THE INTEL BRIEF
News and Content From Our Members
Interesting Links
The SOUFAN Center - IntelBrief
Iran's Use of Information Warfare in the Conflict against the U.S. and Israel
Friday, April 24, 2026
Bottom Line Up Front
One of the most surprising aspects of the current war with Iran has been the Iranians’ effective use of information warfare against the United States and Israel. Iran has waged information warfare in myriad ways, with some efforts dedicated to confusing its adversaries, and some earmarked for domestic consumption. Other aspects have been extremely unorthodox yet arguably effective, including AI-generated videos mocking President Trump and his administration. The Joint Chiefs of Staff publication “Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Campaigns and Operations,” defined information warfare as “the integrated employment of IRCs [information related capabilities] in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own.” But in an era of memes and deepfakes, information warfare is more expansive in its means, methods, and motivations.
Iran's approach to information warfare has evolved over time. At its core, the overarching message has been one of ‘Death to America,’ and portraying the United States and Israel as the 'Great Satan' and the ‘Little Satan.’ More than anything, this rallying cry was a multi-decade effort, dating back to the 1979 Islamic Revolution, to rally around the flag and seek to create a unifying narrative in opposition to the United States and Israel. Iran's information warfare was thus focused inward, with propaganda and media operations concerned with domestic public support for the regime. Iran also spent time, energy, and resources exporting its revolution abroad, and thus, conducted operations in and through the information environment that highlighted its role as the benefactor to Shia militia groups in Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen, while also promoting the Palestinian cause, an effort that won Iran some hearts and minds in the Sunni Arab and non-Persian corners of the Middle East.
In the current conflict with the United States, Iranian information warfare has adopted several dimensions. First, Iran has attempted to shape the narrative and impact global public opinion by portraying the U.S. and Israel as warmongering nations hellbent on destroying Iran and all of its people. Statements by U.S. and Israeli leaders have played into this messaging, with some of President Trump's posts on his social media site Truth Social highlighted as proof by the Iranians that the U.S. will stop at nothing short of complete destruction: “A whole civilization will die tonight, never to be brought back again. I don’t want that to happen, but it probably will.” AI-generated videos have mocked President Trump, pointed out his administration’s mishandling of the Epstein files, and highlighted previous American wars, portraying the United States as militant and an unchecked aggressor and destabilizing force in the world. Other videos have focused on an errant American missile strike that hit an Iranian girls’ elementary school in Minab, mistakenly killing as many as 175 people, most of them children. Official Iranian media has also focused on this incident extensively in its reporting.
Perhaps the most popular and viral videos produced by the Iranians are the Lego videos depicting different scenarios featuring members of President Trump’s cabinet, including the President himself, but also Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and FBI Director Kash Patel. These videos have been produced by an entity known as “Explosive Media,” and have been promoted by the Iranian regime, though it is unclear what the relationship is, if any, between the media outlet and the current leadership in Iran. What is clear, however, is that whoever is helping produce these videos has a keen understanding of American pop culture. The videos have spread across Instagram, TikTok, and other popular social media platforms, going viral in some cases, and featuring catchy lyrics and music, including American-style hip-hop and rap music.
In some cases, the videos have been aimed at populations in other countries, promoted in an effort to demonstrate kinship or solidarity. For example, one video was aimed at espousing goodwill toward the people of Lebanon during Israel’s bombardment of Beirut and other parts of the country. According to Al Jazeera, the team behind Explosive Media, responsible for producing these videos, is approximately ten people, ranging in age from 19 to 25 years old. Information warfare means contesting the information environment and competing in the war of ideas, where narratives are formed and opinions are shaped.
Iranian embassies have also been used to peddle some of the country’s most successful information narratives. Embassies — especially those located in African countries — have gone viral on platforms like X for posting memes reacting to statements by President Trump and White House officials. The Iranian Embassy in South Africa has been especially prominent. In late March, it posted an image of a child’s toy steering wheel sitting in a car’s passenger seat in response to Trump’s March claim that the United States could potentially control the Strait of Hormuz alongside Iran. Iran’s embassy in Zimbabwe has also become a notable source of these reaction memes. Yesterday, it responded to Trump’s lengthy Truth Social post on birthright citizenship by writing, “not sure anyone read all of it yet. Does it have anything to do with us?” These accounts also engage with one another, often reinforcing a shared effort to portray Trump and his administration as absurd or unserious. According to the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, posts from these local embassy accounts have amassed hundreds of millions of views during the first 50 days of the conflict and helped recast Iran’s image for global audiences “toward that of an irreverent, witty underdog confronting the United States.”
The modern information warfare domain includes AI-generated content, disinformation and fake news, influence campaigns, propaganda, and both offensive and defensive cyber operations. According to an analysis by the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) at Reichman University in Israel, during last summer’s Twelve Day War between the United States and Israel, on one side, and Iran, on the other, Tehran’s AI-generated images were centered around five distinct narratives: the perception of widespread destruction across Israel; ridicule directed at Israeli leadership while glorifying then Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei; projecting Iranian dominance over Israel, with footage of military preparations for missile launches; “daily strike” fakes allegedly showing Iranian missile or aircraft attacks on Israeli targets; and fake news validated by AI-generated videos. Even putting out fake videos with images depicting attacks on Israel (when the videos could be from other parts of the world) is intended to confuse the enemy and inflict psychological damage on Israeli civilians, while polluting the information environment.
The United States has not performed well in the information environment, with President Trump failing to make a coherent case for war to the American public. In several cases, administration figures, including Secretary of State Marco Rubio, have suggested that Israel and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu helped steer the United States into this conflict. President Trump himself has offered myriad reasons for launching the war, though the President never made the case before Congress, and his objectives for what would constitute a clear American victory have shifted throughout the course of the war. Iran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz has been a constant feature of the information warfare environment, with various handles trolling President Trump, especially in the wake of his profanity-laced tirade on social media on Easter Day.
https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief/
CTV- Article by Judy Trinh
https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/article/trial-of-ex-mountie-william-majcher-accused-of-working-for-china-begins/
VANCOUVER – In his policing career, William Majcher infiltrated terror groups and drug cartels and was put on an assassin’s hit list.
With a university degree in commerce, the former Mountie often went undercover as an expert who could help criminals launder their money.
In 2021, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) acting on information from Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), issued a national espionage alert warning all its members about Majcher.
He had retired 14 years earlier from the force and moved to Hong Kong, but investigators believed he had been turned by the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
In July 2023, Majcher came back to Canada “voluntarily” to clear his name, instead he was arrested when he landed at Vancouver International Airport.
The former Mountie faces one charge under the Security of Information Act, a law used to prosecute foreign interference.
The 63-year-old is accused of engaging in “preparatory acts,” such as planning to use threats and violence to pressure a Chinese national Hongwei “Kevin” Sun to return to China to face punishment for alleged fraud.
After waiting nearly three years, Majcher’s trial will be heard in the Supreme Court of British Columbia in Vancouver. The case will be tried in front of Justice Martha Devlin and is scheduled for one week.
“Bill has been stuck in Canada. He’s been separated from his family and children. And his position has always been – ‘I’m not guilty. I’m innocent and I want to have my day in court,’” Ian Donaldson, Majcher’s defence lawyer said, adding that his client has elected for a judge alone trial.
Investigators believe Majcher participated in China’s notorious Operation Fox Hunt, Sky Net and anti-corruption campaigns launched by President Xi Jinping. Under the program, the PRC would recruit police officers, private investigators and lawyers in foreign countries to help track down fugitives suspected of financial crimes. Human rights group say Fox Hunt was also a guise used by Beijing to find and silence its critics in the Chinese diaspora.
For the past few months, the prosecution and the defence have been arguing over what evidence can be presented in court. Since Majcher has elected for trial by judge alone, several preliminary rulings have been made public which gives a sense of the defence strategy and of the strength of the crown’s case.
“I’m a patriot not a traitor,” Majcher previously said in an exclusive interview with CTV News. “I challenge almost anybody who be watching this to put themselves at the kind of risks that I’ve put for my country and for our allies.”
After he retired from policing, Majcher moved to Hong Kong where he founded a company, EMIDR, which specialized in helping Chinese firms recover stolen assets. Beijing was also one of his clients.
The RCMP began investigating Majcher in 2021 under Project Severo. The crux of the Crown’s case against Majcher rests on an email from 2017, obtained by the F.B.I. and provided to the RCMP in 2023.
In the 2017 email exchange with Ross Gaffney, EMIDR’s Director of the Americas – Majcher, references negotiations to establish terms of engagement to help recover part of a RMB 2.9 billion fraud against a bank in China’s Jilin Province.
According to court documents, the email states the “fraudster is now a major real estate mogul in Vancouver” with over $100 million in assets.
Majcher writes that the Chinese Police are close to issuing a global arrest warrant, and that he hopes to get a copy so that “we can impress upon the crook that we hold the keys to his future.”
The presumed Vancouver target, Kevin Sun, is not identified in the email.
“There’s no genuine evidence that anyone was after Kevin Sun,” says Donaldson, Majcher’s lawyer.
In the same message to Gaffney, Majcher talks about trying to locate two women in California to establish their assets so that China’s Public Security Bureau can make decision about whether to pursue them for asset recovery. He says the Chinese government wants EMIDR to teach and train their police on how to use “covert methodologies” to investigate international financial crime.
Majcher writes that he and another colleague are developing a “Concept Paper” for the Chinese to establish a “storefront” to run money laundering sting operations. The stings would be initiated on a government-to-government basis under a mutual legal assistance treaty.
Donaldson says the email doesn’t show anything nefarious only that Majcher was “earning a living.”
“His career has been about combatting money laundering. It has nothing to do with Fox Hunt or Sky Net.”
Donaldson was unable to persuade Justice Devlin that the FBI emails should not be entered into evidence, however the defence was successful in arguing that Majcher’s warrantless arrest at the airport was unconstitutional.
The lead investigator on Project Severo was Staff Sergeant Nicolas Ferland, a member of the INSET team which probes terrorism cases and foreign interference. On July 16, 2023, Ferland was notified by CBSA that Majcher would arrive in Canada from Hong Kong within two days. During the preliminary trial, Ferland testified that the investigation was “a bit premature” yet the team decided to arrest Majcher without a warrant.
Justice Devlin found that when Majcher arrived at Vancouver International, the RCMP did not have probable grounds to arrest him. At that time, investigators knew that Kevin Sun was wanted for financial crimes in China and that he had purchased large amounts of real estate in Canada.
They also knew that one of Majcher’s associates in Vancouver, Kim Marsh, also a former Mountie, wanted to investigate Sun.
Fourteen RCMP officers would carry out a search warrant at Marsh’s home which the judge also found was invalid. Marsh was initially labelled a co-conspirator in the case, but has never been charged. He’s now become a Crown witness.
Justice Devlin also slammed the INSET team for relying on second-hand information from an Australian television documentary in which Majcher was featured, instead of doing its own interviews.
In the documentary Majcher admitted to being an “economic mercenary” who worked with the Chinese government.
But the judge says the narrative put forward by Ferland at that time “leaves too many gaps” to reasonably infer that Majcher had “any involvement with Mr. Sun.”
“The investigation simply had not collected sufficient credible, and compelling information,” stated Justice Devlin in her ruling.
“It follows that Mr. Majcher’s warrantless arrest was unlawful. I find that his arrest on July 18, 2023, violated his right not to be arbitrarily detained.”
Court documents also reveal that Majcher, after leaving the RCMP, did provide intelligence to CSIS while he was living in Asia.
Majcher believes he first came under suspicion after the arrest of Huawei chief financial officer, Meng Wanzhou which triggered China’s retaliatory detention of Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig. In 2019, he self-reported to CSIS that he had been hired by a Chinese think tank to research the extradition process in the Wanzhou case.
Majcher says he offered to provide intelligence on the Chinese, instead he was accused of betraying Canada.
His lawyer, Ian Donaldson accuses the Mounties of “tunnel vision.”
“Bill is a patriot, but when a police force gets an idea firmly embedded in their minds – they follow that track and ignore all sorts of off-ramps. Some call this tunnel vision.”
Produced by The Kirsch Group
https://kirschgroup.com/the-enemy-in-the-blanket-are-iranian-sleeper-agents-the-real-problem-here/
It is Ontario premier Doug Ford’s “personal opinion” that Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) “sleeper cells” are present and active in Canada. In a recent press conference, he stated that these sleeper cells may have been behind a series of March 2026 Toronto synagogue shootings, as well as a handgun attack on the US Consulate in downtown Toronto. Premier Ford added that police and intelligence agencies must “weed these people out and hold them accountable.” A few days later, American media echoed Ford, alleging that up to 1,000 Iranian sleeper agents are “embedded” in Canada, where they pose “an urgent security threat” to the United States.
In old-time espionage parlance, sleeper agents refer to people who are infiltrated by a hostile power into a target country without diplomatic or official cover. Often, they are native speakers of the target country’s language, with extraordinary cultural knowledge and sensitivity. Once in place, they go dormant, building a life for themselves that makes them largely indistinguishable from most other citizens or residents of that country, until they are activated.
Given the expense and complexity involved in infiltrating, supporting and activating them, sleeper agents and sleeper cells are exceptional components of espionage, or terrorist, tradecraft. The 9/11 hijackers were not “sleepers,” despite being characterized that way. They were operatives with a specific and limited assignment who entered the United States on their own passports. Rudolf Abel, born and raised in England before relocating to the Soviet Union, was smuggled into the United States by Soviet Intelligence in 1948. He lived and worked as an artist and photographer in Brooklyn, New York while coordinating and managing Soviet espionage operations against the United States. At the time of Abel’s arrest in 1957, then CIA Director Allen Dulles said that he wished that he had at least three people as thorough, and as competent, as Rudolf Abel working for him in Moscow.
In the aftermath of Premier Ford’s comments, senior RCMP officials said that the Force did not “have any information to provide…on any sleeper cells that may or may not exist in Canada.” CSIS, meanwhile, assesses the threat from Iran and its proxies as “medium.” This means that a violent extremist attack related to Iran remains a “realistic possibility.” However, the attack is most likely to come from a lone actor, “inspired by conflict in the Middle East.”
In many respects, this does not seem to square with Iran’s status as one of the world’s most prolific sponsors of terrorism. Hamas, Hezbollah, the Yemen-based Houthi movement, and various Shi’ite militia groups in Iraq, are all part of Iran’s extensive proxy network. Historically, Iran is highly adept at using this network to spread mayhem across the region and, in some cases, around the world. In 2024, Argentina’s highest criminal court ruled that Iran was directly responsible for the “political and strategic design” of a Hezbollah bombing, 30 years earlier, of a Jewish community centre in Buenos Aires that left 85 people dead, and 300 injured.
More recently, both Europe and the United States have dealt with the outcomes of Iranian use of local criminal networks to target journalists, politicians, and Jewish, Iranian and Kurdish activists. In 2023, a member of a local Hells Angels chapter assisted the Iranian government in recruiting the attacker of a synagogue in Bochum, Germany. And two years later, Iran recruited two Russian organized crime figures to kill an Iranian journalist and human rights activist in New York. In Canada, where Iran features on a list of countries believed to be involved in foreign interference activities, authorities uncovered an alleged plot to assassinate human rights activist and former Justice Minister Irwin Cotler.
If not true sleeper agents, what constitutes the threat from Iran? At least two Iranian terrorist proxies, Hezbollah and Hamas, raise funds in Canada. This goes back to at least the 1990s, when the RCMP uncovered highly lucrative Hezbollah-controlled tobacco smuggling networks between the United States and Canada. By 2025, both groups were involved in money-laundering and drug trafficking networks, and the theft and export of high-end automobiles. There are also indications that IRGC officials are present in Canada, and that they are involved in active intimidation and harassment of anti-regime activists in Iranian diaspora communities.
For Iran and its proxies, Canada is strategic space. It is close to, but not part of, “the Great Satan;” it offers all of the conveniences of the modern world, including an efficient financial system connected to international networks; opportunities for various forms of high profit crime; freedom of movement and expression; and a large Iranian diaspora community, with everything that means in terms of fundraising, influence, and leverage through intimidation or deception. The Iranian regime is nothing if not pragmatic, and Iranian operatives and proxy players in Canada are likely to be focussed on those kinds of opportunities. Right now, Canada as the “peaceable kingdom” is probably more valuable to Iran than it is as a terrorist target.
Ill-advised statements about sinister Iranian “sleeper cells,” presumably awaiting the signal to “wake up” and wreak havoc in Canada, do very little except stoke paranoia and a peculiar kind of xenophobia. In the post 9/11 period, anti-Muslim rhetoric placed an unequal onus on ordinary Muslims, even those who were Canadian citizens and permanent residents, to “prove” their loyalty to Canada and to “Western values,” and to repudiate what were euphemistically referred to as “barbaric cultural practices.” A generation before, in the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution and the US embassy hostage crisis, Islam and Muslims became synonymous with terrorism and militancy, at least in the popular imagination. Even prominent political and media figures took sophomoric delight in the obvious mispronunciation of Shi’ite. So, the invocation of sleeper cells achieves nothing but linking an entire diaspora community to the possibility of terrorist violence, even though many, if not most, members of that community are opposed to the current Iranian regime. Rooted in suspicion and distrust, this kind of societal discord plays directly into that regime’s psyops and foreign interference strategies.
As above, American media and American political figures have been quick to seize on the Iranian sleeper cell narrative. This too is highly reminiscent of the decade and more after 9/11, when received American wisdom stated that the hijackers had entered the United States from Canada, exploiting fundamental weaknesses in Canadian immigration and intelligence protocols. This was by no limited to the realm of conspiracy theory: Hilary Clinton, Janet Napolitano, and John McCain were among the respected American political figures who insisted that this was true. Given this history, there is a high likelihood that the 1,000 Iranian sleeper agents supposedly “embedded” here will become a massive stick with which to beat Canada, which is still reeling from the aftershocks of the US administration’s assertions about fentanyl and the porous Canadian border.
None of this diminishes the actual threat of violence associated with the current conflict in Iran. But just as relatively few of the “ISIS-inspired” terrorist attacks in Canada and the United States involved actual ISIS fighters, Iranian-, Hamas-, or Hezbollah-inspired attacks are more likely to be carried out, not by actual operatives, but by contractors, sympathizers, or people inspired or swayed by ideological messaging without necessarily understanding it – what Vladimir Lenin is said to have characterized as “useful idiots.”
In 1989, for example, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini issued a fatwa (Islamic religious ruling) condemning Indian-British novelist Salman Rushdie to death for his “blasphemous” portrayal of the Prophet Muhammad in his novel, The Satanic Verses. The fatwa was carried out in 2022, not by an Iranian agent, but by a disgruntled Lebanese-American at an event in Chautauqua, New York. Rushdie survived. On the other hand, Ayman Ghazali, who drove a makeshift truck bomb into a Michigan synagogue and Jewish day school in early March, was acting under the “direction and control” of Hezbollah, according to the US Justice Department. Intelligence indicates that his brother was a Hezbollah commander who had recently been killed in an Israeli airstrike.
Whether carried out by an agent of the Iranian state, a proxy, a sympathizer, or a useful idiot, terrorist violence is still terrorist violence and the CSIS “realistic possibility” assessment must be taken seriously. Likely targets include anti-regime activists, including Canadian political figures and elected officials, as well as American targets of opportunity.
Since the events of October 7, 2023, antisemitic violence and the deliberate targeting of Jewish people, businesses and institutions has proliferated, internationally and here in Canada. With the ramping up of Iranian eliminationist rhetoric vis-à-vis Israel, the threat to Jewish, Israeli and so-called “Zionist” targets should be considered extreme.
On April 16, Pillar Society Ottawa/Gatineau President Neil Bisson appeared before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Industry and Technology to provide a national security perspective on Canada’s electric vehicle policies, specifically as they relate to Chinese EVs.
This was not about electric vehicles. It was not about competition or innovation. It was about national security. During his remarks, he framed the issue the same way he did throughout his career as an intelligence officer: Motivation. Suitability. Access: Motivation: The People’s Republic of China continues to conduct cyber espionage, foreign interference, and influence operations to advance its strategic interests. Suitability: Canada has already taken action in the past, banning certain technologies and addressing risks tied to surveillance systems and digital platforms. Access: This is where the concern becomes critical. Modern EVs are not just vehicles; they are data collection platforms on wheels, continuously gathering geolocation, behavioural, and environmental data. Now ask yourself: What happens when tens of thousands of these connected systems—built within an environment where companies are legally required to cooperate with state intelligence—are integrated into Canada’s transportation networks and electrical grid? That is not a hypothetical. That is a policy decision being made right now. Once that level of access is established, it becomes incredibly difficult to detect—and even harder to reverse. Neil Bisson’s opening statement begins at 11:16 in the link below:
https://parlvu.parl.gc.ca/Harmony/en/PowerBrowser/PowerBrowserV2/20260417/-1/44749
OTTAWA — An internal Canadian Security Intelligence Service memo says allowing the spy agency to collect foreign intelligence overseas would capitalize on its “existing footprint and expertise,” but might also invite a host of problems.
The memo says giving CSIS the capabilities of a foreign human intelligence service — like the American CIA or Britain’s MI6 — could create governance, accountability and privacy concerns about what constitutes a threat, and about the prospect of targeting Canadians.
The Canadian Press used the Access to Information Act to obtain the memo, which was drafted by CSIS in advance of a roundtable meeting organized by academics last June.
Those invited to the three-hour roundtable at the University of Ottawa included current and former senior intelligence officials and academics with an interest in security and international affairs.
CSIS spokesperson Magali Hébert confirmed that the spy service’s director, Dan Rogers, attended the meeting.
Former national security and intelligence adviser Vincent Rigby, one of the organizers of the roundtable, said the time is right to revisit the question of expanding Canada’s foreign intelligence-gathering, given the perilous state of the world and a growing need for economic information.
“We do not have a reliable ally to the south right now,” Rigby said in an interview. “Some would even suggest that we have a hostile state actor in the United States, and so we can’t rely on them for intelligence necessarily.”
Wesley Wark, a senior fellow at the Centre for International Governance Innovation, attended most of the roundtable. He said he was struck by how open and — in some cases — fully supportive people at the gathering were about the idea of Canada launching a foreign intelligence service.
“The tenor of the discussion was, we should be taking this question seriously. We should be exploring it,” he said. “It was the most hopeful discussion that I’ve ever attended in all my years in thinking about this question.”
The Communications Security Establishment, Canada’s cyberspy agency, collects foreign intelligence through electronic means, while Global Affairs Canada, National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces contribute some reporting, the CSIS memo notes.
CSIS is permitted to gather intelligence in Canada and abroad about security threats such as terrorism and espionage. It’s allowed to gather foreign intelligence — information about the activities, capabilities and intentions of foreign people, organizations and states — only within Canada, not overseas.
The memo says that in “an uncertain geopolitical context,” Canada’s demand for such foreign intelligence might grow.
“Canada can only learn and act so much through its current collection and authorities, and has historically relied on allied partnerships for certain foreign intelligence reporting,” the note says.
Many of Canada’s G7 and Five Eyes allies collect foreign human intelligence abroad, and take action to advance their interests, the memo adds.
It says introducing a Canadian foreign human intelligence capability abroad would position the government to advance Canada’s geopolitical, security, economic and other interests globally.
Rigby said the key step is to decide what sort of intelligence Canada might need its officers and sources to gather abroad, and how to go about it.
“Let’s have an in-depth analysis within government, a public debate, and then make a decision,” he said.
The memo identifies three main options for launching a foreign intelligence capability. Ottawa could create a dedicated new foreign human intelligence service, or develop foreign intelligence capabilities at CSIS that eventually would be transferred to a new organization, or permanently assign expanded foreign intelligence capabilities to CSIS.
A new foreign human intelligence service would have a clear mandate and accountability standards, and would fit well into foreign policy structures led by Global Affairs Canada, the memo says.
It also says a standalone agency would be very costly and setting it up would require much initial effort that would delay its operation for years. This option would also be “highly disruptive” to current security and intelligence community work, the memo says.
On the other hand, fostering foreign intelligence capabilities at CSIS with an eye to handing them off later could be accomplished through simple and “minimally disruptive” legislative amendments, while taking advantage of CSIS’s existing strengths, the memo says.
The downside of this approach would be a long, drawn-out process that would occupy much of the intelligence community’s energy “for at least the next five years,” it says.
Assigning expanded foreign intelligence capabilities to CSIS would have advantages similar to the incubation model, the memo says.
The perceived disadvantages — including concerns about governance, accountability, privacy and “mandate overlap” — appear to stem from the fact that CSIS would have to juggle its traditional security intelligence role with a new foreign intelligence one.
Each of the three options must be accompanied by resources to minimize disruption to existing mandates and work, the memo says.
Hébert said any CSIS advice on the evolution of Canada’s intelligence capabilities or its governing legislation “would be provided to the government as protected advice.”
Various proposals for a Canadian foreign intelligence service have been debated since the end of the Second World War.
A recently published paper by former intelligence analyst Alan Barnes explained how the decades-long discussion has been coloured by input from close allies, budgetary concerns and internal federal rivalries.
The debate also has touched on fears that Canada’s nice-guy, fair broker image could be tarnished by engaging in subterfuge abroad.
“That’s exactly why I think you need a public debate, and you need to clearly explain to Canadians what a foreign human intelligence service in Canada would be and what it wouldn’t be,” Rigby said.
“I don’t think that we should have a foreign intelligence service that is toppling countries in Latin America, or going around and indulging in other unsavoury acts,” he added. “We’re not trying to replicate the CIA, we’re not trying to replicate MI6. This is going to be a made-in-Canada solution.”
Mark Carney’s Liberals have not promoted the idea of a new foreign intelligence service as a means of helping Canada carve a more independent path in the world in the face of highly strained relations with the United States.
Carney said last September that a new national security policy would be released “in due course.” The government has yet to release such a strategy.
Wark said roundtable participants agreed that creating a foreign intelligence service would be a political decision.
“It will require a prime minister to lean in on this and decide this is something that Canada has to do,” he said.
Wark added that a foreign intelligence capability would not only move Canada away from dependence on the United States but help it build intelligence partnerships with other countries, providing a rationale as to “why they would want to co-operate with us.”
This report by The Canadian Press was first published April 10, 2026.
Jim Bronskill, The Canadian Press
Global News - Stewart Bell - April 1, 2026
A protester holds a sign with the image of slain Sikh leader Hardeep Singh Nijjar at Indian consulate in Vancouver, June 24, 2023
Foreign governments are continuing to harass and intimidate Canadians but proving it in court is a challenge, the RCMP said in a statement clarifying controversial remarks by the commissioner.
“What we can say is that the RCMP is aware of complaints of intimidation and harassment against certain communities across Canada,” the RCMP told Global News in the statement.
“The RCMP, and the broader government of Canada, is also aware that foreign states are engaging in such activities in Canada,” the police force added in response to questions.
The statement was released after Global News asked the RCMP to explain Commissioner Mike Duheme’s comments two weeks ago about Indian transnational repression.
In a March 19 broadcast, Duheme told CTV “We have people that are intimidating people, harassing people, but connecting the dots to a foreign entity, regardless of the country, we don’t have that.”
The remarks, the latest in a series of seemingly contradictory comments from the government about India’s activities in Canada, were condemned by critics.
A Canadian Sikh organization said the commissioner had left the impression the RCMP was walking back its accusations about India’s illicit targeting of Canada’s South Asian community.
But in its follow-up statement, the RCMP said the difficulty has been linking specific incidents against Canadians to a foreign state, with evidence that can be revealed in the criminal courts.
“Investigations are ongoing,” the RCMP said. “However, based on criminal intelligence currently held by the RCMP related to transnational repression, establishing a direct link to a foreign entity with information that can be disclosed in a criminal proceeding is a complex process.”
A former Canadian Security Intelligence Service official said the statement was revealing and pointed to the longstanding difficulties in using intelligence information in criminal prosecutions.
“The commissioner is acknowledging a lack of criminally admissible evidence linking foreign states to transnational repression in Canada. That is not the same as an absence of information,” Dan Stanton said.
“CSIS may hold relevant intelligence on current activity, but it is not under any statutory obligation to disclose that intelligence to the RCMP,” added Stanton, author of a forthcoming book on foreign interference.
“The Service would share some intelligence if their investigative target crossed the threshold of criminal activity and the RCMP believes it would further their evidence collection.”
An especially challenging aspect of foreign interference, transnational repression occurs when overseas governments, or those acting for them, use harassment, threats and violence to silence critics abroad.
The RCMP statement did not name specific countries, but CSIS has identified China, India, Russia and Iran as the main states conducting espionage and foreign interference in Canada.
Asked about the commissioner’s comments, CSIS said that “transnational repression and foreign interference remain persistent threats in Canada.”
“CSIS assessment of the main perpetrators of foreign interference and espionage against Canada remains unchanged.”
National security agencies believe the government of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has been engaged in election meddling, disinformation and foreign interference in Canada.
India has mostly targeted the Khalistan movement that seeks independence for the country’s Sikh-majority Punjab, labelling activists as terrorists and demanding their prosecution or extradition.
In 2023, India allegedly escalated its tactics when it contracted the Lawrence Bishnoi gang to assassinate key members of the Khalistan movement, starting with B.C. Sikh leader Hardeep Singh Nijjar.
In October 2024, the RCMP went further, accusing the Indian government of orchestrating an array of violence in Canada. Six Indian diplomats were expelled for their suspected involvement.
“As shared on October 14, 2024, the RCMP observed organized crime elements being used in acts of transnational repression,” the RCMP said in its recent statement.
“A number of investigations related to these findings remain ongoing. For reasons of operational integrity and security, no further details can be provided until charges are laid and the matters become public,” it said.
“The RCMP is committed to combating foreign interference in all its forms and will not tolerate intimidation, harassment, or the targeting of diaspora communities or individuals in Canada.”
India denies the allegations, despite evidence that it also tried to kill one of Nijjar’s associates. The FBI disrupted the plot, which the U.S. says was carried out by India’s Research and Analysis Wing intelligence branch.
Critics have accused Prime Minister Mark Carney’s government of overlooking India’s activities as it seeks a trade deal with the Modi government to offset the impact of a U.S. trade war.
On the eve of Carney’s official visit to India, one of his officials told reporters that India was no longer targeting Canadians, prompting a backlash from within the Liberal ranks.
Following the RCMP commissioner’s remarks to CTV, World Sikh Organization president Danish Singh accused the government of “playing word games to shield the government of India.”
“Sikh Canadians continue to face intimidation, surveillance, and threats linked to Indian state actors and their proxies,” he said.
“We are aware of multiple recent incidents, including cases where Sikh activists have received ‘duty to warn’ notifications from Canadian law enforcement. We are aware of individuals being surveilled and intimidated.”
Stewart.Bell@globalnews.ca
In 1989, the FBI uncovered a deep-cover Czech spy living as a hotel doorman in San Francisco. Instead of a dramatic arrest, agents befriended the New Age enthusiast, taking him out for steak and vodka to earn his trust as the Soviet bloc began to crumble. This quiet operation eventually helped the bureau unravel a much broader network of foreign operatives hiding in plain sight across America.
The fallout led to a standoff with the new post-communist Czech intelligence chief, who accidentally exposed his remaining spies by openly phoning them with orders to return to Europe. Surprisingly, many of these operatives had become so deeply Americanized, with some even coaching Little League baseball, that they refused to leave. Showing remarkable restraint, the U.S. government simply let them be, allowing upward of a dozen former adversaries to permanently live out their fake American lives.
This article appeared in the Politico Magazine on March 7, 2026
Full Story HERE - The Spies Who Loved Us
Analyzing the threat of Iranian sleeper cells in Canada
A string of violent attacks since the start of the Middle East war is raising concerns that Iranian sleeper cells could be operating in Canada. For The National, Idil Mussa talks to threat analysts and intelligence experts about what's real and what's speculation.
CBC Article by Idil Mussa, Aloysius Wond, and Albert Leung
The U.S.-Israel war with Iran has stoked fears that Tehran could activate dormant agents abroad to execute terror plots.
"I believe there’s sleeper cells all over the world," Ontario Premier Doug Ford said at a press conference on March 10. "As we know, they’re in the U.S. They’re in Canada."
According to U.S. media reports, American officials have intercepted encrypted communication believed to have come from Iran that could act as an "operational trigger" to activate "sleeper assets."
Days after the war began, Qatari authorities announced the arrest of 10 suspects allegedly assigned to spy on "vital and military facilities" in the Gulf nation for the Iranian regime. But counterterrorism experts say the threat of Iranian sleeper cells is largely overstated.
Iran uses 'criminal proxies' not 'sleeper cells' in Canada, says ex-spy
Dan Stanton, director of the national security program at the University of Ottawa's Professional Development Institute who also worked for more than 30 years at CSIS, says the Iranian regime does not use ‘sleeper cells’ but rather ‘criminal proxies’ in Canada.
Sleeper cells are understood to be groups of covert agents who remain embedded within a population until they are directed to act — an idea that "often evokes the image of a Russian spy or terrorist living next door, laying low, blending in and waiting to be called upon to carry out an operation," writes Shannon Nash, a counterterrorism expert who has studied the topic extensively.
"This concept, and the fear of an enemy operating from within, is particularly jarring and plays on society’s perception of security."
Anxiety around sleeper cells tends to resurface whenever tensions escalate between the U.S. and Iran. But one Canadian security expert says their deployment is not the modus operandi of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Canada.
"They don't use them," said Dan Stanton, director of the national security program at the University of Ottawa's Professional Development Institute.
Stanton, who worked with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) for more than 30 years, says the actual threat lies in Tehran's use of local criminal networks for targeted intimidation and violence.
"They don't use sleeper cells in that sense of deep cover agents. They use what we would call criminal proxies. These are people that would do surveillance, harass people or try to kill people."
Public figures, both in government positions and in the diaspora, who are critical of the Iranian regime are often subject to targeted campaigns or plots against their life.
Among them is former Canadian justice minister and outspoken critic of the Iranian regime Irwin Cotler. In 2024, the RCMP informed Cotler that they had foiled a plot by agents of Iran to kill him.
In a statement to CBC, CSIS wrote that the intelligence agency works closely with "foreign partners and domestic law enforcement" to counter the actions of Iranian intelligence services and their proxies.
"In more than one case this involved detecting, investigating and disrupting potentially lethal threats against individuals in Canada," it wrote.
I was under direct assassination threat': Irwin Cotler explains alleged Iran plot
Former Canadian justice minister Irwin Cotler tells CBC chief correspondent Adrienne Arsenault about the alleged Iranian assassination plot that has had him under 24/7 police protection and why he thinks more needs to be done to stop the regime’s transnational repression.
In the U.S., two Russians were sentenced to 25 years in prison last October in connection with a murder-for-hire plot targeting Masih Alinejad, an Iranian American journalist and activist, on behalf of the government of Iran. A few years earlier, the U.S. Justice Department announced charges against an Iranian national for attempting to arrange for the assassination of former national security advisor John Bolton on U.S. soil. "All of us who were targeted by Iran should be worried, but so should other people now that this attack has begun," said Bolton, whose security detail was removed in January 2025. "It was obviously wrong for Trump to take away the protection that was afforded — not just to me but to several other former senior officials — because the threat arose from what we did as part of our official duties," Bolton told CBC News in an interview.
Former national security advisor John Bolton, centre, was provided with a security detail following an Iranian plot to hire people to assassinate him in what appeared to be retaliation for the killing of IRGC commander Qasem Soleimani in 2020. The protection was removed by U.S. President Donald Trump in January 2025.
Thomas Juneau, who teaches at the University of Ottawa’s Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, says the IRGC targets the families of Iranian dissidents as a way to punish or silence them.
"There have been multiple documented cases … parents, siblings, close friends, other family members who are still in Iran who will be aggressively interrogated by intelligence services," said Juneau.
"And in more extreme cases, [they] will be physically beaten, tortured or [suffer] other kinds of negative consequences, such as financial assets frozen, careers suspended, jobs lost."
Intelligence experts stressed that lone wolves with a range of possible motives and affiliations are more likely to be behind acts of violence in Canada than deep-cover Iranian agents. "The Iranian regime, we should also remember, is part of a political ideology," said political violence and terrorism researcher Broderick McDonald. "Some of the younger members of the extreme wings of the Iranian IRGC ideology have, in some cases, taken actions on their own." CSIS likewise told CBC the mostly likely scenario for a "violent extremist attack" involves "a lone actor whose intent to mobilize is unknown to authorities" and who "could be inspired by the conflict in the Middle East." There have been numerous violent incidents in the U.S. since the war began on Feb. 28, including a synagogue attack in Michigan and a shooting in Austin, Texas, where a gunman wearing Iranian-flag-themed clothing killed two and injured 14. In Canada, a gym owned by an Iranian Canadian activist in Thornhill, Ont., that displayed pre-revolutionary Iranian flags was shot at 17 times after a large anti-regime demonstration.
Separately, the U.S. consulate in Toronto was the target of gunfire in what police are calling a "national security incident." "I do think the terrorist threat is worldwide, but especially in North America and Europe," said Bolton. "The whole point of terror is to strike people who aren't necessarily involved directly as adversaries, to show that consequences of being unkind to the terrorist power can be fatal. So terrorism doesn't necessarily have to be directed only at opponents of the regime in Tehran." Juneau cautions against drawing conclusions about the precise motives and actors behind these incidents. "In some of the more recent cases, there's still not enough information publicly available to come to a definitive conclusion."
McDonald says the flood of false or misleading information about the war online is causing real-world confusion and harm.
"It's one of the most polluted information environments that I've ever seen within a conflict," he said. "I think we have to look at the war and sleeper cells in that context."
Political violence and terrorism researcher Broderick McDonald says while it’s important to not overlook legitimate intelligence threats from the Iranian regime, 'sensational' reporting and fearmongering are dangerous and play into the 'escalation narrative' of the war.
McDonald says it's important to strike a balance of acknowledging significant threats while remaining highly "aware of the broader information environment." He also advised caution when engaging with rhetoric about threats that could stoke "Hollywood-style fears," which "war hawks" in the U.S. and Israel can use to escalate the war.
"It's a potent tool to also cultivate fear in the United States. And we should, I think, avoid the sensationalization of it."
McDonald says Canada has a significant strategic advantage when it comes to identifying possible threats.
"We have the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing network, so not just the United States sharing intelligence with us, but also our partners in the U.K., Australia, New Zealand, and that significantly helps us to detect threats before they even arrive on our shores."
Additionally, McDonald says Canada's historically bipartisan commitment to staying out of "wars of choice" further shields the nation from foreign retaliation.
"Both governments, Conservative and Liberal, have pursued this kind of stance. And I think that insulates us from the threats of Iran escalating against Canada."
CSIS said it is "focused on ensuring continued vigilance to ensure the safety and security of Canada and all Canadians" and has increased its efforts around "potential Iranian state-directed and violent extremist activity."
Middle East analyst Thomas Juneau explains that Iran intimidates and pressures Iranian Canadians with the goal of sowing fear among them that they could be surveilled, thereby repressing dissent abroad.
Stanton says it is important to remember that Canada is "not the epicentre of espionage," nor would it be a high-priority target for a regime struggling to survive.
Regardless of whether Iranian sleeper cells are active in Canada, the regime’s attempts to target and threaten Iranian Canadians are "absolutely" real, says Juneau.
The IRGC does not have the resources to surveil every member of the diaspora, but Juneau says "the simple fact that it is a possibility — and that they know it's a possibility — sows fear."
"That's how transnational repression works," he said. "If anything, the problem is not its exaggeration. The problem is its neglect by the Canadian government not doing enough to protect Iranian Canadians."
This unclassified extract from the Central Intelligence Agency's premier journal, Studies in Intelligence (Vol. 70, No. 1, March 2026), provides a rare look into how the Agency is preparing for a future saturated by artificial intelligence. While the publication is primarily designed for US government officials, these curated articles offer a masterclass in modern tradecraft for anyone interested in the intersection of national security and emerging technology. The core message is clear: while AI will fundamentally transform how the CIA spots, recruits, and handles assets, the "human touch" of a Case Officer (CO) is more valuable than ever in an era of deepfakes and digital noise. The journal highlights that the CIA’s Center for the Study of Intelligence is aggressively pursuing a baseline of AI training for all officers in the field. Key insights include the use of AI for real-time "persuasion guidance" during meetings and the deployment of "AI officers" to vet walk-ins with 98% accuracy. However, the journal balances this technical optimism with a grounded warning—since AI can be used to scale surveillance and fabrication, the Agency must double down on "non-electronic" traditional tradecraft like dead drops and brush passes to ensure secure, high-trust communication.
Click Here for the Full Report
In the fall of 2025, “The Panel” received an invitation from Greg Spievak and Robert Mendoza of Reboot Communications to speak at the March 2026 Victoria International Privacy & Security Summit. This was the Summit’s 28th year as an international forum with over 600 participants, of which 60 were university students. It is a highly respected conference valued by many returning sponsors and participants.
Members read the complete report HERE!
Sponsors:
The Pillar Society Privacy Policy and Terms of Service | © Copyright 2025 The Pillar Society | All Rights Reserved
