On April 16, Pillar Society Ottawa/Gatineau President Neil Bisson appeared before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Industry and Technology to provide a national security perspective on Canada’s electric vehicle policies, specifically as they relate to Chinese EVs.

This was not about electric vehicles.
It was not about competition or innovation.

It was about national security.

During his remarks, he framed the issue the same way he did throughout his career as an intelligence officer:

Motivation. Suitability. Access:

Motivation: The People’s Republic of China continues to conduct cyber espionage, foreign interference, and influence operations to advance its strategic interests.

Suitability: Canada has already taken action in the past, banning certain technologies and addressing risks tied to surveillance systems and digital platforms.

Access: This is where the concern becomes critical. Modern EVs are not just vehicles; they are data collection platforms on wheels, continuously gathering geolocation, behavioural, and environmental data.

Now ask yourself:
What happens when tens of thousands of these connected systems—built within an environment where companies are legally required to cooperate with state intelligence—are integrated into Canada’s transportation networks and electrical grid?

That is not a hypothetical.
That is a policy decision being made right now.

Once that level of access is established, it becomes incredibly difficult to detect—and even harder to reverse.

Neil Bisson’s opening statement begins at 11:16 in the link below:

https://parlvu.parl.gc.ca/Harmony/en/PowerBrowser/PowerBrowserV2/20260417/-1/44749

OTTAWA — An internal Canadian Security Intelligence Service memo says allowing the spy agency to collect foreign intelligence overseas would capitalize on its “existing footprint and expertise,” but might also invite a host of problems.

The memo says giving CSIS the capabilities of a foreign human intelligence service — like the American CIA or Britain’s MI6 — could create governance, accountability and privacy concerns about what constitutes a threat, and about the prospect of targeting Canadians.

The Canadian Press used the Access to Information Act to obtain the memo, which was drafted by CSIS in advance of a roundtable meeting organized by academics last June.

Those invited to the three-hour roundtable at the University of Ottawa included current and former senior intelligence officials and academics with an interest in security and international affairs.

CSIS spokesperson Magali Hébert confirmed that the spy service’s director, Dan Rogers, attended the meeting.

Former national security and intelligence adviser Vincent Rigby, one of the organizers of the roundtable, said the time is right to revisit the question of expanding Canada’s foreign intelligence-gathering, given the perilous state of the world and a growing need for economic information.

“We do not have a reliable ally to the south right now,” Rigby said in an interview. “Some would even suggest that we have a hostile state actor in the United States, and so we can’t rely on them for intelligence necessarily.”

Wesley Wark, a senior fellow at the Centre for International Governance Innovation, attended most of the roundtable. He said he was struck by how open and — in some cases — fully supportive people at the gathering were about the idea of Canada launching a foreign intelligence service.

“The tenor of the discussion was, we should be taking this question seriously. We should be exploring it,” he said. “It was the most hopeful discussion that I’ve ever attended in all my years in thinking about this question.”

The Communications Security Establishment, Canada’s cyberspy agency, collects foreign intelligence through electronic means, while Global Affairs Canada, National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces contribute some reporting, the CSIS memo notes.

CSIS is permitted to gather intelligence in Canada and abroad about security threats such as terrorism and espionage. It’s allowed to gather foreign intelligence — information about the activities, capabilities and intentions of foreign people, organizations and states — only within Canada, not overseas.

The memo says that in “an uncertain geopolitical context,” Canada’s demand for such foreign intelligence might grow.

“Canada can only learn and act so much through its current collection and authorities, and has historically relied on allied partnerships for certain foreign intelligence reporting,” the note says.

Many of Canada’s G7 and Five Eyes allies collect foreign human intelligence abroad, and take action to advance their interests, the memo adds.

It says introducing a Canadian foreign human intelligence capability abroad would position the government to advance Canada’s geopolitical, security, economic and other interests globally.

Rigby said the key step is to decide what sort of intelligence Canada might need its officers and sources to gather abroad, and how to go about it.

“Let’s have an in-depth analysis within government, a public debate, and then make a decision,” he said.

The memo identifies three main options for launching a foreign intelligence capability. Ottawa could create a dedicated new foreign human intelligence service, or develop foreign intelligence capabilities at CSIS that eventually would be transferred to a new organization, or permanently assign expanded foreign intelligence capabilities to CSIS.

A new foreign human intelligence service would have a clear mandate and accountability standards, and would fit well into foreign policy structures led by Global Affairs Canada, the memo says.

It also says a standalone agency would be very costly and setting it up would require much initial effort that would delay its operation for years. This option would also be “highly disruptive” to current security and intelligence community work, the memo says.

On the other hand, fostering foreign intelligence capabilities at CSIS with an eye to handing them off later could be accomplished through simple and “minimally disruptive” legislative amendments, while taking advantage of CSIS’s existing strengths, the memo says.

The downside of this approach would be a long, drawn-out process that would occupy much of the intelligence community’s energy “for at least the next five years,” it says.

Assigning expanded foreign intelligence capabilities to CSIS would have advantages similar to the incubation model, the memo says.

The perceived disadvantages — including concerns about governance, accountability, privacy and “mandate overlap” — appear to stem from the fact that CSIS would have to juggle its traditional security intelligence role with a new foreign intelligence one.

Each of the three options must be accompanied by resources to minimize disruption to existing mandates and work, the memo says.

Hébert said any CSIS advice on the evolution of Canada’s intelligence capabilities or its governing legislation “would be provided to the government as protected advice.”

Various proposals for a Canadian foreign intelligence service have been debated since the end of the Second World War.

A recently published paper by former intelligence analyst Alan Barnes explained how the decades-long discussion has been coloured by input from close allies, budgetary concerns and internal federal rivalries.

The debate also has touched on fears that Canada’s nice-guy, fair broker image could be tarnished by engaging in subterfuge abroad.

“That’s exactly why I think you need a public debate, and you need to clearly explain to Canadians what a foreign human intelligence service in Canada would be and what it wouldn’t be,” Rigby said.

“I don’t think that we should have a foreign intelligence service that is toppling countries in Latin America, or going around and indulging in other unsavoury acts,” he added. “We’re not trying to replicate the CIA, we’re not trying to replicate MI6. This is going to be a made-in-Canada solution.”

Mark Carney’s Liberals have not promoted the idea of a new foreign intelligence service as a means of helping Canada carve a more independent path in the world in the face of highly strained relations with the United States.

Carney said last September that a new national security policy would be released “in due course.” The government has yet to release such a strategy.

Wark said roundtable participants agreed that creating a foreign intelligence service would be a political decision.

“It will require a prime minister to lean in on this and decide this is something that Canada has to do,” he said.

Wark added that a foreign intelligence capability would not only move Canada away from dependence on the United States but help it build intelligence partnerships with other countries, providing a rationale as to “why they would want to co-operate with us.”

This report by The Canadian Press was first published April 10, 2026.

Jim Bronskill, The Canadian Press

Global News - Stewart Bell - April 1, 2026

A protester holds a sign with the image of slain Sikh leader Hardeep Singh Nijjar at Indian consulate in Vancouver, June 24, 2023

Foreign governments are continuing to harass and intimidate Canadians but proving it in court is a challenge, the RCMP said in a statement clarifying controversial remarks by the commissioner.

“What we can say is that the RCMP is aware of complaints of intimidation and harassment against certain communities across Canada,” the RCMP told Global News in the statement.

“The RCMP, and the broader government of Canada, is also aware that foreign states are engaging in such activities in Canada,” the police force added in response to questions.

The statement was released after Global News asked the RCMP to explain Commissioner Mike Duheme’s comments two weeks ago about Indian transnational repression.

In a March 19 broadcast, Duheme told CTV “We have people that are intimidating people, harassing people, but connecting the dots to a foreign entity, regardless of the country, we don’t have that.”

The remarks, the latest in a series of seemingly contradictory comments from the government about India’s activities in Canada, were condemned by critics.

A Canadian Sikh organization said the commissioner had left the impression the RCMP was walking back its accusations about India’s illicit targeting of Canada’s South Asian community.

But in its follow-up statement, the RCMP said the difficulty has been linking specific incidents against Canadians to a foreign state, with evidence that can be revealed in the criminal courts.

“Investigations are ongoing,” the RCMP said. “However, based on criminal intelligence currently held by the RCMP related to transnational repression, establishing a direct link to a foreign entity with information that can be disclosed in a criminal proceeding is a complex process.”

A former Canadian Security Intelligence Service official said the statement was revealing and pointed to the longstanding difficulties in using intelligence information in criminal prosecutions.

“The commissioner is acknowledging a lack of criminally admissible evidence linking foreign states to transnational repression in Canada. That is not the same as an absence of information,” Dan Stanton said.

“CSIS may hold relevant intelligence on current activity, but it is not under any statutory obligation to disclose that intelligence to the RCMP,” added Stanton, author of a forthcoming book on foreign interference.

“The Service would share some intelligence if their investigative target crossed the threshold of criminal activity and the RCMP believes it would further their evidence collection.”

An especially challenging aspect of foreign interference, transnational repression occurs when overseas governments, or those acting for them, use harassment, threats and violence to silence critics abroad.

The RCMP statement did not name specific countries, but CSIS has identified China, India, Russia and Iran as the main states conducting espionage and foreign interference in Canada.

Asked about the commissioner’s comments, CSIS said that “transnational repression and foreign interference remain persistent threats in Canada.”

“CSIS assessment of the main perpetrators of foreign interference and espionage against Canada remains unchanged.”

National security agencies believe the government of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has been engaged in election meddling, disinformation and foreign interference in Canada.

India has mostly targeted the Khalistan movement that seeks independence for the country’s Sikh-majority Punjab, labelling activists as terrorists and demanding their prosecution or extradition.

In 2023, India allegedly escalated its tactics when it contracted the Lawrence Bishnoi gang to assassinate key members of the Khalistan movement, starting with B.C. Sikh leader Hardeep Singh Nijjar.

In October 2024, the RCMP went further, accusing the Indian government of orchestrating an array of violence in Canada. Six Indian diplomats were expelled for their suspected involvement.

“As shared on October 14, 2024, the RCMP observed organized crime elements being used in acts of transnational repression,” the RCMP said in its recent statement.

“A number of investigations related to these findings remain ongoing. For reasons of operational integrity and security, no further details can be provided until charges are laid and the matters become public,” it said.

“The RCMP is committed to combating foreign interference in all its forms and will not tolerate intimidation, harassment, or the targeting of diaspora communities or individuals in Canada.”

India denies the allegations, despite evidence that it also tried to kill one of Nijjar’s associates. The FBI disrupted the plot, which the U.S. says was carried out by India’s Research and Analysis Wing intelligence branch.

Critics have accused Prime Minister Mark Carney’s government of overlooking India’s activities as it seeks a trade deal with the Modi government to offset the impact of a U.S. trade war.

On the eve of Carney’s official visit to India, one of his officials told reporters that India was no longer targeting Canadians, prompting a backlash from within the Liberal ranks.

Following the RCMP commissioner’s remarks to CTV, World Sikh Organization president Danish Singh accused the government of “playing word games to shield the government of India.”

“Sikh Canadians continue to face intimidation, surveillance, and threats linked to Indian state actors and their proxies,” he said.

“We are aware of multiple recent incidents, including cases where Sikh activists have received ‘duty to warn’ notifications from Canadian law enforcement. We are aware of individuals being surveilled and intimidated.”

Stewart.Bell@globalnews.ca

In 1989, the FBI uncovered a deep-cover Czech spy living as a hotel doorman in San Francisco. Instead of a dramatic arrest, agents befriended the New Age enthusiast, taking him out for steak and vodka to earn his trust as the Soviet bloc began to crumble. This quiet operation eventually helped the bureau unravel a much broader network of foreign operatives hiding in plain sight across America.

The fallout led to a standoff with the new post-communist Czech intelligence chief, who accidentally exposed his remaining spies by openly phoning them with orders to return to Europe. Surprisingly, many of these operatives had become so deeply Americanized, with some even coaching Little League baseball, that they refused to leave. Showing remarkable restraint, the U.S. government simply let them be, allowing upward of a dozen former adversaries to permanently live out their fake American lives.

This article appeared in the Politico Magazine on March 7, 2026

Full Story HERE - The Spies Who Loved Us

Analyzing the threat of Iranian sleeper cells in Canada

A string of violent attacks since the start of the Middle East war is raising concerns that Iranian sleeper cells could be operating in Canada. For The National, Idil Mussa talks to threat analysts and intelligence experts about what's real and what's speculation.

CBC Article by Idil Mussa, Aloysius Wond, and Albert Leung

The U.S.-Israel war with Iran has stoked fears that Tehran could activate dormant agents abroad to execute terror plots.

"I believe there’s sleeper cells all over the world," Ontario Premier Doug Ford said at a press conference on March 10. "As we know, they’re in the U.S. They’re in Canada."

According to U.S. media reports, American officials have intercepted encrypted communication believed to have come from Iran that could act as an "operational trigger" to activate "sleeper assets."

Days after the war began, Qatari authorities announced the arrest of 10 suspects allegedly assigned to spy on "vital and military facilities" in the Gulf nation for the Iranian regime.

But counterterrorism experts say the threat of Iranian sleeper cells is largely overstated.

Iran uses 'criminal proxies' not 'sleeper cells' in Canada, says ex-spy

Dan Stanton, director of the national security program at the University of Ottawa's Professional Development Institute who also worked for more than 30 years at CSIS, says the Iranian regime does not use ‘sleeper cells’ but rather ‘criminal proxies’ in Canada.

Sleeper cells are understood to be groups of covert agents who remain embedded within a population until they are directed to act — an idea that "often evokes the image of a Russian spy or terrorist living next door, laying low, blending in and waiting to be called upon to carry out an operation," writes Shannon Nash, a counterterrorism expert who has studied the topic extensively.

"This concept, and the fear of an enemy operating from within, is particularly jarring and plays on society’s perception of security."

Anxiety around sleeper cells tends to resurface whenever tensions escalate between the U.S. and Iran. But one Canadian security expert says their deployment is not the modus operandi of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Canada.

"They don't use them," said Dan Stanton, director of the national security program at the University of Ottawa's Professional Development Institute.

Stanton, who worked with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) for more than 30 years, says the actual threat lies in Tehran's use of local criminal networks for targeted intimidation and violence.

"They don't use sleeper cells in that sense of deep cover agents. They use what we would call criminal proxies. These are people that would do surveillance, harass people or try to kill people."

Regime critics, activists targeted

Public figures, both in government positions and in the diaspora, who are critical of the Iranian regime are often subject to targeted campaigns or plots against their life.

Among them is former Canadian justice minister and outspoken critic of the Iranian regime Irwin Cotler. In 2024, the RCMP informed Cotler that they had foiled a plot by agents of Iran to kill him.

In a statement to CBC,  CSIS wrote that the intelligence agency works closely with "foreign partners and domestic law enforcement" to counter the actions of Iranian intelligence services and their proxies.

"In more than one case this involved detecting, investigating and disrupting potentially lethal threats against individuals in Canada," it wrote.

 

I was under direct assassination threat': Irwin Cotler explains alleged Iran plot

Former Canadian justice minister Irwin Cotler tells CBC chief correspondent Adrienne Arsenault about the alleged Iranian assassination plot that has had him under 24/7 police protection and why he thinks more needs to be done to stop the regime’s transnational repression.

In the U.S., two Russians were sentenced to 25 years in prison last October in connection with a murder-for-hire plot targeting Masih Alinejad, an Iranian American journalist and activist, on behalf of the government of Iran.

A few years earlier, the U.S. Justice Department announced charges against an Iranian national for attempting to arrange for the assassination of former national security advisor John Bolton on U.S. soil.

"All of us who were targeted by Iran should be worried, but so should other people now that this attack has begun," said Bolton, whose security detail was removed in January 2025.

"It was obviously wrong for Trump to take away the protection that was afforded — not just to me but to several other former senior officials — because the threat arose from what we did as part of our official duties," Bolton told CBC News in an interview.

Former national security advisor John Bolton, centre, was provided with a security detail following an Iranian plot to hire people to assassinate him in what appeared to be retaliation for the killing of IRGC commander Qasem Soleimani in 2020. The protection was removed by U.S. President Donald Trump in January 2025.

Thomas Juneau, who teaches at the University of Ottawa’s Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, says the IRGC targets the families of Iranian dissidents as a way to punish or silence them.

"There have been multiple documented cases … parents, siblings, close friends, other family members who are still in Iran who will be aggressively interrogated by intelligence services," said Juneau.

"And in more extreme cases, [they] will be physically beaten, tortured or [suffer] other kinds of negative consequences, such as financial assets frozen, careers suspended, jobs lost."

Lone wolf attacks most likely

Intelligence experts stressed that lone wolves with a range of possible motives and affiliations are more likely to be behind acts of violence in Canada than deep-cover Iranian agents.

"The Iranian regime, we should also remember, is part of a political ideology," said political violence and terrorism researcher Broderick McDonald. "Some of the younger members of the extreme wings of the Iranian IRGC ideology have, in some cases, taken actions on their own."

CSIS likewise told CBC the mostly likely scenario for a "violent extremist attack" involves "a lone actor whose intent to mobilize is unknown to authorities" and who "could be inspired by the conflict in the Middle East."

There have been numerous violent incidents in the U.S. since the war began on Feb. 28, including a synagogue attack in Michigan and a shooting in Austin, Texas, where a gunman wearing Iranian-flag-themed clothing killed two and injured 14.

In Canada, a gym owned by an Iranian Canadian activist in Thornhill, Ont., that displayed pre-revolutionary Iranian flags was shot at 17 times after a large anti-regime demonstration.

Intelligence experts stressed that lone wolves with a range of possible motives and affiliations are more likely to be behind acts of violence in Canada than deep-cover Iranian agents.

"The Iranian regime, we should also remember, is part of a political ideology," said political violence and terrorism researcher Broderick McDonald. "Some of the younger members of the extreme wings of the Iranian IRGC ideology have, in some cases, taken actions on their own."

CSIS likewise told CBC the mostly likely scenario for a "violent extremist attack" involves "a lone actor whose intent to mobilize is unknown to authorities" and who "could be inspired by the conflict in the Middle East."

There have been numerous violent incidents in the U.S. since the war began on Feb. 28, including a synagogue attack in Michigan and a shooting in Austin, Texas, where a gunman wearing Iranian-flag-themed clothing killed two and injured 14.

In Canada, a gym owned by an Iranian Canadian activist in Thornhill, Ont., that displayed pre-revolutionary Iranian flags was shot at 17 times after a large anti-regime demonstration.

Separately, the U.S. consulate in Toronto was the target of gunfire in what police are calling a "national security incident."

"I do think the terrorist threat is worldwide, but especially in North America and Europe," said Bolton.

"The whole point of terror is to strike people who aren't necessarily involved directly as adversaries, to show that consequences of being unkind to the terrorist power can be fatal. So terrorism doesn't necessarily have to be directed only at opponents of the regime in Tehran."

Juneau cautions against drawing conclusions about the precise motives and actors behind these incidents.

"In some of the more recent cases, there's still not enough information publicly available to come to a definitive conclusion."

Risk of sensationalization

McDonald says the flood of false or misleading information about the war online is causing real-world confusion and harm.

"It's one of the most polluted information environments that I've ever seen within a conflict," he said. "I think we have to look at the war and sleeper cells in that context."

Political violence and terrorism researcher Broderick McDonald says while it’s important to not overlook legitimate intelligence threats from the Iranian regime, 'sensational' reporting and fearmongering are dangerous and play into the 'escalation narrative' of the war.

McDonald says it's important to strike a balance of acknowledging significant threats while remaining highly "aware of the broader information environment." He also advised caution when engaging with rhetoric about threats that could stoke "Hollywood-style fears," which "war hawks" in the U.S. and Israel can use to escalate the war.

"It's a potent tool to also cultivate fear in the United States. And we should, I think, avoid the sensationalization of it."

Are Canadians safe?

McDonald says Canada has a significant strategic advantage when it comes to identifying possible threats.

"We have the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing network, so not just the United States sharing intelligence with us, but also our partners in the U.K., Australia, New Zealand, and that significantly helps us to detect threats before they even arrive on our shores."

Additionally, McDonald says Canada's historically bipartisan commitment to staying out of "wars of choice" further shields the nation from foreign retaliation.

"Both governments, Conservative and Liberal, have pursued this kind of stance. And I think that insulates us from the threats of Iran escalating against Canada."

CSIS said it is "focused on ensuring continued vigilance to ensure the safety and security of Canada and all Canadians" and has increased its efforts around "potential Iranian state-directed and violent extremist activity."

Middle East analyst Thomas Juneau explains that Iran intimidates and pressures Iranian Canadians with the goal of sowing fear among them that they could be surveilled, thereby repressing dissent abroad.

Stanton says it is important to remember that Canada is "not the epicentre of espionage," nor would it be a high-priority target for a regime struggling to survive.

Regardless of whether Iranian sleeper cells are active in Canada, the regime’s attempts to target and threaten Iranian Canadians are "absolutely" real, says Juneau.

The IRGC does not have the resources to surveil every member of the diaspora, but Juneau says "the simple fact that it is a possibility — and that they know it's a possibility — sows fear."

"That's how transnational repression works," he said. "If anything, the problem is not its exaggeration. The problem is its neglect by the Canadian government not doing enough to protect Iranian Canadians."

This unclassified extract from the Central Intelligence Agency's premier journal, Studies in Intelligence (Vol. 70, No. 1, March 2026), provides a rare look into how the Agency is preparing for a future saturated by artificial intelligence. While the publication is primarily designed for US government officials, these curated articles offer a masterclass in modern tradecraft for anyone interested in the intersection of national security and emerging technology. The core message is clear: while AI will fundamentally transform how the CIA spots, recruits, and handles assets, the "human touch" of a Case Officer (CO) is more valuable than ever in an era of deepfakes and digital noise.

The journal highlights that the CIA’s Center for the Study of Intelligence is aggressively pursuing a baseline of AI training for all officers in the field. Key insights include the use of AI for real-time "persuasion guidance" during meetings and the deployment of "AI officers" to vet walk-ins with 98% accuracy. However, the journal balances this technical optimism with a grounded warning—since AI can be used to scale surveillance and fabrication, the Agency must double down on "non-electronic" traditional tradecraft like dead drops and brush passes to ensure secure, high-trust communication.

Click Here for the Full Report

In the fall of 2025, “The Panel” received an invitation from Greg Spievak and Robert Mendoza of Reboot Communications to speak at the March 2026 Victoria International Privacy & Security Summit.  This was the Summit’s 28th year as an international forum with over 600 participants, of which 60 were university students.  It is a highly respected conference valued by many returning sponsors and participants.  

Members read the complete report HERE!

Iwona Mooney CSIS DDG (Ret.)

To have or not to have?  In recent years there has been much speculation on the pros and cons of whether Canada should have a separate Foreign Intelligence organization, or should this responsibility be allocated to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), or perhaps housed within another government ministry.  As a former intelligence professional with a passion for current events, international politics, I try to stay atop relevant information as it becomes available. I use the word “try”.  So many weigh in with opinions and arguments, whether it be an informed source or a member of the public who feels they have the solution.  I am from neither camp. I am writing from “my heart”, from experience, and from years of reading about and researching intelligence agencies, as well as following ongoing intelligence issues as impacted and/or influenced by various global conflicts.

Even though espionage is considered to be the second-oldest profession in the world, today in 2025, no intelligence organization can function using traditional spy craft of the 1900s.  Post-World War II, the race for the atomic bomb, the heroic efforts of Igor Gouzenko to get “the West” to come to grip with the true realties of the now former U.S.S.R., and the devastating work of the Cambridge Five brought to a head the need to rethink how an intelligence entity deals with new security threats. The end of the Cold War era accelerated security intelligence priorities in areas unheard of before. Terrorism, international and domestic, is probably what comes to mind.  Yet there are so many new variants of threats that have emerged and will continue to evolve.  Cyber threats to governments, businesses and to individuals, are rampant.  Transnational repression is a type of foreign interference that can be subtle ranging to violence.  Regional conflicts based on religious and/or ethnic issues, which have been around for eons, do not seem to wane.  They just move around the globe with waves of migration from continent to continent.  And there are other issues, such as climate change, sabotage and counter proliferation.

What has changed?  Attitudes, younger generations dissatisfaction with the current situation, religious factions having greater influences over the less fortunate, the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few with the exponential rise of the oligarch / billionaire category.  How does this all fit into the dialogue of whether Canada should or should not have its own separate foreign intelligence agency?

In 1984, CSIS was established primarily as a defensive intelligence organization to protect Canada’s national security interests as mandated by The CSIS Act.  It collects information through human interaction, ergo – HUMINT – human intelligence.  Its sister organization, the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) is SIGINT-based, signals intelligence obtained through “ears in the skies”.  Both organizations operate within Canada’s borders, but, yes, there is a BUT.  These borders are a hindrance of sorts.  Canada has been relying on the sharing of intelligence through its partnership within the Five Eyes alliance – United Kingdom, United States, Australia and New Zealand, as well as other countries.  Some do have foreign intelligence agency capabilities; others deal with such collections as their laws allow.  Recent events have strained some of these partnerships, putting Canada at a disadvantage. 

The CSIS Act has been amended, the last being Bill C-70 (June 2024) to align its powers better to deal with the increase in, and changes within the current threat environment.  However, it did not provide CSIS with a distinct, separate “foreign intelligence capability” that would allow intelligence operatives to work abroad.  Federal court warrants can provide CSIS with the authority to conduct specific investigations abroad.  These changes are a step in the right direction.

In 2003 the former Liberal Member of Parliament (Nepean) David Pratt tabled a private member’s bill – C-409, An Act to establish the Canadian Foreign intelligence Agency.  As with the majority of private members’ bills, it did not pass. The idea was put forth and continues to have supporters and detractors.  The security intelligence environment is an ever-evolving one and if Canada is to participate in a level playing field, perhaps the time has come for serious consideration to be given to the conundrum of whether Canada should or should not have a foreign intelligence agency of its own. 

On the one hand, increasing substantially the funds to CSIS that would allow it to develop a “Foreign Intelligence Branch” within its organizational structure would seem to be the easier path to take.  However, it begs the question of sustainability, of integrating it into the strategic operational environment without jeopardizing the “agents” who would choose to work abroad.  Would these agents rotate in/out of the Service in order to “round” out their careers?  Where would their operational mandates emanate from?  These are just a few of the challenges that CSIS would face should it be given the foreign intelligence agency responsibility. 

There are sound reasons why our allies have separate foreign intelligence services:  The British have MI6, the Americans the CIA, Israel the Mossad, Germany the BND, France the DGSE, Australia the ASIS.  Then there is Russia with the SVR, and China the MSS. Some are smaller in stature and others, like the CIA or MI6 are legendary in their own right. 

Canada needs to focus on the WHY there may be need to have a permanent, separate foreign intelligence agency.  Will it enhance its stature within the intelligence community?  Will it allow Canada to focus specifically on those areas abroad where information cannot be otherwise gathered than through deploying agents?  And how long will it take Canada to get such an agency up and running at full speed.  Certainly, it is not an overnight exercise.  Probably more like five if not more years before it would be fully operational.  Does Canada have an appropriate human resources pool to hire suitable candidates, or does the initial round come from within CSIS and other Canadian intelligence-related entities?  Once the WHY is answered then the rest should fall into place.  A bill to enact a Canadian Foreign Intelligence Agency is already drafted, albeit would require updating.  Changes in today’s world security environment show that Canada needs to be part of the playing field, not just a spectator on the sidelines.  Some of these changes impact directly on Canada and going to the source of the “threat” to try and mitigate it may be the only way Canada will be able to deal with said threat.  Our partners may not be of much assistance if they do not have a vested interest.  To quote Lewis Carroll’s opening line in his poem, The Walrus and the Carpenter - “The time has come,” the Walrus said, “to talk of many things” – to have or not to have a separate foreign intelligence entity.  

Iwona Mooney
CSIS DDG (Ret.)

The Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies (CASIS) announces the 5^th annual competition for the CASIS Essay Prize, supported by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS). Prizes will be awarded for the best undergraduate and graduate papers on a subject dealing with intelligence or on a matter related to Canada’s broad national security interests.

The Award

 One graduate and one undergraduate paper will be awarded. The graduate prize is $2500, while the undergraduate prize is $1000. Both winners will be invited to deliver their papers at a CASIS event in 2026, and both papers will be published on-line through the CASIS website.

Eligibility Criteria

 The competition is open to undergraduate or graduate students enrolled at a Canadian university or college, or any Canadian student enrolled at a university or college outside of Canada. Papers submitted as part of a course requirement and papers specifically designed for this contest are welcome. Submissions can be in English or French. Only one paper per candidate will be accepted for the competition.

Topics

Essays must address some dimension of intelligence, security, or law enforcement issues in any time period and in any country. Submissions can be from any Humanities or Social Sciences discipline, inter-disciplinary programmes, or law school. Essays touching on the following topics are encouraged, but will not receive preferential grading:

• Emerging and/or priority domestic terrorism threats in Canada over the next five years
• Polar research and national security
• Energy security: opportunities and threats
• Biotechnology, health sciences, and national security

Submission

Undergraduate essays cannot exceed 30 pages including footnotes. Graduate papers cannot exceed 40 pages including notes. Submissions should be sent by email with a clear subject heading reading “CASIS-CSIS Prize”, graduate or undergraduate level, and the author’s last name: i.e. CASIS-CSIS Prize – undergraduate – Doe, Jane.

Submissions must be in Microsoft Word, 12-point font, double spaced, and must include a full title page with the author's name, institution, academic programme, and contact information. Proof of registration at a University in Canada or abroad (transcript or certification) is required, and proof of citizenship may be required for students studying outside of Canada. Send an electronic copy of the paper to:

Dr. Arne Kislenko
Department of History
Toronto Metropolitan University
350 Victoria Street
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The deadline for submissions is Monday, June 1, 2026.

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All submissions will be adjudicated by a panel comprised of academics and representatives of the CSIS Academic Outreach & Stakeholder Engagement (AOSE) program. The review process will commence in June 2026, with results announced via email in August.

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About CSIS AOSE

The Academic Outreach & Stakeholder Engagement program is an important bridge linking CSIS to Canadians. The program engages with stakeholders and thought leaders on national security issues from across Canada and around the world to ensure that CSIS’ work is informed by a broad and diverse spectrum of voices and perspectives.

Nigel Farage’s party is “very interested” in taking up the intelligence agency’s offer to help with national security checks.

A Reform UK spokesman said: “If this offer comes to fruition, we would be very interested in taking the MI5 up on it. 

Politico Magazine
March 11, 2026 4:00 am CET
By Mason Boycott-Owen

LONDON — Nigel Farage’s Reform UK has welcomed an offer from MI5 to help political parties vet their election candidates as hostile states try to infiltrate British democracy.

Last month MI5 — Britain’s domestic intelligence agency — said it would help political parties with candidate checks for potential foreign interference risks.

A Reform spokesman told POLITICO the party would be “very interested” in taking up the offer, if it “comes to fruition.”

Ken McCallum, the director general of MI5, made the offer at a cross-party briefing with U.K. political parties last month, alongside Security Minister Dan Jarvis, three people with knowledge of the meeting told POLITICO.

The offer from McCallum is part of a wider effort by the U.K. government and security services to shore up British democracy amid a wave of espionage activity from hostile states.

In the past six months, several foreign and U.K.-born citizens have been arrested on suspicion of working for Iran, Russia and China.

Earlier this month three former Labour officials, including the husband of a sitting Labour MP and former candidate for North Wales police and crime commissioner, were arrested by counter-terrorism police on suspicion of spying for China.

Last year, the former Reform UK leader in Wales Nathan Gill was jailed for accepting bribes to make pro-Russian statements while he was a member of the EU parliament for Reform’s precursor Brexit Party.

Britain’s political parties have no standardized system for vetting those who want to become MPs. Each party has its own internal, and in some cases, external processes for probity checks.

Reform leader Nigel Farage in 2024 blamed a “reputable vetting company” for oversights in helping sift its candidates ahead of the general election after one praised Hitler and backed Russia’s war in Ukraine. He apologized, adding: “We have been stitched up politically and that’s given us problems.”

MI5’s role in vetting is limited to its own staff and certain levels of security clearance for specific government and official roles in Whitehall. Its offer to candidates is expected to be limited to helping parties assess foreign interference risks, rather than any official security clearance.

POLITICO asked the six main Westminster parties if they will take MI5 up on its offer to assist in their vetting processes. The ruling Labour Party, the Conservatives, the Greens and the Liberal Democrats all declined to comment. The Scottish National Party did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

The offer from Ken McCallum is part of a wider effort by the U.K. government and security services to shore up British democracy amid a wave of espionage activity from hostile states.

A Reform UK spokesman said: “If this offer comes to fruition, we would be very interested in taking the MI5 up on it. 

“We must do all we can to stamp out foreign interference in our politics. We have seen just last week with the Labour China spy scandal just how deeply embedded this issue is.”

The government unveiled its Counter Political Interference and Espionage Action Plan last November. It includes an elections bill, which is currently making its way through parliament. An independent review into financial interference in U.K. democracy is examining the use of cryptocurrency. Ministers are also considering bringing in proscription-like powers to disrupt proxies and state-backed terror groups as part of the plan.

A Government spokesperson said: “The Security Minister is coordinating an action plan to ensure we’re doing all we can to safeguard our democracy, including working directly with political parties to help them detect and deter interference and espionage.

“We’re also strengthening rules on political funding, rolling out security advice for election candidates, and working with professional networking sites and think tanks to make them a more hostile operating environment for foreign agents.”