden until 1966, when Justice Minister Lucien Cardin exposed it amid a security scandal, initially claiming Munsinger had died of leukemia before she resurfaced in Munich for media interviews.The Munsinger affair erupted into Canada's first major political sex scandal, dominating headlines, halting parliamentary business, and prompting a judicial inquiry by Lester Pearson's government. Dubbed the "Mata Hari of the Cold War," Munsinger admitted to liaisons with cabinet ministers but denied spying, while Sévigny acknowledged the relationship without confessing security breaches. No charges resulted from the unproven Soviet links, but the saga damaged reputations and fueled public fascination for months.

Bower Edward Featherstone: First Post-Gouzenko Official Secrets Conviction (1966)

Bower Edward Featherstonewas a Canadian civil servant who was convicted of espionage in 1966. Featherstone was a lithographer who worked for the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources, making him the first individual to be convicted under the Official Secrets Act since the trials that followed Igor Gouzenko's defection in the late 1940s.

A promising young officer in the RCMP Security Service, Gilles G. Brunet, played a significant role in his conviction, work for which he won a promotion. His handler was Eugen Kourianov. Soon after Featherstone came under surveillance by the RCMP, the GRU cut contact with him and Kourianov was recalled unexpectedly to Moscow, suggesting that the investigation, codenamed Gold Dust, had been compromised by a leak from inside the RCMP, suggesting a mole had tipped of the Soviets. Decades later western intelligence learned that Brunet, the young officer who won promotion for his work in convicting Featherstone, had also been a mole.

The main document he was convicted of handing over to the Soviets was a confidential chart of two shipwrecks southeast of Newfoundland. Although he was convicted of violating Canada's Official Secrets Act none of the documents he passed on was actually secret. Featherstone was the first individual to be convicted under the Official Secrets Act since the trials that followed the defection of Igor Gouzenko in the late 1940s.

Featherstone received a 30-month sentence and served 10 months—2 months in the maximum security Collin's Bay Penitentiary, and 8 months at a minimum security forestry camp—before he was paroled.

Featherstone was born January 24, 1939 and died on August 22, 2017 Ottawa, Cananda.

SOURCE:

For further information, see “For Services Rendered” by John Sawatsky 1982 pgs.194-203

George Victor Spencer: Operation Moby Dick and Civil Rights (1965--1966)

OTTAWA, March 5, 1966

When Ottawa expelled two Soviet Embassy aides last May, External gave an unusually detailed account of the hanky-panky they had been up to. The Russians had tried to enlist two Canadians and one, a new Canadian electronics engineer, had gone straight to the Mounties, then played along while Ottawa collected the goods on the moonlighting diplomats. The second Canadian, identified by Prime Minister Pearson as a “very junior” civil servant, had been paid “thousands of dollars to gather information and documentation in Canada, to assist in the establishment of espionage activities.”

Presumably for the training value, the Russians assigned their man to collect data, easily available to anyone, on the route of the transmountain pipeline system. More usefully, Ottawa noted, he also searched out the names of immigrants from Eastern Europe that could be used without their knowledge on forged passports for Red agents abroad. But the junior civil servant was gravely ill with cancer, and Ottawa obviously expected that a higher authority would soon relieve it of any decision whether to prosecute under the Official Secrets Act.

The Canadian Government has bowed to Opposition demands for an inquiry into the dismissal of a Vancouver post office clerk accused of spying for the Soviet Union. Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson approved the inquiry yesterday after a telephone conversation with George Victor Spencer, the accused man, who has asked to be heard. Mr. Pearson told the House of Commons about his conversation and his decision to reopen the case. His announcement came at the end of a turbulent week in which the Government's handling of the case was attacked as a denial of civil rights. Opposition forces united in the House to block funds for the Justice Department and to threaten Mr. Pearson with a vote of nonconfidence. Mr. Spencer, 57 years old, was one of two Canadians linked by the Government with a spy case that resulted in the expulsion a year ago of two attachés of the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa.

In Operation Moby Dick, the RCMP Security Service determined that Spencer had provided names of dead people, bankrupt companies, and closed schools, which would have been useful in creating background cover stories for Russian agents based in the lower mainland area, as well as information about post office security. There was also evidence that the Russians were grooming Spencer to act as a “live letter box” for passing on messages. In return, Spencer was paid several thousand dollars to meet with his Soviet handlers in Ottawa. He had also hoped to get a free ticket to visit Russia.

Spencer made a number of trips to Ottawa to clandestinely meet his KGB contacts.  During these encounters, the Russians went to extreme measures to ensure they were not under RCMP surveillance. Often, despite leaving the embassy at three in the morning, they would take four or five hours driving in the as far as Brockville and in the countryside in an effort to detect surveillance.  After these elaborate maneuvers, they felt confident that that they could meet Spencer securely.  But, in fact, the watcher service had been following them from the beginning but were never detected.  This clearly demonstrated the Watcher Service’s competency and also the value the Russians placed on Spencer.

The Government never made public the details on security grounds. However, it became known that the two Canadians had been charged with receiving "thousands of dollars" for assistance to the Russians. Mr. Spencer's identity was then confirmed by Lucien Cardin, Minister of Justice, who was urged by members of the Opposition and by some newspapers to investigate the case openly. Mr. Cardin contended this could not be done because it would disclose secret information. The Government discharged Mr. Spencer from his post office job and canceled his pension rights.  Mr. Cardin was promptly attacked for denying Mr. Spencer the right to be tried on formal charges and of having his name cleared. Mr. Pearson said the hearing requested by Mr. Spencer covered only his dismissal and his pension rights.

Justice Wells completed his report in late July 1966. He completely vindicated the Pearson government's actions in the Spencer case. He contended that George Spencer had been treated with “forbearance and fairness” by the Pearson government. Justice Wells also supported the government's decision not to prosecute; Spencer was fatally ill with lung cancer, and died days before the Wells Commission started its hearings.

SOURCES:

“Men In the Shadows” by John Sawatsky Doubleday Books 1982

https://www.nytimes.com/1966/07/27/archives/ottawa-is-upheld-in-espionage-case-panel-approves-the-ouster-of.html

Gilles Brunet: The Mole Within the RCMP Security Service (1966--1984)

Gilles Brunet joined the security service in the early 1960s. At the Russian desk, he won promotion in 1966 for investigative work that led to the conviction of Bower Featherstone. The following year, Brunet was enrolled in a Russian-language course and scored top marks. In 1972, an internal assessment report was glowing:

"Sgt. Brunet is well above average and clearly shows that he is capable of assuming heavier responsibilities. He is a very aggressive and resourceful investigator and has developed to a remarkable degree the ability to recognize the significant thereby getting to the crux of a problem and permitting him to cope easily with unexpected developments. In addition to being fully bilingual, he is fluent in Russian, which is a valuable asset in his current position. This is a solid member who is making a most valuable contribution."

However, Brunet's rise in the force was interrupted. A year after this glowing report, he was thrown out of the RCMP in December 1973. This had nothing to do with Soviet espionage at the time. Along with his old security service sidekick, Donald McCleery—a tough guy from Montreal never properly socialized into the hierarchical ethic of the Mounted Police—Brunet was believed to have been close to shady Montreal underworld connections. Refusing to back off, both were cashiered.

Early Detection Failure: Gilles Brunet could have been snared as a traitor as early as 1968, just months after he volunteered cooperation with the KGB as a mercenary in January of that year. In May 1968, Brunet was almost exposed by his own wife, with whom he was on shaky grounds because of his drunkenness and philandering. After he returned drunk late one night, his suspicious wife, seeking evidence of an affair, searched his vehicle and found over $2,000 in twenty-dollar bills neatly folded into an envelope—an amount equivalent at that time to about one-third of Brunet's annual net salary as a Mountie corporal.

Unconvinced by Brunet's prevarications about the origins of this extraordinary sum, she contacted the security service and was interviewed about her husband's highly suspicious behavior. It appears, however, that Brunet had already preemptively warned the service that his jealous and vindictive spouse might try to discredit him. An internal security report was opened on Brunet, and it was kept under the control of only three persons. But by September the report was "lost." Brunet's charmed double life as an untouchable traitor continued unimpeded for another five years.

Betrayal of Jim Bennett: Brunet's activities settled instead on the innocent Jim Bennett, who was wrongly accused of being a KGB mole. Bennett suffered years of suspicion and investigation because of Brunet's misdirection.

Character Assessment: Brunet was described as intelligent, aggressive, and ambitious but also "avaricious, vindictive and devoid of morals." When it suited his purposes, he was extremely outgoing and gregarious. He played hard and was a heavy drinker. An investigation memo noted that "not only was Brunet compromised, but that he was so committed that he gave his Soviet handlers everything he got his hands on." Several sources said he not only had a grudge against the RCMP but also "lacked character and his loyalty was questionable."

KGB Recruitment Factors: In August 1986, CSIS assessed Brunet's motivation. The agency concluded it was a combination of financial gain, ego, career frustrations, and his opinion "that the Security Service was too small a pawn in a large game." Brunet was constantly reminded that his father reached high levels within the RCMP and felt his own progress was stalled due to lack of recognition of his expertise.

Operational Pattern: By December 1983, security investigators believed they had identified their man. They documented that no Soviet case of which Brunet was aware ever came to a successful conclusion, even though there were operational successes in other areas of the country during his period of activity. In each case investigators documented, "operations died immediately upon Brunet learning of them."

By February 1984, investigators had found Brunet's current address in Montreal near Mount Royal, obtaining aerial photographs and noting his home was within sight of the Soviet consulate. The RCMP tailed Brunet for several days in early April 1984, clandestinely observing his visits to the dry cleaners, a grocery store, and on the day before his death, a pizzeria.

Death Before Prosecution: On April 9, 1984, at age 49, the hard-drinking, high-living Brunet died of an apparent heart attack—just as investigators were closing in.

Final Revelation: Brunet was finally unmasked by another spy. In 1985, veteran KGB officer Vitaliy Yurchenko defected at the Americans' Rome embassy. Although he later re-defected, Yurchenko was extensively debriefed by the CIA. Since he had been deputy chief supervising all North American KGB residencies, Yurchenko knew KGB operations in Canada inside out.

Among the gold nuggets Yurchenko offered was the fact that there had been a KGB mole operating within the RCMP security service during the Bennett years. Yurchenko did not remember the mole's name but stated that the mole had recently passed away. When investigators checked, it was not Jim Bennett. It was Gilles Brunet.

In 1993, the Canadian government sent a representative to Perth, Australia, to offer Jim Bennett an unconditional apology and a lump sum of financial compensation.

Posthumous Confirmation: In 2021, CSIS released hundreds of pages of declassified documents confirming the Brunet probe and identifying him as a KGB mole. The molehunters determined in the mid-1980s that Gilles Brunet was an agent of the Soviet KGB from the late 1960s well into the 1970s. His betrayal had long been the subject of whispers, chronicled in news articles and books since at least the early 1990s. But until 2021, Canadian intelligence officials had not publicly confirmed his exploits.

Grave Marker: His grave marker at a Montreal cemetery depicts a beach scene in Acapulco, Mexico—a favourite destination—and a martini glass.

Part III: Post-Cold War and Modern Espionage (1984--2024)

Hugh Hambleton: NATO Secrets for Three Decades (1952--1982)

Hambleton “spent 30 years spying for the KGB”

The Guardian, 30 November 1982

A British professor who worked for NATO was accused yesterday of spying for the Russians for 30 years, and of passing thousands of pages of top secret material in a career which once saw him smuggled into Moscow to meet Yuri Andropov, then head of the KGB and now the Soviet leader.

Hugh George Hambleton, aged 60, who has been professor of economics at Laval University in Quebec, Canada since 1964, appeared at the Old Bailey on two charges under Section One of the Official Secrets Act. He denied both.

The Attorney General, Sir Michael Havers, who is conducting the prosecution, said that Professor Hambleton had been recruited in the late 1940s: “For 30 years he has been in almost continual contact with Russian agents all round the world, but particularly in Paris and Quebec.”

Sir Michael said that Professor Hambleton was a British subject with dual British and Canadian nationality. Although he was born in Canada, his father and grandfather were born in Britain, and he was of British nationality and held a British passport.

As a member of NATO’s economic directorate in Paris from 1956 to 1961, he had had access to the most sensitive material – classified as ‘Cosmic’ – and had regularly taken documents home and photographed them for the KGB, Sir Michael said.

He alleged that in Quebec, Professor Hambleton had maintained regular contact with KGB officers, as well as using secret codes and ‘invisible writing’ paper to contact Moscow direct. He had provided reports from Europe, Canada and the Middle East. Sir Michael described how he had come to make one report personally to Yuri Andropov in 1975.

One of his KGB contacts, known to him only as Paul, had summoned him to Vienna to a restaurant by the Danube where he had met KGB officers in the past. There he was told that he was to go to Moscow the next day, Sir Michael said.

Following Paul’s instructions, he had waited in the street the next morning until a car drew up beside him. He was driven to the Austrian border with Czechoslovakia, where his companions in the car used a false diplomatic passport to get him past the guards.

In Bratislava, on the other side of the border, he was put out of the car and told to walk alone up the street. A man who spoke Russian met him, took him to a car and drove him to Prague, where he was given new papers and a room for the night.

Sir Michael said that Professor Hambleton was taken next morning to a military airfield outside Prague from where he was flown, along with senior Soviet officers and their families, to East Germany. No one spoke to him. The plane took off again and flew to Poland before flying on to Moscow, where he was met by a man he described as ‘the American Russian’.

He was taken by chauffeur-driven car to a flat, where he watched television and learned the latest techniques for using code pads, short wave radios and chemicals for invisible writing.

Sir Michael said that Professor Hambleton later told the British Special Branch that Mr Andropov came for an evening meal at the apartment. “There were seven or eight people there. They were interested to see me. Andropov asked me general questions, like: ‘Did I think the US defence budget was too high?’”

Professor Hambleton told the police he was quite sure it was Mr Andropov. The other guests had hardly spoken – “They were all afraid of him.” They had discussed the Common Market. He had told Mr Andropov it would not last because nationalist feeling was too strong.

Mr Andropov had suggested he should run for the Canadian Parliament. “He said he would finance my campaign. I got the feeling that he wanted me to exert influence on behalf of Russia, rather than spy.”

Mr Andropov had criticised him for not working well since leaving NATO. “He didn’t give me a medal. He thanked me and said he hoped I would fare well in world trouble spots. He wanted political and economic assessments of trouble spots.

“They like to sound you out on certain views. I wasn’t a flunky. His English was very good. He had a good grasp of the West.” They had wanted him to stay in Moscow, but he had wanted to return to see a girl in Belgrade.

Sir Michael said that Professor Hambleton told the police in his statement: “After Moscow I had a very strange sense of not wanting to get involved, but a certain excitement, a feeling of camaraderie with the people looking after me. You get the feeling you are playing an important role.”

Sir Michael told the jury of ten men and two women that Professor Hambleton had been recruited in 1947 in Canada, where he grew up, by a cultural attache to the Soviet embassy there called Borodin, who was a friend of Hambleton’s parents.

Borodin had entertained him lavishly without explicitly recruiting him, Hambleton told police. “I thought he was trying to train me. He was always talking about dead letter boxes and things.” He had enjoyed the “sense of belonging,” He later told police: “If I identified with any class it was with the officer class of the KGB.”

In 1954, he had moved to London to study at the London School of Economics. From there he had frequently visited Paris where he met with five different KGB contacts, including ‘Paul’ who was eventually to take him to Mr Andropov, Sir Michael said.

They used to meet in Metro stations in working class areas of the City. They had encouraged him to leave the LSE and take a job with NATO in Paris. To his surprise, his application succeeded. He told police he regretted his success, since he was frightened by the KGB and wanted them to leave him alone.

“In Paris,” he later told police, “I was moving into meetings which were becoming more frightening. You are becoming compromised, you see. They never have to put pressure on you. You are getting in so slowly you never notice it.”

Sir Michael said that Professor Hambleton told Special Branch that he had passed on up to 300 documents, amounting to thousands of pages. He said he had never passed on anything that was classified as Cosmic, but Sir Michael suggested that this was not true, and added that records showed that Hambleton had signed out 80 Cosmic files during his four years with NATO.

Hambleton had been worried when a KGB defector told Western intelligence of a spy in NATO’s economic directorate. He told police he thought he was the one the defector was referring to. “But there must have been others there,” he added.

He had also been worried when he realised that some documents he had thought of passing over could have jeopardised the safety of NATO sources in Lithuania. He had decided to leave and told the Russians he had been sacked so that they would not argue with him, Sir Michael said.

In Quebec he had been contacted by a KGB officer called Herman, with whom he had established a rapport. Paul had also visited him to give him instructions of writing secret letters to East Berlin. Hambleton had been worried because the address was in Karl Marx Strasse, which might have attracted attention.

Herman had eventually been ‘turned’ by the FBI and recorded a video confession in which he described Professor Hambleton as “a tried and tested spy.”

In June 1982 Hambleton was arrested in the United Kingdom, during a transit there. He was tried in the United Kingdom, under the [UK] Official Secrets Act. He pleaded guilty and, on December 7, 1982 he was sentenced by Mr Justice Croom-Johnson to ten years in prison. He spent jail time in Gartree Prison, in Market Harborough, Leicestershire. He was transferred to a prison in Canada in June 1986. He was released under surveillance in March 1989. He died in 1995.

CBC News Report

Ian & Laurie Lambert (Dmitriy & Yelena Olshanskaya) (1993-1996): SVR tombstoned kids

In the early 1990s, Dmitriy Olshansky and Yelena Borisovna Olshanskaya entered Canada under false identities borrowed from deceased children: Ian Mackenzie Lambert, who died at three months in 1966, and Laurie Catherine Mary Lambert, who passed away at age two in 1965. Settling in Toronto as a seemingly ordinary married couple, Yelena took a job at an insurance firm while Dmitriy worked at a photo processing plant, allowing them to blend into suburban life. These "illegals" were suspected SVR deep-cover agents from Russia's foreign intelligence service, using "tombstoned" IDs, stolen from gravestones, to evade detection over several years.​

CSIS surveillance eventually uncovered their operation, culminating in a CBC exposé on May 27, 1996, that publicly identified them. The couple divorced soon after their arrest, chose not to fight deportation, and left Canada in June 1996 without facing criminal charges, as their activities were viewed as a national security threat rather than prosecutable offenses under the circumstances. This approach avoided prolonged legal battles while ensuring their removal.​

The couple divorced soon after they were arrested, and were deported from Canada in June 1996. Dmitriy Olshansky then married his girlfriend; Yelena married her boyfriend, a UK-born Canadian doctor named Peter Miller, in a ceremony attended by her ex-husband.

In 1998, Peter Miller sponsored Elena's application for permanent residence in Canada.  Miller claimed that she posed no threat to Canada because she had quit Russian intelligence in October 1996. She also refused to discuss her spying activity in Canada because of a non-disclosure agreement. The suit failed in federal courts due to her security status.

CSIS conducted the investigation with competence, employing steady surveillance to expose the spies without fanfare. Their decision to pursue deportation over prosecution reflected a pragmatic balance, addressing the immediate risk effectively while limiting broader diplomatic tensions.​

The case highlighted CSIS's role in routine counterintelligence during the post-Cold War period, protecting Canadian interests from foreign espionage through targeted action.

Stephen Ratkai (1988-1989): Sought SOSUS via sting; sentenced to 9 years.

Stephen Ratkai, a 25-year-old Nova Scotian with Hungarian ties, was recruited by Soviet intelligence in 1988 to target sensitive NATO submarine detection data from Canada's SOSUS (Sound Surveillance System) array at Naval Station Argentia, Newfoundland. Posing as a bartender and using the alias "Joseph Reid," he approached a supposed Bulgarian contact—who was actually a Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) undercover officer in a sting operation named "Operation Zebra." Ratkai offered up to $40,000 for blueprints and operational details of the underwater acoustic surveillance system, which tracked Soviet submarines during the Cold War's final years, but he obtained no actual secrets before his arrest in June 1988.

Ratkai pleaded guilty to three counts of espionage under Canada's Official Secrets Act in February 1989, receiving a nine-year sentence that he served until parole in 1994, marking one of the last major Soviet spy cases in Canada amid thawing East-West relations. The affair exposed vulnerabilities in NATO's classified naval intelligence sharing and highlighted RCMP counterintelligence prowess, though no Soviet handlers were apprehended. Ratkai later claimed manipulation and expressed remorse, fading from public view post-release.

Cuban Spy Operations (1977-1990s)

Canada expelled five Cuban diplomats, including three from consular staff, for operating a "spy school".

Canada expelled five Cuban diplomats in 1996, including three from consular staff, after discovering they were operating a covert "spy school" from a Toronto residence disguised as a cultural center. The Cuban officials, identified as intelligence operatives, were training local recruits in espionage techniques such as dead drops, surveillance detection, and covert communications to gather intelligence on Canadian military, government, and business targets. Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) surveillance uncovered the operation, which involved encrypted radio transmissions and recruitment of Canadian citizens sympathetic to Cuba, prompting swift diplomatic action without public charges to avoid escalation.

The expulsions strained Canada-Cuba relations temporarily but highlighted ongoing Cuban intelligence activities in North America during the post-Cold War era. No arrests of Canadian recruits followed, as the focus remained on diplomat removal under the Vienna Convention, and Cuba denied the allegations, calling it a fabrication. This incident echoed earlier Cuban spy rings in Canada and underscored vulnerabilities in consular operations for espionage.

Orlando Brito Pestana, was stationed in Canada during the early 1990s before his expulsion and later defection, using the country as a base for U.S.-targeted operations.

Orlando Brito Pestana served as a Cuban diplomat and intelligence officer (DGI chief of station) in Canada during the early 1990s, posing as vice consul until his expulsion in February 1994 for espionage activities. From Ottawa, he orchestrated operations targeting the United States, leveraging Canada's proximity and laxer security to recruit agents, handle assets, and gather intelligence on U.S. military, policy, and academic targets. Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) surveillance confirmed his role in covert meetings, dead drops, and communications with Havana, prompting quiet diplomatic removal without public charges to preserve relations.

After expulsion, Pestana relocated to Panama as commercial attaché at the Cuban embassy, continuing SVR-style tradecraft until defecting dramatically on March 27, 2002, with his wife and daughters, citing disillusionment amid a financial scandal involving Sunset Group International. U.S. authorities swiftly extracted him for debriefings, where he exposed Cuban networks in Canada and the U.S., including alleged handlers for academics like Marifeli Pérez-Stable. His revelations bolstered counterintelligence efforts but drew Cuban denials and threats, marking a rare high-level defection from Havana's post-Cold War apparatus.

Paul William Hampel (2006): SVR illegal at airport with fake docs; deported.

Paul William Hampel was the alias of a suspected SVR (Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service) "illegal" agent arrested on November 14, 2006, at Montreal's Pierre Elliott Trudeau International Airport while attempting to board a flight out of Canada. Canadian authorities, including the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), detained him under a rare security certificate signed by Public Safety Minister Stockwell Day and Immigration Minister Monte Solberg, citing him as a danger to national security due to espionage activities. Upon arrest, he possessed a fraudulent Ontario birth certificate hidden under his clothing, a fake Canadian passport obtained with it, Can$7,800 in multiple currencies, a shortwave radio, encrypted cell phones with SIM cards, digital cameras, and index cards detailing Canadian history and civics—items consistent with building a deep-cover legend. No specific espionage targets or secrets were publicly detailed, but his profile matched elite SVR operatives operating without diplomatic cover.

Hampel, believed to be around 40 and posing as a Toronto native with no verifiable birth record, had acquired multiple Canadian passports over seven years despite post-9/11 security enhancements. CSIS filings in Federal Court described him as an SVR member engaged in covert operations, referencing expert analysis on Russian intelligence tradecraft. He was not prosecuted criminally but held briefly before deportation to Russia in late 2006 or early 2007 under supervision, avoiding trial due to national security protocols. The case echoed Cold War-era spy hunts, exposing gaps in Canada's identity verification systems and prompting scrutiny of passport issuance processes.

Operation Ghost Stories (2000-2010): SVR; Heathfield/Bezrukov & Foley/Vavilova stole Canadian IDs, lived in Toronto then US; FBI swap.

Operation Ghost Stories was the FBI's decade-long counterintelligence probe (2000-2010) into an SVR "Illegals Program" ring of deep-cover Russian spies who stole Canadian identities to establish legends before infiltrating the US. Key operatives Andrei Bezrukov (posing as Robert Christopher Metsos) and Elena Vavilova (as Tracey Lee Ann Foley) lived in Toronto during the early 1990s, using forged Canadian passports and birth certificates to build authentic backstories, including fake university attendance and jobs. They relocated to the US around 1999-2000, blending into suburban life in places like Montclair, New Jersey, raising children, and pursuing careers in finance and real estate while cultivating contacts among academics, policymakers, and scientists for intelligence on US policy, military issues, and terrorism. Communication relied on steganography in images, shortwave radio bursts, brush passes in public spots like train stations, and invisible ink, though no classified secrets were acquired.

The operation unraveled after Canadian intelligence arrested Paul Hampel (an SVR illegal using Canadian docs) in 2006, alerting Moscow and prompting the SVR to halt support for Metsos/Foley, who faced financial strain. FBI surveillance intensified, capturing tradecraft via bugs, tailing, and decrypting messages, culminating in synchronized arrests of 10 spies on June 27, 2010, across New York, New Jersey, and Virginia—timed to avoid diplomatic fallout during summits. They pleaded guilty to failing to register as foreign agents and money laundering, then were swapped in Vienna on July 9 for four Western spies held by Russia, including Sergei Skripal. The case exposed SVR persistence post-Cold War, vulnerabilities in North American identity systems, and FBI prowess, with no espionage convictions but major embarrassment for Russia.

Excellent video covering this complex case

Jeffrey Delisle: The Five Eyes Compromise (2007--2013)

Jeffrey Paul Delisle (born March 30, 1971) was a former sub-lieutenant in the Royal Canadian Navy who passed sensitive information from the top-secret STONEGHOST intelligence sharing network to the Russian spy agency GRU. Delisle's actions have been described as "exceptionally grave" by Canada's Department of National Defence (DND) and "severe and irreparable" by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service.

At court in October 2012, Delisle pleaded guilty to breach of trust and two counts of passing secret information to a foreign entity, contrary to the Security of Information Act. He was sentenced to 20 years in penitentiary, minus time served, by the Chief Judge of the Provincial Court of Nova Scotia on February 8, 2013. On February 13, 2013, the Department of National Defence announced that Delisle had been stripped of his commission and service decorations and been released under Item 1(a), the notation "Dismissed with Disgrace for Misconduct" or "Dismissed for Misconduct".

Early and personal life

Delisle graduated from Sackville High School in 1990. On May 3, 1997, Delisle  married Jennifer Lee Janes in Lower Sackville, Nova Scotia. On February 17, 1998, he filed for bankruptcy and declared liabilities of $18,587 and assets of $1,000. In June 2008, Delisle and his wife separated. On May 3, 2010, Delisle and his wife filed for divorce, due to his wife's affair.

Military career

Delisle served as a naval threat assessment analyst for the Royal Canadian Navy. He initially joined as a reservist in January 1996, enrolling as a regular member in March 2001. In October 2001, Delisle completed a leadership course and became a Master Corporal. In November 2006, Delisle was promoted to Sergeant. In 2008, he enrolled in the faculty of arts at Royal Military College. He received his commission as a Sub-Lieutenant in July 2008. In September 2010, Delisle graduated from Royal Military College with a Bachelor of Arts.^[5] He was posted to the multinational naval intelligence and communications centre HMCS Trinity in Halifax in August 2011.

Espionage

In July 2007, Delisle walked into the Embassy of Russia in Ottawa and offered to sell secret information to the Russian military intelligence service (known as the GRU).

Delisle's activities were particularly damaging due to his access to the Stone Ghost database of intelligence shared between Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand. Referring to the information he passed on, he said: "It was never really Canadian stuff. ... There was American stuff, there was some British stuff, Australian stuff – it was everybody’s stuff."

Delisle has blamed his espionage activities on his marital problems, rather than financial need. He entered the Russian embassy the day he discovered his wife was having an affair.

Investigation and conviction

The investigation into Delisle was triggered by a tip from the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation on December 2, 2011. His home was searched that month and he was arrested the following January.

Delisle had previously been stopped by Canada Border Services Agency agents at Halifax airport in September 2011 after returning from a trip to Brazil to meet his GRU handler, carrying a large amount of cash and prepaid credit cards. There is no sign this led to an investigation. In May 2013, The Canadian Press reported that Canadian Security Intelligence Service had been aware of Delisle's spying well before the FBI tip but failed to contact the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

The Interrogation and Confession Jeffery Delisle

On February 8, 2013, Delisle was sentenced to 20 years in prison. On February 13, 2013, it was announced by DND that Delisle had been stripped of his commission and service decorations and been dishonourably discharged. DND was also moving immediately to recover the salary paid to Delisle since his arrest in January 2012.

The Parole Board of Canada granted Delisle day parole in October 2018, and full parole in March 2019.

References

1.      Jeffrey Delisle Pre-Sentence Report

CANADIAN SECURITY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (CSIS) INJURY ASSESSMENT REPORT PROVIDED FOR RCMP PROJECT STOIQUE

At this time, CSIS (the Service) can only provide preliminary findings and an initial assessment of the damage inflicted by the actions of Jeffrey Paul DELISLE. The full scope and nature of the injury, if ever fully known, can only be determined once the Service and its partners (domestic and foreign) have additional insight regarding DELISLE's access during the period in which he was providing information to the Russians, as well as the volume and specific documents he provided. In his National Defence (ND) role, DELISLE had access to a secure Government of Canada (GoC) Top Secret network which contains highly classified documents. These include intelligence reports and assessments from several Canadian departments, including CSIS. Further, in October 2011, DELISLE commenced contact with the CSIS Atlantic Region office in his role as a Threat Assessment Officer at Trinity. In addition to this access, DELISLE would have been in a position to provide the Russians with character assessments of individuals he had met within the Government of Canada (GoC), including at CSIS. CSIS.

In a post arrest RCMP interview of DELISLE which took place on January 13, 2012, DELISLE admitted that in 2007 he walked into the Russian Embassy and from then on transmitted information from databases accessed at his work-site to the Russians for compensation. He normally received compensation by the Russians on a monthly basis, beginning in 2007. The Russians were looking for "anything related to their business" and specifically information on "western agents in Russia". According to DELISLE, the Russians sought to have him fill their intelligence gaps, which included "foreign agents" and the "energy sector" - specifically related to China and GoC relations. DELISLE stated he was asked to provide information from "Wiretaps basically or human gathering access". On January 11, 2012, while operating under the belief he was communicating with the Russians, DELISLE passed classified documents, including two (2) CSIS Intelligence Reports (CIRs). These documents were classified "SECRET (CEO)"and "SECRET". Classified information is information that could reasonably be expected to cause injury to the national interest if compromised. Regarding the SECRET level, compromise could reasonably be expected to cause serious injury to the national interest. The Policy on Government Security defines the national interest as the security and the social, political and economic stability of Canada. The Service uses caveats in conjunction with a level of classification. Within the Service, the Canadian Eyes Only (CEO) caveat identifies classified information that cannot be shared with allied agencies. The versions of the CIRs DELISLE attempted to share with the Russians on January 11, 2012 are identical to those CIRs disseminated by the Service to Canadian Government departments, including ND.

DELISLE had access to a secure GoC Top Secret network which contains highly classified documents. It is noted that a high volume of CSIS documents are posted to this network and that DELISLE accessed the foregoing CIRs through this network. According to RCMP information stemming from the January 13, 2012 interview, DELISLE noted that (he) had passed "a lot" of information between 2007 and 2012, with information dumps effected electronically, occurring approximately the 10th of each month - everything was to be "fresh", as "old information is really not good information". Although DELISLE indicated that the information sent "wasn't a risk to our security", this is in contrast to his statement that "a lot of it was SIGINT" and that "some of it was CSIS reporting. I think it was a CSIS report. I sent some of those, but those are usually CEO DEFAIT (sic) related". He also noted that the most recent package, which he believed was sent circa January 10, 2012, was the "smallest package" that he had sent. The previous package was sent in "early December, maybe late November". He also had sent "contact lists" and "phone lists" of intelligence-related individuals in Canada and in the United States, in addition to other information from the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia.

Sources:

CBC News

Wikipedia

Sky News

2013: The Qing Quentin Huang Case: CSIS Success, System Failure

Qing Quentin Huang, a Hamilton-based naval engineer working for a firm involved in Canada’s shipbuilding program, was arrested in November 2013 and charged under the Security of Information Act for allegedly attempting to pass sensitive details of the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy to the Chinese government. The allegations centred on phone calls Huang made to the Chinese embassy in Ottawa, offering information about future Royal Canadian Navy and Coast Guard vessels in exchange for benefits, though authorities intervened before any classified material was actually transferred. His case became one of Canada’s most prominent modern espionage prosecutions linked to China, highlighting both insider‑threat vulnerabilities and foreign‑interference concerns in critical defence projects.

CSIS played a central role in detecting the threat and supporting law enforcement. Using a court‑authorized warrant targeting the Chinese embassy as part of a broader foreign‑intelligence investigation, CSIS relayed intelligence to the RCMP, which launched “Project Seascape” and quickly moved to neutralize the threat. This cooperation allowed police to act before any secrets were compromised, while the subsequent use of secrecy mechanisms, including a national‑security confidentiality certificate, was aimed at protecting CSIS sources, methods, and sensitive operational details from exposure in open court. The case thus demonstrated CSIS’s effectiveness at discovering foreign‑interference activity and feeding timely intelligence into the criminal system, even as it strained that system’s ability to manage classified information.

Ultimately, however, the prosecution collapsed under its own procedural weight. Years of litigation over disclosure of CSIS material, parallel proceedings in Federal Court, and the government’s requirement to protect national‑security information produced extensive delays. In December 2021, an Ontario Superior Court judge stayed the charges on the basis that the roughly eight‑year delay violated Huang’s Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time, effectively ending the case without a verdict. The outcome underscores a core tension in Canadian national‑security prosecutions: while CSIS can successfully detect and disrupt hostile intelligence activity, structural weaknesses in how courts handle secrecy and disclosure can force the state to abandon serious cases to preserve intelligence equities and uphold constitutional timelines.

2018: Meng Wanzhou: Huawei and Geopolitical Hostage Diplomacy

Meng Wanzhou, age 47 and board deputy chairperson of Huawei Technologies, is the daughter of Huawei founder Ren Zhengfei. Huawei, a Chinese state-supported technology company with close ties to the Chinese government, is a leading global telecommunications and 5G infrastructure manufacturer.

On December 1, 2018, Meng was arrested at Pierre Elliott Trudeau International Airport in Vancouver after U.S. prosecutors initiated an extradition request. The charges alleged fraud (misrepresenting Huawei's relationship with Skycom to global banks), conspiracy (circumventing U.S. sanctions against Iran), and wire fraud (using international financial systems to execute sanctions evasion).

House Arrest: Meng spent three years under house arrest in a Vancouver home while fighting extradition proceedings. She was required to wear an electronic ankle bracelet and pay for her own security guards at significant expense.

Resolution and Hostage Diplomacy: On September 24, 2021, a Canadian judge ordered Meng's release after she reached a deferred prosecution agreement with U.S. prosecutors. Under the DPA, Meng admitted to misleading HSBC regarding Huawei's business dealings with Iran, agreed to cooperate with U.S. authorities, avoided criminal trial and conviction, and was permitted to return to China.

Critical Revelation: China's near-simultaneous release of Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig—two Canadian nationals detained for espionage—on the exact same date (September 24, 2021) appeared to confirm what Beijing had previously denied: their detention had been explicitly linked to Meng's case. This represented a form of hostage diplomacy in which China detained Canadian citizens to pressure Canada into releasing a senior Chinese technology executive.

2020–2022: Hua Yong: Suspected Chinese Targeted Killing in British Columbia

Hua Yong was a Chinese dissident and vocal critic of the Chinese Communist Party. He fled China in April 2020 and arrived on the Sunshine Coast of British Columbia, Canada, seeking asylum from CCP persecution.

The Deceptive Infiltration: Hua invited a man he knew—identified only as "Eric"—to join him in Canada as a spokesperson for a revolutionary group opposing the CCP. Unknown to Hua, Eric was an undercover operative for Office No. 1 of China's Ministry of Public Security (MPS)—the internal security police ministry at the core of the global network of unofficial "CCP police stations" operating in Canada and other Western countries.

Eric had spent over 15 years working as a Chinese intelligence operative tasked with hunting down dissidents and critics of the Chinese Communist Party worldwide. His assignment in Canada was to infiltrate Hua's exile network and target him for "neutralization"—the euphemistic term for elimination or capture.

Elaborate False Persona: To gain Hua's trust and integration into his dissident network, Eric constructed an elaborate false persona online and on encrypted applications. He posed as a radical anti-Communist militant and founder of a fake guerrilla group called "Brigade V." He appeared in propaganda videos wearing camouflage and a balaclava, creating a credible cover as a fellow anti-CCP activist willing to engage in direct action.

Operational Infrastructure: Eric's phone records reveal he was given operational freedom through cover jobs. He worked under Prince Group, a vast Cambodian conglomerate involved in real estate and finance with billions of dollars in annual transactions. His employment provided plausible cover for his travels and communications.

Suspicious Death: On November 25, 2022, Hua Yong set out for a kayaking paddle near Gibsons, British Columbia, and did not return. His body was recovered in the water the following day. The RCMP initially reported no signs of foul play, concluding it was an accidental drowning.

Defection and Revelation: In December 2024—over two years after Hua's death—Eric walked into the headquarters of Australia's domestic intelligence agency (ASIO) carrying his mobile phone loaded with years of internal messages, digital communications, and operational records from Office No. 1.

In May 2024, Australia's investigative program Four Corners revealed Eric's story, documenting his 15+ years as a Chinese intelligence operative hunting dissidents. Subsequently, in December 2024, Radio-Canada conducted a comprehensive investigation of Eric's evidence and digital records.

Digital Evidence of Targeting: Eric's digital records revealed explicit communications with his Chinese handlers stating: "Our superiors want to get rid of him," referring to Hua Yong. Eric told Radio-Canada: "I fully comprehend the methods employed by the Chinese Communist Party. They would stage an accident to eliminate someone. While I lack direct evidence to confirm his murder, I suspect it based on their standard operational practices."

Eric further stated that based on standard Ministry of Public Security tradecraft, "there were certainly other teams beyond me monitoring Hua in Canada at the time of his death." This suggests a multi-layered surveillance and operational structure targeting Hua, possibly involving field teams independent of Eric's direct involvement.

Investigation Status: The B.C. Coroners Service investigation remains officially open as of December 2025—over three years after Hua's death, well beyond the typical 16-month investigation timeline for coroner inquiries. Eric submitted a detailed investigative dossier with specific leads to the RCMP.

Watch  Eric's story after his defection to Australia

RCMP Officer Arrested for Leaking Information to Rwandan Government

Andrew Chen

2/13/2024|Updated: 2/13/2024

An RCMP officer has been arrested for allegedly accessing the national police force’s record systems to help the Rwandan government.

The RCMP said in a Feb. 13 that Const. Eli Ndatuje, an Alberta RCMP front-line police officer, is facing three charges in relation to accessing “non-Top Secret RCMP records systems” and intending to share the information with a “foreign actor.” The police force later identified the foreign actor as the Rwandan government.

“Upon learning of the security breach, the RCMP implemented measures to monitor, mitigate and manage any further unauthorized disclosures and ensure maintenance of public safety as the investigation unfolded,” the RCMP said in a statement.

“The RCMP takes threats to the security of Canadians very seriously and wants to reassure everyone that our primary focus is the safety and protection of the public at all times.”

Const. Ndatuje is facing charges of breach of trust, unauthorized use of a computer, and breach of trust in respect to safeguarded information, which is related to the Security of Information Act.

His first court appearance is scheduled for March 11 at the Calgary Provincial Court.

“The RCMP is committed to combatting foreign actor interference at all levels and is actively leveraging all tools at its disposal. Foreign interference takes on many forms and it is critical that all organizations are aware of the potential harm at any levels,” the statement said.

It added that there will be no further comments on the case.

Cameron Ortis: RCMP Intelligence Director Leak (2019--2024)

View the excellent 40 minute exposé by the CBC’s Fifth Estate

Ortis was ’on the cusp’ of passing state secrets to foreign entity at time of arrest, Crown alleged

Information presented at RCMP analyst's bail hearing can be published for the first time.  Cameron Ortis, convicted by a jury Wednesday of violating Canada's secrets act, was arrested when he was on the cusp of passing state secrets to a foreign entity, a Crown prosecutor alleged during the former RCMP official's bail hearing in 2019.

When RCMP officers raided Cameron Ortis's condo in late August 2019, they were hunting for clues related to leaks of internal police documents to criminal groups.  Their investigation took a quick turn into the murky world of international espionage when they analyzed electronic equipment and documents seized at the residence of the national police force's top intelligence analyst.

According to an unsealed 2020 court document, which can now be reported on, RCMP investigators feared Ortis was planning to share information with Chinese officials.  On several to-do lists police found in his condo, Ortis noted mundane activities like donating blood, cleaning his apartment, working out and filing dental insurance claims — in addition to tasks related to what he called the project. Prosecutors said this was the name given to his plan to leak state secrets.

On his computer equipment, RCMP agents discovered 488 highly classified documents.

According to information disclosed in court in the fall of 2019 — which can now be reported publicly for the first time — almost all of these documents were printed by Ortis at his RCMP offices between September 2018 and August 2019.

Ortis, a civilian with a doctorate in international relations, was serving at the time as the director of the RCMP's national intelligence co-ordination centre in Ottawa. He had access to Canada's Top Secret Network (CTSN), a computer network used by the federal government to share classified information. CTSN held intelligence from Canada's allies in the Five Eyes, an intelligence-sharing network that includes the U.S., Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom.

During his bail hearings in October 2019, federal prosecutor Judy Kliewer alleged Ortis was in the final stages of a plan to pass state secrets to a foreign entity.

Ortis was arrested by his RCMP colleagues on September 12, 2019 before he acted on that plan, said the Crown. During the bail hearing, Kliewer argued that if Ortis had carried out his plan, the consequences would have been catastrophic for the security of Canada, its allies and intelligence agents in the field.  It was like he was holding a loaded gun and about to pull the trigger, she said.

On Wednesday, a jury found Ortis guilty of all charges against him.

Testifying in his own defence, Ortis claimed he was actually working on a secret mission from a foreign agency. Ortis said the plan was to lure criminals to an encrypted email service to allow authorities to collect intelligence about them.

Ortis said he sent the information to police targets in order to prove his bonafides.

Now that his trial is over, CBC is allowed to publish previously unreported allegations made against Ortis during his bail hearing four years ago. Before the verdict, those allegations were covered by a publication ban.

This new series of allegations, related to a potential case of international espionage, were not raised in Ortis's trial and were never proved in court.  In fact, four charges against Ortis related to alleged infractions under section 16 of the Security of Information Act, which deals with communications with foreign entities or terrorist organizations, were dropped by the court in 2022.

In that ruling, which was also under a publication ban until Wednesday, the court concluded that restrictions on the use of classified information at the trial would prevent Ortis from presenting a full defence.  According to that ruling, Ortis was preparing to argue that he accumulated classified information to make a presentation to senior RCMP members concerning how to best respond to the growing threat from a specific foreign entity.

Police found scanned business cards of Chinese officials.  What most concerned investigators was that one of Ortis's to-do lists mentioned the need to start to plan first contact. When the RCMP raided his residence, Ortis's current to-do list referred to setting up an initial meeting at a restaurant on the third Thursday in September.

According to a 100-pages-plus information to obtain (ITO) document reported on by the Canadian Press, police went through Ortis's recent police database searches as part of their initial investigation in June and September of 2019.

Among his queries were subjects that related to China, embassies, and something that appears to be a national security investigation, wrote RCMP Sgt. Jamie Driscoll in a sworn affidavit supporting the ITO.  Investigators also found saved copies of two business cards from officials at the Chinese embassy.  I believe Ortis planned to communicate safeguarded information to one or both of the Chinese officials, Driscoll wrote.

The 2020 ITO was used to support the RCMP application to obtain an additional search warrant and production orders.

A 'business proposition'

After growing up in British Columbia, Ortis joined the RCMP in 2006. In 2015, he used an alias to make an unusual offer to a British Columbia businessman named Vincent Ramos.  Ramos headed a company, Phantom Secure, that sold encrypted phones to members of organized crime and was already in the sights of police forces in several countries.

You do not know me. I have information that I am confident you will find very valuable, Ortis wrote in an email under a pseudonym, adding his pitch was a simple business proposition.

Vincent Ramos is arrested by Bellingham Police on March 7, 2018. (Bellingham Police Department)

Photo: Service de police de Bellingham

In his emails to Ramos, Ortis presented himself as a hacker and said he had information that Ramos could find useful. It is not risk free, of course, but the risk to reward ratio will prove to be more than acceptable, he said.  Ortis asked for $20,000 in exchange for confidential information that was in the hands of the RCMP.  He also proactively offered Ramos information that the Crown said could have endangered the life of an undercover RCMP officer who had attempted to infiltrate Phantom Secure. Ortis rejected that claim during his testimony, saying he never released the undercover agent's name.  'This is not a trick'

According to the Crown, Ortis also offered information from police files to members of a group involved in money laundering — a CD-ROM containing a sample of the material at his disposal.  This is not a trick and I do not work for a law enforcement or intelligence agency, demonstrated, I think, by the attached documents. I do, however, have the ability to access a wide variety of information, he said in his communications with this group.

The jury has heard there is no evidence Ortis ever received money in exchange for confidential information.

The RCMP became aware of the illicit contacts with Ramos in 2018, when he was arrested in the United States and his electronic devices were seized and analyzed by police.  Seeing one of their documents in Ramos's possession, RCMP investigators concluded there was a mole in their organization.  RCMP analysts quickly determined that Ortis was one of the people who had access to the sensitive information found in Ramos's computer.

The ensuing investigation led them to surreptitiously enter Ortis's residence on August 26, 2019. There they started to copy and analyze the information on his electronic equipment.  Ortis tried to make documents untraceable, Crown said.  The RCMP seized five laptops, three cellphones, five portable hard drives, 10 memory sticks and a few pre-paid SIM cards from Ortis's condo in Ottawa.

Although some of his computer tools were encrypted, at least one laptop was accessible without a password, which allowed RCMP experts to move quickly.  Investigators found 488 classified documents in a laptop under a folder called Batman, prosecutors said.

Based on the dates on the documents, investigators concluded they had been printed mostly on weekends and holidays, when fewer colleagues would have been in the office to see Ortis at work.  Prosecutors said Ortis removed the headers and footers from certain documents before transforming them into PDFs, to make them untraceable.

The only inference is that these documents were created for the purpose of sharing them, communicating secret information to people who would be interested in them, Kliewer alleged during the bail hearing.

Given the nature of the documents … these are no longer organized-crime directed documents. These are all documents that related to national security and would only be of interest to a foreign entity.  One of the processed documents was created in the middle of the night between September 8 and 9 and placed in a folder called first meeting, said Kliewer.  Driscoll said that inside that file, he saw an image of a top secret document from the National Security Agency, the U.S. foreign signals intelligence agency. She added the file was classified gamma, meaning it was one of the most closely-held secrets in Canada's hands.

Organized and meticulous

During their search, police discovered intriguing to-do lists that paint a picture of Ortis as organized and meticulous.  One list related to his project laid out a series of tasks, such as printing and scanning documents, installing software or making backup copies of files.

One of his to-do lists mentioned the need to start to plan first contact. When the RCMP raided his residence, the current to-do list referred to setting up an initial meeting at a restaurant on the third Thursday in September.

Kliewer said Ortis was arrested three days after the second RCMP raid, when he was at a critical stage of his project and on the cusp of a great betrayal. No information was provided at the bail hearing regarding the identity of the country that could have been approached by Ortis.

Unraveling a Convoluted Story

A high-stakes American gambler who is an FBI informant and goes by the nickname Robin Hood 702 played a key role in a series of events that eventually led the RCMP to charge their head of intelligence, Cameron Ortis, with leaking secrets.  R.J. Cipriani, whose nickname incorporates the 702 Las Vegas area code, built his reputation by winning money in casinos and donating much of it to worthy causes.

But in 2011, he was asked to gamble money in Australia by former U.S. college football player Owen Hanson. 

"I figured he had to be a billionaire or a billionaire's son for him to just hand me, you know, a million and a half dollars," Cipriani told The Fifth Estate in an interview.  But eventually fearing he was being drawn into criminal activity, he went to the FBI. That led to Hanson being charged and convicted of drug trafficking.  It's what the FBI found in Hanson's possession after he was arrested at a golf course outside San Diego in 2015 that ultimately led to the doorstep of the RCMP and their intelligence operations.

He is supposed to be working with these documents for intelligence and to assist law enforcement to protect Canadians against criminal activity and also to ensure national security, said Kliewer. But he is going to work to cull these documents to share them with people adverse [to] these interests.

Despite the Crown's argument that Ortis could flee the country or find a way to pass on his secrets, he was released on bail in October 2019.  That decision was overturned on appeal a few days later, and Ortis was detained for more than three years, until the end of 2022.

Driscoll wrote that police intercepted Ortis's communications while he was in custody.  In October 2019, Ortis discussed his future, said the ITO document.

I owe everybody an explanation of how I think this happened and what happened, he said.  I'll never do this again, I'll never go into a deep dive in a career like this, at the sacrifice of family and friends, there's no f--king way, and my own happiness because I've been miserable the last 4-5 years so .... never again, it's just not worth it.

In recent months, he has lived with numerous restrictions on his freedom, including a ban on access to any electronic devices except to prepare for his trial.  During his bail hearing in 2019, he acknowledged he was not particularly close to his parents, who only learned after his arrest that he had an estranged 17-year-old daughter for whom he was providing parental support.

The bail hearing also heard Ortis was also responsible for the monthly payments on a $100,000 mortgage his parents took out on their condominium to cover his student loans.

2022–2025: Yuesheng Wang - Critical Infrastructure Espionage

Yuesheng Wang, a 38-year-old Chinese national researcher, was arrested on November 14, 2022, by the RCMP and charged with economic espionage—making him the first person charged under Canada's Security of Information Act specifically for economic espionage targeting critical infrastructure.

Wang was employed by Hydro-Québec from 2016 until his termination in 2022, serving as a researcher at the utility's Centre of Excellence in Transportation Electrification and Energy Storage (CETEES). This center develops critical technologies for electric vehicle batteries, grid energy storage solutions, power management technologies, and strategic electrical infrastructure.

Espionage Activities: According to RCMP allegations, Wang:

·        Provided confidential proprietary battery research to Chinese universities and research institutions

·        Published scientific papers using Hydro-Québec's proprietary information without authorization

·        Filed patents with Chinese entities rather than with Hydro-Québec

·        Utilized classified research and development data for personal academic advancement

·        Jeopardized Hydro-Québec's intellectual property commercialization opportunities

·        Benefited Chinese state-sponsored scientific advancement initiatives

Investigation and Charges: Hydro-Québec's internal security team became suspicious of his activities and alerted the RCMP. The investigation revealed systematic unauthorized disclosure of sensitive energy storage and battery technology research.

·        November 2022: Arrested and charged with fraudulent computer use, breach of trust, and fraudulently obtaining trade secrets

·        February 2024: Received two additional charges under the Security of Information Act for "committing preparatory acts on behalf of a foreign entity"—the People's Republic of China

Trial: The trial began in October 2025 before Federal Court. Crown prosecutor Sabrina Delli Fraine presented evidence that Hydro-Québec's internal investigation confirmed Wang's access to and unauthorized use of confidential information. As of November 2025, the trial was ongoing, with Wang testifying regarding his research activities and claiming his concerns about missing payroll training were unrelated to alleged espionage.

Significance and CSIS Coordination: This case marks the first prosecution of a foreign national for economic espionage targeting Canadian critical infrastructure and represents escalation of Chinese targeting beyond political and military intelligence to critical energy systems.

2024–2025: Master Warrant Officer Matthew Robar—Military Intelligence Breach

Master Warrant Officer Matthew Robar served in the Canadian Forces Intelligence Command, a sensitive military intelligence organization responsible for signals intelligence, human intelligence, and strategic assessments.

On December 11, 2025, Robar was charged with 8 counts under the National Defence Act for:

·        Transmitting classified "special operational information"

·        Providing secrets to a "foreign entity"

·        Unauthorized disclosure of sensitive military intelligence

Investigation: The investigation began in 2024 following the unauthorized release of sensitive military intelligence. The RCMP's national security enforcement team collaborated with the Canadian Forces National Investigation Service to develop the case.

The specific foreign actor involved remained undisclosed at the time of charging.