THE INTEL BRIEF
News and Content From Our Members
Interesting Links
LONDON, Dec 15 (Reuters) - Russian President Vladimir Putin is dragging out negotiations over Ukraine, while Russia is seeking to bully critics with tactics from sabotage attacks to buzzing airports with drones, the head of Britain's MI6 spy agency said on Monday.
In her first public speech since becoming the head of Britain's Secret Intelligence Service, Blaise Metreweli said Russia posed an "aggressive, expansionist, and revisionist" threat that still sought to subjugate Ukraine and harass NATO members.
Blaise Metreweli is the first female chief of MI6
Talks between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy and U.S. President Donald Trump's envoys resumed in Berlin on Monday, after the U.S. side said a "lot of progress" had been made on ending the conflict.
Metreweli cast doubt on how much Putin himself wanted peace.
"I find it harrowing that hundreds of thousands have died, with the toll mounting every day, because of Putin's historical distortions and his compromised desire for respect," said Metreweli, who in October became MI6's first female chief - a role known by the codename "C" - in its 116-year history.
"He is dragging out negotiations and shifting the cost of war on to his own population," she said in her speech at the agency's London headquarters.
She said Russia should be in no doubt about Britain's "enduring" support for Ukraine and that "the pressure we apply on Ukraine's behalf will be sustained".
Putin has repeatedly said he is ready to talk peace, but that if Ukraine refuses an agreement then Russia's forces will advance further and take more Ukrainian territory.
Metreweli also accused Russia of using tactics "just below the threshold of war", including cyberattacks on critical infrastructure, drones buzzing airports and military bases, "aggressive activity" above and below the sea, arson and sabotage, and propaganda operations.
"The export of chaos is a feature not a bug in the Russian approach to international engagement, and we should be ready for this to continue until Putin is forced to change his calculus," she said.
Russia regularly denies accusations that it is behind drone incidents or cyberattacks affecting Western countries. It also denies any plans to attack NATO, which has been providing weapons, intelligence and other assistance to Ukraine since Moscow's 2022 invasion.
Metreweli was previously MI6's head of technology, known as "Q", and much of her speech focused on the peril posed by technological innovations, such as artificial intelligence, biotechnology and quantum computing.
It meant power was becoming more diffuse and unpredictable, shifting from states to corporations, and sometimes to individuals, she said.
"AI-powered robots and drones are brilliant for scaled manufacturing but devastating on the battlefield. Discoveries that cure disease can also create new weapons," she said.
"And as states race for tech supremacy, or as some algorithms become as powerful as states, those hyper-personalised tools could become a new vector for conflict and control."
Faced with these challenges, she said MI6 would take on a more active, operational role, "hustling to make things happen".
"We will take calculated risks, where the prize is significant and the national interest clear," she said. "We will never stoop to the tactics of our opponents. But we must seek to outplay them."
Richard Knighton, head of Britain's armed forces, will also call in a separate speech on Monday for a "whole society" approach to defence in the face of growing uncertainty and threats, and highlight an increased probability of Russia invading a NATO country.
From The Globe and Mail Reporter: Steven Chase Published 2025-12-11
A member of the Canadian Armed Forces’ intelligence-collection unit has been arrested and charged with passing highly sensitive government secrets to a foreign entity, the military announced Thursday.
Master Warrant Officer Matthew Robar, a member of the Canadian Forces Intelligence Command, has been charged with multiple offences under both Canada’s foreign interference and security of information laws as well as the National Defence Act and the Criminal Code.
The arrest and charges stem from a joint operation between the Canadian Forces Military Police and the RCMP that the two organizations described Thursday as a probe into “foreign interference and security of information.”
This case emerges at a time of heightened concerns about foreign interference from Russia, China, Iran and India, and other countries. A lengthy public inquiry into foreign interference tabled its final report at the start of 2025.
The accusations could invite scrutiny of how effectively Canada safeguards not only its own military secrets but those of allies shared with Canadians through the Five Eyes network, which includes the United States, Britain, Australia and New Zealand.
Among the charges are “communicating special operational information” and “breach of trust in respect of safeguarded information” under the Foreign Interference and Security of Information Act, the military and RCMP said in a joint statement.
The first charge is under Section 17 (1) of the act, which deals with communicating “special operational information to a foreign entity or to a terrorist group.” The act says everyone who commits an offence under this subsection is “guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for life.”
Special operational information under the Foreign Interference and Security of Information Act refers to highly safeguarded government data revealing confidential sources, military plans for armed conflict, covert intelligence methods and vulnerabilities, targets of secret investigations, identities of undercover agents, military advantages or vulnerabilities, protective measures like encryption, or similar intelligence from foreign entities or terrorist groups.
This designation protects some of Canada’s most sensitive operational secrets, including signals intelligence capabilities – interception of electronic communications to gather information – as well as countermeasures.
The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) on Thursday declined to reveal which foreign country or foreign entity was allegedly involved in this case, or divulge specific details on the allegations.
None of the accusations have been proven in court.
The Forces and the RCMP said the investigation began in 2024 and “focused on the unauthorized disclosure of safeguarded information to a Foreign Entity.”
They said should the charges proceed to prosecution, “they will be tried in the military justice system by court martial.”
Other charges laid against MWO Robar include three counts of “Conduct to the Prejudice of Good Order and Discipline” under the National Defence Act, firearm storage charges as well as one count of “feigning disease” under the National Defence Act.
Canadian military legal rules published online say a charge of feigning disease or infirmity “should be laid only where the accused exhibits appearances resembling genuine symptoms which, to his knowledge, are not due to such disease or infirmity, but have been induced artificially for purposes of deceit, for example, simulating fits or mental disease.”
The Canadian Forces Intelligence Command oversees multiple divisions and it’s unclear where MWO Robar worked. The Canadian Forces Joint Imagery Centre provides imagery and imagery intelligence, the military’s website says. The Canadian Forces National Counter-Intelligence Unit “identifies, investigates and counters CAF threats by foreign intelligence services, individuals and groups engaged in terrorism, espionage, sabotage, subversion, or organized criminal activities that impact DND/CAF security.” The Mapping and Charting Establishment provides geospatial information and Joint Task Force X provides “strategic, operational and tactical human intelligence resources.”
Brigadier-General Vanessa Hanrahan, Canadian Forces Provost Marshal, praised the efforts of her staff in a statement accompanying the charges.
“The protection of national security relies on collaboration and precision. The success of this operation demonstrates the strength of joint policing efforts and what can be achieved when agencies and organizations work together toward a common goal.”
MWO Robar is not the first Canadian Forces intelligence staffer to be charged with communicating secrets to a foreign entity.
Nearly 14 years ago, a then-Canadian naval intelligence officer, Jeffrey Paul Delisle, was arrested and charged with passing secrets to a foreign entity. He later pleaded guilty to spying for Russia and went to prison.
Stephanie Carvin, a national-security expert at Carleton University, said the Delisle espionage hurt Canada. “There was serious concern and damage done with the Jeffery Delisle breach and that raised considerable concern about information security and Canada’s reputation,” she said. ”There’s the potential for that to happen here as well, depending on the severity of the case."
That being said, Prof. Carvin added, many militaries have experienced similar incidents like this in recent years. “Canada is by no means the exception.”
Mr. Delisle, who spied for Russia, had volunteered his services to Moscow, walking into the Russian embassy in Ottawa in 2007 and offering to betray his country for cash.
For nearly five years, Mr. Delisle stole highly classified and secret information from a treasure trove of material at his work and shipped it to the Russians.
The former sailor, who was arrested in January, 2012, smuggled out information from top-secret Canadian military facilities using a memory stick hidden in his pocket.
Mr. Delisle was paid by wire transfer for the first four years. At first he was paid $5,000 but this quickly dropped to about $2,800 a month and then finally $3,000 every 30 days. This continued until about five months before he was caught, when the Russians changed how they paid him.
Young journalists exposed Russian-linked vessels circling off the Dutch and German coast. This article is definitely worth the time to read. It demonstrates the continued and increasing Russian threat facing the West. Part of the current hybrid warfare. This is what they quoted from official sources pertaining to the sailors on the vessels:"Russian intelligence services deploy so-called low-level agents for espionage, sabotage, and other disruptive measures. These ‘pocket money agents’ or ‘disposable agents’ operate for small sums in the interest of hostile intelligence services without belonging to them. They’re used for comparatively simple operations. Unlike regular staff, they’re expendable—exposure is accepted as a cost of doing business.”
Similar occurrences on the North American coasts???
See the full story HERE
A man who spent a decade and a half working as a Chinese spy has shared details of some of his missions with Radio-Canada, including what he knows about a Chinese dissident who died in B.C. in 2022.
"From 2008 to 2023, my real job was to work for China's secret police. It's a means for political repression," said "Eric," who was interviewed in the suburbs of Melbourne, Australia. "Its main targets are dissidents who criticize the Chinese Communist Party."
Eric shared a variety of documents — including financial records, secret money transfers and the names of spies — with journalists from the Australian Broadcasting Corp. and the Washington-based International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, of which CBC/Radio-Canada is a partner.
The records give an unprecedented glimpse at the inner workings of China's overseas spy operations.
Eric was willing to be filmed and photographed but didn't want Radio-Canada to use his real name. The interpreter hired to translate from Mandarin also asked not to be named, out of fear of reprisal.
Chinese artist Hua Yong staged a protest in Beijing's Tiananmen Square on June 4, 2012, where he punched himself in the nose and then used his blood to write '6-4,' representing the date of the 1989 massacre. Hua died mysteriously in November 2022. (Hua Yong/Twitter)
Eric explained that he was once a pro-democracy activist, having joined the underground Social Democratic Party of China. But he said he was forced into spy work after receiving a visit from the police one day.
For 15 years, Eric worked for the 1st Bureau at China's Ministry of Public Security, a unit that specializes in surveillance of dissidents abroad. He previously told the Australian Broadcasting Corp. that he spied on a Japanese-based cartoonist and a YouTuber exiled in Australia. Often, he said, his cover was working for real companies in the countries where he was deployed — companies that collaborated with China's secret police.
For example, while on assignment in Cambodia, his cover was with the Prince Group, a multibillion-dollar conglomerate with interests in real estate and financial and consumer services. (The company did not reply to messages from Radio-Canada.)
In 2020, Eric said he was tasked with snooping on a dissident named Hua Yong, an artist and hardcore opponent of China's Communist Party who eventually ended up on B.C.'s Sunshine Coast.
After staging a protest in Tiananmen Square in Beijing in 2012, Hua was arrested and sent to a re-education labour camp. He was eventually released but arrested again in 2017 for documenting mass evictions in a working-class Beijing neighbourhood.
By March 2020, Hua was in exile in Thailand. Eric said Chinese authorities wanted him captured, but they felt he was out of reach there. So Eric's handler instructed him to lure Hua to Cambodia or Laos — countries that have close ties with China.
Eric's assignment was delivered to him via voice message on one of several messaging apps he and his handlers used over the years. It was one of thousands of audio and text exchanges, including his communications with his bosses, that Eric held on to.
Among them are Eric's handler's messages to him in Mandarin about Hua:
Listen to my request below. It's about Hua Yong. The higher-ups find him quite annoying and want to deal with him.- Eric's handler
(The latter phrase could also be translated as "want to get rid of him.")
Eric said he talked with his bosses about different ways to entice Hua to go to another country where China's secret police could get at him. Ultimately, Eric came up with a strategy: He started chatting with Hua on social networks, then moved to encrypted messaging apps. In a conversation on the app Telegram, Eric suggested they set up a resistance group and try to build a following.
To gain Hua's confidence, Eric invented a fake anti-Communist rebel group called the V Brigade and started posting about it on social media.
In a video posted to YouTube in September 2020, Eric is wearing a three-hole balaclava and camo and is seen firing blanks. He announces: "Hello, everyone. I'm here with V Brigade to introduce today's topic: How to individually prepare for armed revolution and armed struggle."
The ruse worked.
Chinese ex-spy 'Eric' invented a fake anti-Communist rebel group called the V Brigade to gain Hua's trust and posted this promotional video for it on YouTube, in which Eric can be seen firing a blank gun. (V Brigade/YouTube)
"This is awesome!" Hua wrote to Eric, as the two became revolutionary comrades and even met up in Bangkok at one point.
But in early April 2021, the Chinese secret police lost track of Hua. A brief scramble ensued. Eric reported to his handlers that Hua appeared to have gone to Turkey and then Paris.
Then on April 6, Hua posted on social media that he was in Canada. He invited Eric to join him and become the spokesperson for a revolutionary group. Eric's handlers ordered him instead to return to China and keep tabs on his target from afar.
Hua ended up moving to Gibsons, B.C., where he took up crab fishing and kayaking, his own social media posts show.
In the fall of 2022, Hua was out paddling when his kayak nearly capsized after a luxury yacht passed near him.
"For him, this was a mere accident. But to me, it looked like an orchestrated murder," said Li Jianfeng, a former judge in China who also served prison time there before being granted refugee status in Canada.
Li said he helped Hua escape to Canada.
Hua fled to Canada in April 2021 and later moved to B.C. and took up kayaking. He died while kayaking not long after this photo was taken, in November 2022.
A couple of weeks later, on Nov. 25, 2022, Hua went out for another paddle, but this time he didn't come back. After a night of searching, his body was found along the shore of an island off the Sunshine Coast.
The RCMP saw no foul play at the time. But the force didn't appear to know then that Hua was in the crosshairs of a covert operation by China's secret police.
"I fully understand the modus operandi of the Chinese Communist Party," Li told Radio-Canada in an interview, referring to his former job in China's justice system. "They would stage an accident to murder someone. Yes, I don't have direct evidence to prove his murder."
Li said he put together a dossier with several different leads and sent it to the RCMP.
Guy Saint-Jacques, Canada's former ambassador to China, said no possibility should be excluded. "China's regime has no shame and doesn't hesitate to use brutal means to attain its objectives."
Eric told Radio-Canada he suspects other informants were keeping an eye on Hua in Canada.
"Based on the Chinese police's commonly known operating methods, the party definitely has other agents in Canada, including spies or other special operation teams," he said. "I'm almost certain of this."
After several failed attempts to flee China, Eric finally succeeded in 2023. The former spy wanted to go to Canada to claim asylum but ended up in Australia because he was able to get a tourist visa there.
The world has a right to know what China's secret police are up to, Eric said, adding that revealing it publicly actually buys him a measure of protection.
Meanwhile, the police investigation into Hua's death isn't officially closed because three years later, the B.C. Coroners Service still hasn't completed its report, which normally takes about 16 months.
Eric said he's had no contact with Canadian police but that he did confidentially send some documents to the Hogue commission, Canada's public inquiry into foreign interference.
"There are some strange aspects to this case that demand further investigation," he said.
Login to See the newest Pillar TALK. Click HERE!
Connectez-vous pour voir le tout nouveau Pillar TALK
The icy winds of recent days hinted at the snow to come, yet there was nothing but warmth at the Pillar Society Remembrance Ceremony, held at the CSIS National Memorial Cemetery located at Beechwood Funeral, Cemetery and Cremation Services.Hosted annually by the Pillar Society—the national alumni organization of former employees of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) | Service canadien du renseignement de sécurité (SCRS)—this ceremony brings together representatives from all levels of government, the Canadian Armed Forces, Veterans’ organizations, and members of Canada’s broader security community including allied partners.Our Co-Chair Andrée Paige laid a wreath on behalf of the City of Ottawa and Ottawa Veterans Task Force. The harmonious voices of the Canadian Military Wives Choir were definitely a highlight of the ceremony!It was a moving reminder that remembrance extends beyond military service to include all who have quietly dedicated their lives to protecting Canada’s security and democratic values.As we pause to remember at gatherings happening throughout Veterans' Week and on Remembrance Day, may we continue to strengthen the bonds between those who serve, those who have served, and the communities they protect.
Our “Spy Panel” was grateful to be invited by the Royal Kingston United Services Institute (RKUSI) as guest speakers for their monthly meeting held at the Fort Frontenac Officer’s Mess in Kingston, Ontario on Nov 20.All the members of our panel are members of The Pillar Society; the national alumni organization of former employees of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the RCMP Security Service.
Our “Spy Panel” together with our host, MGen Dean Milner at Fort Frontenac Officer’s Mess, Kingston, Ontario, Nov 20, 2025. Front row, L/R: Iwona Mooney, Dan Stanton, Don Mahar. 2nd Row: MGen Dean Milner (Ret’d), Jim Gough, Ralph Mahar
Founded in 1925, RKUSI marked its centenary this year. It is one of 27 United Services Institutes across Canada modeled after the original Royal United Services Institute at Whitehall in London.
We were treated to a lovely “surf & turf” dinner in the dining hall and then addressed the RKUSI membership for 90 minutes discussing the origins of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the current threat environment that Canada & allies face, current challenges, the compelling requirement for Canada to develop a robust foreign intelligence capacity and the character and form that such an entity could take. It was a great evening of dialogue and camaraderie.The RKUSI members & guests attending included a host of retired Canadian Army officers, (RCHA, RCA, PPCLI), retired Chief of Defence Staff Gen. Walter Natynczyk, and several cadets of the Royal Military College (RMC).Our primary host was retired MGen Dean Milner. MGen Milner was the Task Force Commander of Canadian Armed Forces in Afghanistan during my 2nd tour to Kandahar Airfield there in 2011 and I had occasion to meet him a number of times in theatre while serving there.Fort Frontenac, established as a French trading post in 1673, is among the oldest military sites in Canada and is arguably the oldest site that still contains an active Canadian Army presence. The British destroyed the fort duuring the Seven Years War and in 1758, rebuilt it and occupied it until turning it over to the Canadian Army in the 1870s. It remains an integral Canadian military installation to this day. It is the present day home of the Canadian Army Command and Staff College.It was an honour to be welcomed to RKUSI by these great & distinguished Veterans of the Canadian Armed Forces. They have served and sacrificed in defence of Canada and allies, and sought to build & preserve a fragile peace in many of the most dangerous places in the world; including Cyprus, Sinai, Rwanda, Bosnia & Haiti; fighting and dying in Afghanistan. We are in their debt.
- Ralph Mahar
The Canadian Security Intelligence Service Director’s Annual Speech
November 13, 2025
Introduction
Distinguished guests, members of the press, and fellow Canadians. Thank you for joining me today and allowing me to provide you with an update on the security challenges facing Canada.
This is my first time addressing Canadians as the Director of CSIS. I do so at a time when Canada’s national security environment is more complex and dynamic than at any point in recent memory. Polarization and radicalisation are on the rise, and social cohesion is eroding. Global events are unpredictable and competition between states is intensifying. Our global environment emboldens competitors’ attempts to interfere and spy, and advancements in technology enable our adversaries while challenging us to adapt. All aspects of national security have risen in urgency and priority, the demands on our service are unrelenting, and there is no clear path to a simpler future.
But, while challenged, CSIS has remained strong and able. We have trusted partners in Canada and abroad and, together with them, we’ve acted decisively to keep Canadians safe. Our intelligence professionals devote themselves to protecting the rights, freedoms, and safety of all in Canada. Even when they aren’t aware of it, Canadians benefit greatly from their work.
By sharing details today about what we see and what we’ve done, I hope to arm Canadians with a better understanding of the national security context to help them be more resilient against threats, make more informed decisions, and know how they can work together with us in keeping our country safe, secure, and prosperous.
I’ll begin with the threat of violent extremism.
This year marks 40 years since the worst terrorist attack in Canadian history—the bombing of Air India Flight 182. This tragic event killed all 329 people on board, most of them Canadians. It was truly a terrible moment in Canadian history and serves as an important reminder of the consequences of violent extremism.
The threat of violence motivated by extreme religious, ideological or political views has changed significantly over the last 40 years, but it persists as one of Canada’s most significant national security concerns.
Today’s violent extremists are motivated by an increasingly diverse, often personalized, set of extreme beliefs including xenophobia, accelerationism, nihilism, anti-Semitism, misogyny, extreme interpretations of religion, and more. Increasingly, violent extremists with these different ideologies find common causes through their shared targets. They find inspiration and motivation in the events and trends that polarize society or cause them to lose hope for the future. And, they easily access and amplify content online that radicalizes them and reinforces their view that violence is justified to achieve their extremist goals.
Worryingly, nearly one in ten terrorism investigations at CSIS now includes at least one subject of investigation under the age of 18.
In August 2025, a minor was arrested in Montreal for allegedly planning an attack on behalf of Daesh.
In May 2025, a 15-year-old Edmonton area minor was arrested for a terrorism-related offence, as RCMP investigators feared they would commit serious violence related to COM/764, a transnational violent online network that manipulates children and youth across widely accessible online platforms.
And, only a few kilometers from this room, in late 2023 and early 2024 two 15-year-olds were arrested in Ottawa for allegedly conspiring to conduct a mass casualty attack targeting the Jewish community in Canada’s capital.
Clearly, radicalized youth can cause the same harms as radicalized adults, but the societal supports for youth may help us catch radicalization early and prevent it. This is why CSIS joined the RCMP and our intelligence partners from the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand in releasing a joint public report, in December 2024, highlighting the evolving issue of young people and violent extremism. It provides advice to parents, guardians, and others with information to help them identify early concerns and address youth radicalization before it’s too late.
Fortunately, only small number of youth or adults with extreme views resort to violence. But when they do the consequences are devastating. Since 2014, there have been 20 violent extremist attacks in Canada resulting in 29 deaths, and at least 60 victims injured.
But these tragic numbers would have been higher if not for disruptive actions taken by CSIS and our law enforcement partners.
Since 2022, CSIS has been involved in the disruption of no fewer than 24 violent extremist actions, each resulting in arrests or terrorism peace bond charges.
For example, in 2024, CSIS played an integral role in the disruption of two Daesh inspired plots. In one case, a father and son were allegedly in the advanced stages of planning an attack in the Toronto area. In another, an individual was arrested before allegedly attempting to illegally enter the United States to attack members of the Jewish community in New York.
In these examples, and in many others, I can’t discuss publicly, our counter-terrorism teams have partnered with law enforcement and saved lives. They work hard, day and night and I’m deeply proud of their dedication. I hope that Canadians feel safer because of their ongoing efforts and their regular success.
That said, eroding social cohesion, increasing polarization, and significant global events provide fertile ground for radicalization and many who turn to violence radicalize exclusively online—often without direction from others. They use technology to do so secretly and anonymously, seriously challenging the ability of our investigators to keep pace and to identify and prevent acts of violence.
For this reason and others, countering violent extremism will remain a significant portion of our work, though it now accounts for less than half of it.
Last year, the Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference and the work of Justice Hogue helped Canadians better understand the actions of foreign states that have tried to secretly interfere in our democratic processes and institutions.
This past spring, Canada held its forty-fifth general election, during which CSIS focused our efforts to identify foreign interference and take action to counter it. As the Chair of the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force, CSIS coordinated our country’s security and intelligence response and supported an independent panel of senior public servants in monitoring threats to the election. We applied the lessons we learned from past experience, Justice Hogue’s report, review bodies, and others to do this work better—and more transparently—than ever.
We shared the results of our efforts through weekly briefings to media by senior officials during the election period and in October. Canadians can now read the details in our after-action reports online. In essence, while we did see some foreign interference activity of concern, Canadians can be assured that we saw nothing that had an impact on our ability to have a free and fair election.
CSIS will stay vigilant in our work to identify attempts of foreign interference in our democratic processes and institutions. We’ll take action when necessary and continue to provide information to Canadians to keep them resilient and informed.
But, of course, foreign interference affects more than just our democratic processes and institutions.
Canada is a country that thrives in its diversity and guarantees the individual rights and freedoms of all within its borders. When foreign states don’t share our respect for these rights and feel threatened or embarrassed by the lawful activity of individuals in Canada, they sometimes resort to direct intimidation, influence, or reprisal. We refer to this as transnational repression.
Transnational repression disproportionately targets human rights and political activists, journalists, and others in cultural, ethnic, and religious groups. We’ve observed this in Canada in the form of surveillance; in the spreading of false and discrediting information; extortion; the threatening of loved ones abroad; and, at its most extreme, threats to safety and life.
These actions have deeply harmful consequences for those targeted. They also intimidate others, deterring them from exercising their right to free speech and lawful advocacy, or from fully participating in their community or democracy.
As a Canadian institution that proudly defends the rights of all in Canada, CSIS collects intelligence and acts to defend against transnational repression. In the past, we’ve publicly discussed transnational repression by the People’s Republic of China, India, and others. In particularly alarming cases over the last year, we’ve had to reprioritize our operations to counter the actions of Iranian intelligence services and their proxies who have targeted individuals they perceive as threats to their regime. In more than one case, this involved detecting, investigating, and disrupting potentially lethal threats against individuals in Canada.
While CSIS can take action to counter transnational repression, we don’t often do it alone. Our work with law enforcement often serves as our best defence. Also, alongside Public Safety Canada’s Counter-Foreign Interference Coordinator, we partner with ethnic, religious and cultural communities. Dialogue with them serves equally to share our information about transnational repression and to help us better understand their experiences.
Unfortunately, transnational repression and other forms of foreign interference are not the only threat posed by other states.
Today’s geopolitical environment is more dynamic and unpredictable than at any other time in recent memory. International relationships are shifting, and states are competing more intensely for economic opportunity and global influence. Our adversaries monitor and seek to exploit any weakness or division that may arise. It’s an environment where the value of intelligence is at its highest, and our adversaries will be more assertive than ever in trying to obtain it.
Intelligence services have long focused their espionage efforts on those with access to sensitive or classified information. Government and military secrets, including insights into technology and economic strategies, have been the primary goals. Today, while the goals are similar, the targets are more varied—some of the world’s most advanced and emergent technology is now held by private sector and academic institutions. National governments are still targeted for sensitive intelligence, military, and economic secrets but so too are corporations and other levels of government whose data, technological innovations, influence and access to resources can shift the balance of advantage.
Canada is an advanced economy. We have an abundance of natural resources. We hold privileged and influential positions in multilateral fora like NATO, the G7, and the Five Eyes intelligence alliance. Our success makes us prosperous. It also makes us a target and CSIS regularly identifies efforts by foreign intelligence services to collect intelligence across all sectors of our society.
Classified and sensitive Canadian government information continues to be the target of foreign intelligence services, including the PRC’s civilian and military intelligence services. Chinese spies have tried to recruit Canadians with access to government plans, intentions, information, and military expertise, through social media and online job platforms. We, along with our partners, have found ways to identify and counter these efforts over the last year.
We also routinely work with Global Affairs Canada, the Communications Security Establishment, and other partners to counter espionage threats from Russia. This includes, for example, identifying Russian intelligence officers through intelligence and denying their travel to Canada. It also includes working with allied and domestic partners to degrade the strength of Russian Intelligence Services globally, for example by countering their efforts of sabotage through commercial courier companies and the transportation industry.
And our counter-intelligence efforts benefit more than just the security of Canada.
As was recently highlighted in the media, illicit Russian procurement networks seek to illegally acquire Canadian goods and technologies, which they move to Russia through a complex series of front companies based around the world. Once in Russia, these Canadian products are then used to support Russian military efforts in Ukraine and elsewhere.
This year, CSIS took action to prevent this by informing several Canadian companies that Europe-based front companies seeking to acquire their goods were in fact connected to Russian agents. These companies not only took immediate measures to deny the Russians their success but also expressed gratitude and interest in working together to counter any future Russian activity.
Canada is a proud Arctic nation, and the global Arctic has become a theatre of increased interest due to its economic and strategic potential. Non-Arctic states, including the People’s Republic of China, seek to gain a strategic and economic foothold in the region. Russia, an Arctic state with a significant military presence in the region, remains unpredictable and aggressive. Both of those countries, and others, have a significant intelligence interest in our Arctic and those who influence or develop its economic or strategic potential. It's no surprise then that CSIS has observed both cyber and non-cyber intelligence collection efforts targeting both governments and the private sector in the region.
So, what are we doing? We collect intelligence to identify any state activity counter to Canada’s national interest in the region. We engage significantly with Indigenous, Arctic and Northern partners across Canada to develop awareness of what we’ve observed and to learn from their insights. In essence, we’re positioning ourselves to partner and defend Canada’s interests whenever it becomes necessary. For example, we’ve provided Inuit and territorial governments with information that empowers them to take into account national security interests as they make decisions about economic and research opportunities with foreign companies and investors.
Amendments to the CSIS Act last year facilitated these engagements and we expect to build on them in the coming years. Beyond the North, we’ve also developed stronger relationships with the private sector, academia, and other governments across Canada to raise awareness and help protect them against espionage. For instance, we’ve worked with the Business Council of Canada, the Canadian Chamber of Commerce, and others and intend to build on these partnerships to help ensure Canada’s economic security.
While I’ve outlined today threats of violent extremism, foreign interference, and espionage, I could say much more.
Foreign governments will continue to manipulate and propagate information in their interests. The threat of hostile hybrid and cyber operations against us continues to rise, and the nexus between criminal groups and state actors challenges traditional definitions and complicates our efforts to respond. It will be important for CSIS and its national security partners to work closely together to understand the intentions and activity of foreign states when they act against our interest, and to ensure our response uses the full range of government options.
Advances in technology, including artificial intelligence, have increased the sophistication of foreign states and other actors.
At the same time, Canadian’s data increasingly resides the hands of foreign governments and the corporations in their jurisdictions. This arms states who may choose to act against Canada’s interests with new ways to weaponize data and information. In response, CSIS will be challenged to adopt technology and use data in new and more significant ways to keep Canadians safe and to secure an advantage for Canada.
I understand that what I’ve covered today is concerning, but my intent is not to alarm. I want to reassure Canadians that CSIS, and the rest of Canada’s security and intelligence community, is here and working tirelessly in their best interests. As the threats shift and evolve, CSIS will continue to prioritize deliberately and ruthlessly, and become comfortable with an extraordinary pace of change.
As the Government seeks to navigate challenges and gain advantages inherent to more complex international relationships, CSIS will also play a significant and essential supporting role. Our intelligence will help serve Canada’s national interests and ensure its sovereignty.
Our many, trusted intelligence relationships with partner services across the globe will allow us to cooperate to defend our shared interests. Our ability to act against and to engage with competitors and adversaries will give the Government options to address security challenges when necessary.
As you’ve heard today, our environment provides real and significant challenges for CSIS. But, in my first year as Director, I have been continually reminded of one of our greatest advantages: the people of CSIS are passionate and capable. They are deeply proud to serve Canada and have dedicated themselves to defending the rights, freedoms, and way of life that define what it is to be Canadian.
As their Director, I’m proud of their tireless devotion in service of all Canadians, even when their most significant work is often not known or recognized outside our walls.
I hope that Canadians will join me in taking pride in their work and take comfort in CSIS’ able and steadfast efforts to keep them safe and prosperous.
Thank you.
Dan Rogers
Dan Stanton's upcoming book A Spy’s Perspective on Combating Foreign Interference will be a nonfiction account of Mr. Stanton’s career as an intelligence officer, from his training in the early days of CSIS to his decision to go public with concerns about foreign interference in 2023. Publication is expected for fall 2026. University of Toronto Press’s Daniel Quinlan has acquired world rights to Dan Stanton’s Seesoid: A Spy’s Perspective on Combating Foreign Interference for the Aevo imprint. The deal was arranged by Jake Babad at Westwood Creative Artists.
Sponsors:
The Pillar Society Privacy Policy and Terms of Service | © Copyright 2025 The Pillar Society | All Rights Reserved
