From The Globe and Mail
Reporter: Steven Chase
Published 2025-12-11

A member of the Canadian Armed Forces’ intelligence-collection unit has been arrested and charged with passing highly sensitive government secrets to a foreign entity, the military announced Thursday.

Master Warrant Officer Matthew Robar, a member of the Canadian Forces Intelligence Command, has been charged with multiple offences under both Canada’s foreign interference and security of information laws as well as the National Defence Act and the Criminal Code.

The arrest and charges stem from a joint operation between the Canadian Forces Military Police and the RCMP that the two organizations described Thursday as a probe into “foreign interference and security of information.”

This case emerges at a time of heightened concerns about foreign interference from Russia, China, Iran and India, and other countries. A lengthy public inquiry into foreign interference tabled its final report at the start of 2025.

The accusations could invite scrutiny of how effectively Canada safeguards not only its own military secrets but those of allies shared with Canadians through the Five Eyes network, which includes the United States, Britain, Australia and New Zealand.

Among the charges are “communicating special operational information” and “breach of trust in respect of safeguarded information” under the Foreign Interference and Security of Information Act, the military and RCMP said in a joint statement.

The first charge is under Section 17 (1) of the act, which deals with communicating “special operational information to a foreign entity or to a terrorist group.” The act says everyone who commits an offence under this subsection is “guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for life.”

Special operational information under the Foreign Interference and Security of Information Act refers to highly safeguarded government data revealing confidential sources, military plans for armed conflict, covert intelligence methods and vulnerabilities, targets of secret investigations, identities of undercover agents, military advantages or vulnerabilities, protective measures like encryption, or similar intelligence from foreign entities or terrorist groups.

This designation protects some of Canada’s most sensitive operational secrets, including signals intelligence capabilities – interception of electronic communications to gather information – as well as countermeasures.

The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) on Thursday declined to reveal which foreign country or foreign entity was allegedly involved in this case, or divulge specific details on the allegations.

None of the accusations have been proven in court.

The Forces and the RCMP said the investigation began in 2024 and “focused on the unauthorized disclosure of safeguarded information to a Foreign Entity.”

They said should the charges proceed to prosecution, “they will be tried in the military justice system by court martial.”

Other charges laid against MWO Robar include three counts of “Conduct to the Prejudice of Good Order and Discipline” under the National Defence Act, firearm storage charges as well as one count of “feigning disease” under the National Defence Act.

Canadian military legal rules published online say a charge of feigning disease or infirmity “should be laid only where the accused exhibits appearances resembling genuine symptoms which, to his knowledge, are not due to such disease or infirmity, but have been induced artificially for purposes of deceit, for example, simulating fits or mental disease.”

The Canadian Forces Intelligence Command oversees multiple divisions and it’s unclear where MWO Robar worked. The Canadian Forces Joint Imagery Centre provides imagery and imagery intelligence, the military’s website says. The Canadian Forces National Counter-Intelligence Unit “identifies, investigates and counters CAF threats by foreign intelligence services, individuals and groups engaged in terrorism, espionage, sabotage, subversion, or organized criminal activities that impact DND/CAF security.” The Mapping and Charting Establishment provides geospatial information and Joint Task Force X provides “strategic, operational and tactical human intelligence resources.”

Brigadier-General Vanessa Hanrahan, Canadian Forces Provost Marshal, praised the efforts of her staff in a statement accompanying the charges.

“The protection of national security relies on collaboration and precision. The success of this operation demonstrates the strength of joint policing efforts and what can be achieved when agencies and organizations work together toward a common goal.”

MWO Robar is not the first Canadian Forces intelligence staffer to be charged with communicating secrets to a foreign entity.

Nearly 14 years ago, a then-Canadian naval intelligence officer, Jeffrey Paul Delisle, was arrested and charged with passing secrets to a foreign entity. He later pleaded guilty to spying for Russia and went to prison.

Stephanie Carvin, a national-security expert at Carleton University, said the Delisle espionage hurt Canada. “There was serious concern and damage done with the Jeffery Delisle breach and that raised considerable concern about information security and Canada’s reputation,” she said. ”There’s the potential for that to happen here as well, depending on the severity of the case."

That being said, Prof. Carvin added, many militaries have experienced similar incidents like this in recent years. “Canada is by no means the exception.”

Mr. Delisle, who spied for Russia, had volunteered his services to Moscow, walking into the Russian embassy in Ottawa in 2007 and offering to betray his country for cash.

For nearly five years, Mr. Delisle stole highly classified and secret information from a treasure trove of material at his work and shipped it to the Russians.

The former sailor, who was arrested in January, 2012, smuggled out information from top-secret Canadian military facilities using a memory stick hidden in his pocket.

Mr. Delisle was paid by wire transfer for the first four years. At first he was paid $5,000 but this quickly dropped to about $2,800 a month and then finally $3,000 every 30 days. This continued until about five months before he was caught, when the Russians changed how they paid him.