Five arrested for alleged terrorism offences after ‘major incident’ near RAF Fairford

Men held also suspected of explosives offences as homes evacuated near British airbase used in US attacks on Iran.

The five men were arrested in the early hours of Sunday. Photograph: BBC

Counter-terrorism police are leading the investigation in which five men were arrested on suspicion of explosives and terrorism offences near an RAF base used in US attacks against Iran.

(Trump says terror suspects in possible Iran-linked plot to attack UK base were being watched: ‘Looking to do big damage’)

After the declaration of a major incident at RAF Fairford, a bomb squad was sent to the village of Whelford and extra security measures were put in place, including the fortification of entrances to the base. Roadblocks and armed police have been seen in the area over the weekend.

After their initial arrest over explosives offences, the five men detained early on Sunday morning (2026-09-27) were further arrested later in the day on suspicion of the preparation of a terrorist act, the Metropolitan police said.

Eighty-five households were evacuated and taken to a leisure centre in the early hours of Sunday morning, while the army’s bomb squad examined three suspicious vehicles. Police said they were working to get local people back into their homes as soon as possible.

Materials were seized after the arrests by armed officers under the Explosives Act and were being examined to see how dangerous they were and whether they were technically capable of being used in an attack, the Guardian understands.

The operation was not intelligence-led, suggesting that investigators had not known about any potential plot in advance.

Police blocking a road outside RAF Fairford

The Gloucestershire constabulary assistant chief constable Richard Ocone said: “Around 12.45am today police received a call relating to three suspicious vehicles travelling towards RAF Fairford. Armed officers responded and subsequently arrested five men in the Whelford area on suspicion of committing offences under the Explosives Act. The men were taken into custody where they remain.”

The broad circumstances of the arrests and proximity to RAF Fairford have led investigators to consider whether any plot was sponsored by Iran or another state. In July, a statement from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps noted RAF Fairford’s use by US bombers, warning the UK that “any base used for aggression against Iranian territory constitutes a legitimate target for our forces”. Security sources said they were keeping an open mind on state involvement.

A B‑1B Lancer bomber is parked at the RAF Fairford airbase

Julian Tudsbery, a resident of Whelford, said three “suspicious vans” had been spotted in the village and reported to police in the early hours of Sunday morning.

“Evidently, they phoned the airbase police, who didn’t answer the phone,” he said of the person who reported the sighting. “It just rang out so she dialled 999.”

On Sunday afternoon, overhead pictures showed a remote-operated bomb disposal robot inspecting the three vans. The rear doors of two of the vans were open and large black items could be seen scattered around.

Tudsbery said he was evacuated at about 7am. “[The police] were then banging on the door, so I went downstairs in my dressing gown. There were several police, three police cars in the drive, and they said you need to evacuate, there’s been a major incident, said he couldn’t elaborate.”

The prime minister, Andy Burnham, was being updated on the matter from Liverpool, where the Labour party conference is taking place. He cancelled plans to take part in a journalists versus politicians football match in order to take calls about the incident.

A government spokesperson said: “The prime minister is being kept updated on the incident in Gloucestershire. We are grateful to the emergency services, who have acted quickly to detain several suspects and put measures in place to keep the community safe. It would be inappropriate to comment further whilst investigations are ongoing.”

There have been protests in recent months over the British government’s decision to allow the US to use RAF Fairford to carry out strikes on Iranian missile sites that are attacking ships in the strait of Hormuz.

At the time of Iran’s warning in July, a government spokesperson said: “Our armed forces are ready to keep the United Kingdom safe from any kind of attacks, whether it’s on our soil or from abroad. The UK stands ready 24/7 to defend itself.”

Emergency vehicles at a football club in Fairford. 

Gloucestershire police said: “A number of properties are currently being evacuated in the Whelford area following the declaration of a major incident. It follows the arrest of several men on suspicion of offences under the Explosives Act.

“We are working closely with our partners and are enacting the well-rehearsed plans we have in place.”

A police spokesperson said the situation was contained and local people need not be alarmed.

The defence secretary, Wes Streeting, said: “I would like to thank all those emergency and specialist teams who have acted so swiftly regarding the incident in Gloucestershire. We can be reassured that this is being dealt with, and it is exactly why our emergency response teams and armed forces are on standby 24/7.”

A heavy vehicle positioned in front of a gate at the airbase on Sunday

Armed police have been seen blocking access to the main gate of the base, and many emergency vehicles including police cars, ambulances and fire engines were visible on Sunday morning in Fairford, the town near the base.

A ‌spokesperson for the US air force said they would not discuss specific force protection measures.

“The 501st Combat Support Wing and our fellow ​UK-based wings remain vigilant and will take appropriate actions to ensure the safety and security of our US service members, civilians, contractors and their families,” the spokesperson said.

“We constantly assess a variety of factors that determine what measures we institute or modify to protect ⁠our installations, our people and their families.”

The MP for South Cotswolds, Roz Savage, described the situation as “worrying” but said it was believed to be “contained”. She said: “I have contacted the police for further updates and I’ve been told that it is believed the incident is contained. I would like to thank them for the work they are currently doing.”

In May, the Royal International Air Tattoo, which is usually held at the base, was cancelled due to the escalating geopolitical situation in the Middle East.

Robert Fife, Ottawa, Published Secptember 26, 2026

Canada’s embassy in Havana, Cuba, in 2018. Ottawa triggered a rare national security provision to keep secret the details of a lawsuit brought by Canadian diplomats who began experiencing debilitating symptoms while stationed in Havana.

A Canadian diplomat was sharing intelligence with American spies in Havana and Canadians were using satellite equipment brought into Cuba by the United Stateswhen officials from both countries began experiencing debilitating symptoms caused by alleged sonic attacks linked to Russia, The Globe and Mail has learned.

Two sources tell The Globe that Canada and the United States were working closely together between 2016 and 2018 when diplomats and American intelligence operatives began reporting symptoms including nosebleeds, dizziness, headaches, blurred vision and memory loss.

One source described a Canadian diplomat gathering human intelligence and occasionally sharing information directly with American spies in Havana, while a second said Canadians were using satellite equipment brought in surreptitiously by the United States.

The allegations of Canadian spying in Cuba have not been reported before. The Globe and Mail is not identifying the sources, who could face charges under the Foreign Interference and Security of Information Act for disclosing government secrets.

Last year, Ottawa triggered a rare national security provision to keep secret new details of a multimillion-dollar lawsuit brought by Canadian diplomats who were stationed in Havana at the time.

The Department of Justice confirmed Fridaythat the government invoked Section 38 of the Canada Evidence Act in the case, a rarely used law that restricts disclosure of matters that could harm national security, national defence or international relations, and is typically triggered in terrorism cases and to protect classified information.

The Justice Department said it could not provide further comment on the case because it is before the courts.

In the spring of 2024, fresh investigative reporting suggested the set of symptoms known as Havana Syndrome could have been caused by sonic weaponry tied to Russian military operatives who were targeting adversaries’ intelligence operations.

An amended statement of claim in the Canadian lawsuit was submitted in Federal Court in August of that year. The court order to seal information was issued in April, 2025.

Paul Miller, the lead lawyer for the diplomats, declined to discuss specifics of the case, citing the court order. “There was a fear that things could be said in court that could be of a national security sensitivity,” he said.

In a statement Friday, Global Affairs Canada disputed the allegations that Canadian diplomats in Cuba shared intelligence with U.S. spies.

Asked about the lawsuit, the department said there is “no definitive common cause” to the illness that affected those serving at Ottawa’s embassy. The department said it could not comment further because the matter is before the courts.

The Globe reported on the initial filing of the lawsuit in 2019. It contained allegations from 10 diplomats and their families that Ottawa denied leading-edge health care, withheld critical information and downplayed the seriousness of brain injuries caused by the attacks.

In 2023, the diplomats and government agreed to mediation, but it was not successful. At that time, the diplomats’ legal team quoted John Bolton, U.S. President Donald Trump’s national security adviser in his first term, as saying the Canadians were targeted by Cuban hard-liners “with co-operation” from another unnamed country.

Mr. Bolton was quoted as saying the hard-liners and the other country did not “appreciate Canadian involvement in normalizing relations between the U.S. and Cuba.”

The U.S. has already paid out nearly US$3-million in compensation to Americans who reported the same symptoms.

Mr. Miller said his clients, who are not allowed to discuss the case, are frustrated by Ottawa’s unwillingness to settle and its use of national security law to keep the public from knowing what happened to them. “It’s a great delay tactic,” he said.

The United Nations Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations requires diplomats to respect the laws of countries in which they operate. They are not allowed to engage in espionage.

A source said a diplomat working for the Global Security Reporting Program at the Canadian embassy in Cuba between 2016 and 2018 gathered intelligence on behalf of allies, including from outside of the capital of Havana.

The source said the information was passed on to the security and intelligence division at Global Affairs Canada, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and Canada’s Five Eyes partners: the U.S., Britain, Australia and New Zealand.

“Sometimes they could be asked to service the information directly” with a CIA agent at the U.S. embassy, the source said.

The U.S. Embassy in Havana in 2017. The U.S. government acted swiftly after learning of a wave of mysterious illnesses among diplomats in Cuba in 2016, arranging for testing and treatment at first-class facilities.

The GSRP is an elite unit within Global Affairs Canada that is mandated to obtain overt security and political information. GAC said in a statement Friday that its officers in the program are not covert intelligence operators and do not recruit, handle or pay sources.

“Canadian diplomats, including those assigned to a Global Security Reporting Program (GSRP) role, are accredited by the host country and conduct diplomatic activities overtly, legally and in compliance with the Vienna Convention,” the statement said.

GAC added GSRP “is not an intelligence collection program.”

But the unit was criticized by a federal national security watchdog in 2023 for lacking “sufficient oversight” and strong safety rules.

The report by the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency said the program operated in a “distinctly grey zone,” and officers in some cases liaised with foreign intelligence agencies and appeared to collect classified information from sources.

A second source said the U.S. sent satellite equipment in diplomatic sea containers for Canada’s use in late 2016. Under the Vienna Convention, which forbids the search of diplomatic packages, the Cubans were not allowed to open the containers.

The source said the electronic equipment was later alleged to have been picked up by a Canadian diplomat and set up on the roof of the Canadian embassy and homes of certain Canadian diplomats. The source said the satellites “could be used for anything. It could be used for the internet. It could be used for whatever you wanted to use it for.”

The two sources said the Canadian embassy’s intelligence-gathering was valued by the U.S. because of Canada’s longstanding friendship with Cuba. Unlike the Americans, Canadian diplomats had better access to Cuban officials and were allowed to travel outside of Havana. At the time, Washington had a chargé d’affaires, and not an ambassador.

In 2015, then-president Barack Obama re-established full diplomatic relations with Cuba. President Dwight Eisenhower had broken off diplomatic ties in 1961.

A former senior GAC official who oversaw the department’s security and intelligence operations maintained that Canadian diplomats did not engage in spying.

The former official said Global Affairs believed Russia was behind the sonic attacks, but the department could not say so publicly because it had no proof. The Globe is not naming the former official, who was not authorized to share details about high-level discussions on the Havana Syndrome case.

Although Ottawa has never acknowledged there was a hostile attack against the diplomats, the former official said many inside GAC believed Russia was trying to disrupt thawing relations between the U.S. and Cuba, in which Canada had played a role.

Russia was believed to have gone after Americans and Canadians with ties to intelligence-gathering, the source said.

Scientists have offered conflicting explanations for what could have caused the set of symptoms that became known as Havana Syndrome.

Researchers at the University of Pennsylvania examined 21 of the American diplomats and concluded that their injuries were similar to a concussion, but with no blow to the head. The findings were published in early 2018 by the Journal of the American Medical Association. “We are collectively convinced that these individuals as a group sustained a neurological injury,” Dr. Randel Swanson, the lead author, said in a podcast published by the journal.

Other theories were put forward about pre-existing medical issues, psychosomatic conditions and even environmental factors such as noise made by chirping crickets. A study by Dalhousie University in 2019 suggested the Canadians could be facing symptoms from neurotoxic pesticide spraying.

Dr. James Giordano, a professor at the departments of neurology and biochemistry at Georgetown University Medical Center, has suggested the U.S. and Canadian diplomats were exposed to some form of sonic or ultrasonic stimulation.

In 2023, the U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence released an assessment that said five of seven U.S. intelligence agencies found it “very unlikely” a foreign actor had used a “novel weapon or prototype device” to injure personnel and their families. Two unnamed agencies were cited saying there was a “roughly even chance” a foreign adversary could have developed such a device.

The U.S. House of Representatives Intelligence Committee concluded in 2024 that the assessment had “lacked analytic integrity.” The Office of the Director of National Intelligence has since said it is conducting a review of its previous investigation.

In its Friday statement, GAC pointed to a February, 2024, department report that concluded the unexplained health ailments “were not the result of any malicious act of a foreign power.”

But a joint investigation in April, 2024, by CBS’s 60 Minutes, Germany’s Der Spiegel and Russia-focused The Insider linked the mysterious illness to a radio-frequency-based energy weapon employed by a Russian military intelligence unit known as GRU Unit 29155.

Earlier this year, 60 Minutes also reported that the U.S. had obtained and tested a similar sonic weapon – from a Russian criminal network – that can inflict injuries associated with Havana Syndrome.

And Mr. Trump said in January of this year that American forces used a “secret sonic” weapon during their capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro that month.

The U.S. government had acted swiftly after learning of a wave of mysterious illnesses among diplomats in 2016.

It arranged for testing and treatment of Havana Syndrome at first-class facilities and offered to monitor the symptoms of affected diplomatic families for life. The U.S. State Department also cut its staff in Cuba by 60 per cent in September, 2017, and evacuated spouses and children.

After Canadians reported similar symptoms beginning in 2017, the Canadian government asked the RCMP to investigate. Six years later, a heavily redacted RCMP report was released that said the national police force had no conclusive findings.

Ottawa did not send family members home until April, 2018. That July, Global Affairs changed the hardship rating for Cuba to its highest out of five rankings – the same as missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2019, GAC cut the number of staff who remained in Havana by half, down to eight people.

In the meantime, the Canadian diplomats and their families were told there was nothing the government could do for them.

Mr. Miller, the plaintiffs’ lawyer, said they were told to go through the standard workers’ compensation system, “which was not set up for the types of injuries that were suffered by these diplomats.”

Seven years after the lawsuit was first launched and months after the U.S. issued its first payout to compensate the alleged American victims, Mr. Miller said of the decision to seal the case: “I think the Canadian government is just so fearful of starting an international incident that they are willing to throw people under the bus.”

Erika Morris· The Canadian Press· Posted: Sep 25, 2026 2:31 PM EDT | Last Updated: September 25

Coalition Avenir Québec Leader Christine Fréchette 

Allegations of political interference from the United States dominated the 30th day of Quebec's election campaign on Friday as Coalition Avenir Québec Leader Christine Fréchette expressed concerns that Americans were trying to help sovereigntists take control of the province.

Her warnings were met with skepticism from her political rivals, but Fréchette said the threat was serious enough for her to request a meeting with Prime Minister Mark Carney and for her party to approach the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS).

"I want help from the federal government to shed light on the issue," she said Friday morning, adding that it was up to Quebecers to choose the next government.

Five parties are expecting to win seats in the Oct. 5 election, Fréchette's CAQ, the Parti Québécois, the Quebec Liberals, the Quebec Conservatives and Québec Solidaire.

Fréchette spoke to journalists twice on the campaign trail on Friday about the allegations. Her office also issued a statement later in the afternoon to clarify that she was only publicly talking about the allegations due to a news report by Quebecor media.

The report quoted two unnamed sources from Fréchette's government who said American government officials had attempted to negotiate tariffs with Quebec directly. The news report also noted how a U.S.-based think tank, the Defense Analyses and Research Corporation, published an essay in February calling for Americans to destabilize the Canadian federation.

The essay urged Americans to support the election of sovereigntists in Canadian elections and to "weaponize" reconciliation between Canada and First Nations to "slowly nudge" the country on a path toward the end of history.

Fréchette confirmed that American officials had reached out to her Coalition Avenir Québec government in the spring "to reach an agreement with Quebec regarding sectors related to CUSMA."

"When my team told me about it, I shut the door on it right away. Because, as far as I’m concerned, it’s unthinkable that Quebec could sign an agreement with the United States," she said in the afternoon.

Fréchette's subsequent statement, sent by a spokesperson in the premier's office, said that her team informed her last Saturday about essays published by the U.S. think tank. Fréchette said this prompted her to inform Ian Lafrenière, her government's interior security minister. She also said the party contacted CSIS on Tuesday, which led a meeting with the federal intelligence agency on Wednesday.

The statement added that Fréchette's team had received no information confirming any interference in the election campaign.

CSIS did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

Canada taking allegations seriously

Canada's foreign affairs minister, Anita Anand, said at a news conference in Ottawa that the federal government is taking the latest allegations very seriously. 

"Protecting our democracy is of the utmost importance to our country," she said. 

She added that she doesn't believe that there is anything affecting Canada's democracy at this time, but that when she "sees something," she raises it with her counterparts, including U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio.

"Right now I do not have proof," she said.

PQ Leader Paul St-Pierre Plamondon said his party was not contacted by American officials, and that he has not seen proof of interference. The PQ leader has promised on the campaign trail to hold a referendum on sovereignty if his party forms a government — but not before President Donald Trump leaves the White House.

He told journalists that he finds the timing of the news about alleged foreign interference "weird" as Quebecers can vote in advance polls starting Sunday. 

"I'm told the information was available as of January. We're talking about events that might have taken place in early September," he said. "And we're only hearing about this two days before voting begins."

Earlier in the campaign, the PQ leader accused the federal government of electoral interference by strategically announcing major investments in Quebec and of "anxiety-inducing" messaging concerning the trade war with the United States.

But St-Pierre Plamondon urged Quebecers on Friday to head to the polls "with peace of mind" and to not allow the federal and American governments to "kidnap" the election.

Quebec leaders respond

Fréchette's rivals demanded more transparency from the premier.

"What is she telling us? After she meets Carney, it's crucial that she informs all Quebecers of the nature of the interference, if there was interference," said Québec Solidare co-spokesperson Ruba Ghazal. 

She suggested that the American government may have an interest in separatist parties in Quebec and Alberta.

"It's not up to Donald Trump to choose who will be elected, either in Quebec or in Alberta," Ghazal said.

Liberal Leader Charles Milliard agreed, saying Trump would benefit from political instability in Canada with the PQ promising a referendum on separation in its first mandate, if elected.

He added that Fréchette should have contacted all party leaders as soon as she found out about the allegations.

Corrections

• A previous version of this story incorrectly misquoted Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Anita Anand saying she would speak to U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio after reviewing evidence of allegations of foreign interference. In fact, she said she had not received any proof of foreign interference and that when any issues arise, she will raise them with her counterparts, including U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio.

  Sep 25, 2026 5:14 PM EDT

Finnish and Swedish Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) fighter jets were scrambled to intercept and identify Russian military aircraft in international airspace over the Gulf of Finland on 24 September 2026. This was the first joint operational identification mission for the Finnish and Swedish air forces.

Finland and Sweden’s air forces carried out their first joint operation on Sept. 24, scrambling Finnish F/A-18 Hornets and Swedish JAS 39 Grimness to intercept and identify a Russian formation over the Gulf of Finland.

The Russian formation included Tu-134 transport aircraft, MiG-31 fighters, and Su-30 fighters, remaining in international airspace over the Gulf of Finland.

The identification mission was conducted as a part of Finland’s and Sweden’s cooperation in surveillance and protection of territorial integrity. Led by the Finnish Air Force’s Air Operations Centre, the mission involved Finnish F/A-18 Hornet and Swedish JAS 39 Gripen fighter jets. The Finnish and Swedish QRA jets intercepted and identified a Russian detachment consisting of a Tu-134 transport aircraft (NATO reporting name “Crusty”), MiG-31 fighter jets (“Foxhound”) and Su-30 fighter jets (“Flanker-H”) in international airspace over the Gulf of Finland.

‒ The Finnish and Swedish air forces are responsible for the surveillance and protection of territorial integrity of their nations’ airspace. The deeper cooperation that began this autumn enables joint identification missions and allows QRA fighter jets to operate from the other country’s air bases, says Colonel Vesa Mäntylä, Deputy Chief of Staff, Air Force Command Finland. 

‒ This is what close cooperation looks like in practice. Built over years on trust and strong personal relationships, we can now operate seamlessly together – as air forces, as nations and as Allies, says Major General Jonas Wikman, Commander of the Swedish Air Force. 

Finnish and Swedish Quick Reaction Alert fighter jets support each other

Fighters are kept on QRA duty as directed by the Air Operations Centre. The locations of QRA aircraft and response times are tailored to meet existing requirements and in accordance with the prevailing situation. Finnish and Swedish fighter jets are on QRA duty mainly in their national air bases, but they may operate 

from each other’s bases, if necessary. 

The cooperation between the Finnish and Swedish air forces is active and well-established. Cross Border Training sorties have been flown on an almost weekly basis already for several years. In recent years, the partnership has deepened further in the context of the Nordic Air Power cooperation, which includes the Finnish, Swedish, Norwegian and Danish air forces developing their interoperability as part of NATO’s collective defence. In the Baltic Sea region, the Finnish and Swedish air forces cooperate and coordinate their activities also with the NATO Baltic Air Policing detachments. 

The close cooperation between Finland and Sweden strengthens security in the North and on NATO’s Eastern flank, also enhancing Finland’s and Sweden’s interoperability in all situations, both in peacetime and during emergencies and disruptions.

Russian MiG-31 fighter jet ("Foxhound"). Photo: Swedish Air Force

Finnish and Swedish fighters were scrambled to intercept Russian Su-30 jets, above

Wesley Wark

Sep 20, 2026

Thanks for reading Wesley Wark’s National Security and Intelligence Newsletter! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.

The National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) has been resting in the shade since its ill-fated report of June 2024 on foreign interference, whose dramatic findings were undermined and discounted in the final report of the Foreign Interference Inquiry. ^[ii] NSICOP also lost its experienced chair, when David McGuinty was appointed as a Cabinet Minister, first as Public Safety Minister in December 2024, and then as Minister of National Defence in May 2025. The committee had to be re-constituted after the federal election in May 2025.

So, it was welcome news when NSICOP announced, in June 2026, on the eve of Parliament’s summer recess, that it was going to launch a review of foreign intelligence. ^[iv] The statement said that NSICOP was going to study two aspects: effectiveness of current foreign intelligence efforts; and whether “gaps” exist.

This sounds like ambition redux. The committee tackling an important and topical issue and bringing a strategic lens to it. Maybe all the members are reading The Walrus? ^[v] But, in truth, I have no idea where the inspiration for tackling this issue came from. A report by Jim Bronskill of Canadian Press states that Cabinet Ministers have been briefed on the question of expounding Canada’s foreign intelligence capacities and that the Committee would have access to background material for their study, including a “recent academic paper.”

https://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/article/intelligence-committee-scrutinize-canadas-ability-to-spy-overseas/

Whatever the motive and inspiration might haver been, it’s an important study for NSICOP and for the Canadian intelligence system. My hopes are high for it, but also tempered.

Tempered not from cynicism but from knowledge of how things work. NSICOP will be reliant on the intelligence community and particularly PCO to help it navigate its understanding of effectiveness issues and gaps. It doesn’t have the resources to do that work on its own. It will get records and briefings from the intelligence community, but it also faces the dilemma of being able to push-back on bureaucratic wisdom and come to its own independent findings.

In this process, there are two things I think we can be sure of. One is that the Canadian intelligence community will paint its best picture of current effectiveness in foreign intelligence collection. Some of that picture will, no doubt, be accurate, especially with regard to CSE capabilities. How much the committee will be told about the limits to CSIS operations abroad remains to be seen. What the committee might learn about choke points in the current set up of the Five Eyes intelligence partnership, especially when it comes to intelligence sharing from the U.S., may be very limited because of the extreme sensitivity of the problem. What it will be told about the potentiality of new intelligence partnerships beyond the Five Eyes will likely also be limited, especially if these are still nascent.

When it comes to the gaps analysis, I expect the Committee to hear a tired and old song from the intelligence community, about how Canada should continue to steer away from having an independent foreign intelligence agency on grounds of cost, distraction and disruption, uncertain mandates, and limited benefits.

The challenge facing NSICOP is to demonstrate that they can come up with a truly independent take on the issues of the current effectiveness and future needs of Canadian foreign intelligence. They won’t get much encouragement from government.

High hopes, tempered.

^[iv] NSICOP, “The National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians launches a review on the collection of foreign intelligence,” June 11, 2026, https://www.canada.ca/en/national-security-intelligence-committee-parliamentarians/services/statement-2026-06.html

^[v] Wesley Wark, “Canada needs a Foreign spy agency,” The Walrus, March 9, 2026, https://thewalrus.ca/canada-spies/

The Russian flag flies on the roof of the Russian Embassy in Berlin, Germany, Tuesday, Sept. 1, 2026. 

Updated 6:13 AM EDT, September 14, 2026

BERLIN (AP) — Germany’s federal prosecutor’s office said Monday it had filed charges against a German-Ukrainian woman suspected of acting on behalf of Russian intelligence.

The woman, who was only identified as Ilona W. in line with German privacy rules, is accused of having been in contact with a full-time intelligence officer at the Russian Embassy in Berlin at least since Oct. 2023, the prosecutor’s statement said.

The defendant ran a marketing agency in Berlin and was also the chairwoman of a lobbying group. As a result, she had an extensive network in military and political circles, prosecutors said.

Over the course of several years, the woman provided the intelligence officer at the Russian embassy with numerous tips about high-profile events and ensured that he could attend them — sometimes under a false name. This was intended to enable him to build his own network for intelligence purposes, the statement said.

To identify contacts and potential targets, she also attended such events herself. Furthermore, the defendant attempted to recruit individuals from the German Ministry of Defense and the defense industry for her own purposes, prosecutors alleged.

On behalf of her contact at the Russian embassy, the defendant sought information on German defense policy and the defense industry, particularly in light of Russia’s war on Ukraine.

The woman was arrested in January and charges were filed on Sept. 6. She remains in pretrial detention.

The foregoing is provided in light of the Russian presence in Canada. 

Networking sites are the latest front in Beijing’s espionage campaign

by Sushant Singh Updated 15:07, Aug. 4, 2026 | Published 6:30, Aug. 4, 2026

The job offer looks legitimate. The recruiter appears credible. The client is never quite identified. According to an urgent warning issued by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service on June 3, that’s how the Chinese military is attempting to aggressively recruit Canadians.

Titled “Safeguarding Our Secrets,” the joint assessment from the Five Eyes intelligence alliance (which includes Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the United States, and the United Kingdom) states that Chinese operatives create profiles on professional networking platforms, such as LinkedIn, Indeed, and Upwork. These operatives then pose as private consultants, corporate recruiters, human resource executives, or academic researchers.

This is what the playbook looks like: foreign policy and defence analysts answer online job advertisements. These candidates often have no direct access to classified information, but, if successful, are offered lucrative compensation for any non-public information they hold, including benign data on government and military policy and structure. Once the financial relationship is established, candidates find themselves handing over more sensitive information, with communications shifting to encrypted messaging applications and untraceable payment networks.

The Five Eyes warning fundamentally alters our understanding of modern espionage targets. Historically, counterintelligence efforts prioritized the protection of top military and scientific officials. The new alert explicitly identifies a completely different demographic: individuals in positions of peripheral access. These professionals often lack direct security clearances but possess aggregate knowledge of domestic policy debates, regional security assessments, and defence procurement strategies. Their unclassified insights, when compiled and analyzed, provide Chinese military intelligence with critical tactical advantages.

What makes the alert more concerning is its timing. It arrives just as Prime Minister Mark Carney has been actively trying to engineer an economic recalibration with Beijing. He wants to increase Canadian exports to the Chinese market by 50 percent over the next four years. This export strategy relies on deepening institutional ties, fostering corporate integration, expanding agricultural shipments, and encouraging bilateral commercial partnerships. The economic agenda requires the Canadian private sector to engage deeply and widely with Chinese counterparts.

The priority for commerce and trade is evident in Canada’s recent regulatory decisions on global trade. For instance, following Carney’s visit to China in January, the federal government permitted 49,000 electric vehicles manufactured in that country to enter the Canadian market at a minimal tariff of 6.1 percent. The administration views such initiatives as necessary steps to achieve macroeconomic stability and secure access to the largest global consumer base.

This economic recalibration was driven by the structural disintegration of the North American economic consensus. With Canada’s auto and energy sectors heavily dependent on the US, President Donald Trump’s universal tariffs and refusal to renew the Canada–United States–Mexico Agreement, or CUSMA, have transformed the reliance on Washington into a vulnerability. Facing a hegemon that views trade as a zero-sum weapon, Ottawa pivoted to Beijing out of economic necessity.

Carney’s assertion that China has become a more predictable partner than the US underscores Ottawa’s frustration with Washington—but has raised alarms among trade experts. Deeper integration with China risks exposing Canadian industries to long-term strategic vulnerabilities, particularly as China increasingly seeks new markets for its exports beyond the US.

The tension inside Canada’s foreign policy is now impossible to ignore. How does Ottawa aggressively chase a trade reset with Beijing when its own security agency is co-authoring emergency public warnings about aggressive Chinese state espionage targeting Canadians online?

The fundamental flaw in this foreign policy approach is its internal incoherence. The Carney administration is treating China as a market while the Chinese state treats Canada as a target. The economic strategy assumes a trustworthy trading partner, while the security reality, articulated explicitly by CSIS, reveals an adversarial intelligence state. A government cannot securely build a deeply integrated strategic partnership when its own security agencies warn that the partner state is actively compromising its workforce.

The contradiction places Canadian professionals in an impossible position. The federal government directs businesses, research institutions, and universities to seek capital and expand partnerships in the Chinese market. Simultaneously, the federal intelligence service instructs the same demographic to treat overtures from Chinese entities with extreme suspicion. This policy requires citizens to view Chinese counterparts as lucrative business partners during trade missions and as potential intelligence operatives in other communications.

The Carney administration hopes to reconcile these competing priorities by applying a policy of strict compartmentalization. This “small yards, high fences” model assumes that a government can identify sensitive strategic assets, restrict access to military research facilities, and build rigorous regulatory protections around them, leaving the rest of the economy open to foreign investment and collaboration.

The Five Eyes alert demonstrates why this compartmentalized strategy is no longer viable. Modern intelligence gathering does not rely exclusively on stealing highly classified schematics or compromising secure military communication networks. In this age of artificial intelligence, it can work as effectively by cumulating thousands of disparate unclassified data points. When foreign operatives recruit non-official experts, they are circumventing the heavily guarded technological and defence sectors. They are extracting immense strategic value—perhaps equally damaging—from the unprotected areas of civil society.

A government cannot regulate or secure this type of peripheral information exchange in the modern age. The data resides in academic publications, private policy consultations, and countless unclassified industry reports. China’s strategy specifically exploits the open nature of Canada’s academic and commercial sectors. The attempt to isolate national security concerns from broader trade relations will fail because the targeted assets are entirely decentralized. Economic engagement itself provides the cover and the communication channels required for intelligence operations to succeed.

This structural failure is not restricted to Ottawa’s bilateral relationship with Beijing. Canada faces an identical policy dilemma with India. The Carney government is seeking to maximize bilateral trade and negotiate favourable market-access agreements with New Delhi. At the same time, Canadian security agencies manage the fallout from transnational operations targeting Canadian citizens on domestic soil. The administration repeatedly attempts to separate the pursuit of commercial treaties from the reality of foreign interference and political violence within Canada’s borders.

In both instances, the foreign policy establishment assumes it can dictate the terms of engagement—that foreign capitals will respect the boundary between economic co-operation and domestic security. Both the Chinese and Indian examples prove the assumption wrong.

Foreign states leverage their economic importance to deter Canadian diplomatic retaliation against their intelligence operations. They understand that Canada prioritizes export growth and economic stability above complex national security disputes—and exploit this prioritization. The Five Eyes alert shows that the Carney government cannot afford to ignore intelligence assessment simply because it complicates the timeline for achieving ambitious trade targets.

A lot of this trouble, of course, is courtesy of Trump. Canada’s security architecture has traditionally assumed alignment with Washington on its China policy, but Trump’s second-term aggression toward Canada has forced Ottawa to diversify, creating new vulnerabilities.

The Trump administration, meanwhile, views trade and security as inseparable domains. It implements punitive tariffs on strategic competitors and demands that allies align with its own restrictive security postures. Canada is highly vulnerable to this pressure due to the country’s reliance on cross-border supply chains and American market access. When the Canadian government pursues a low-tariff agreement for Chinese vehicles or encourages academic integration with Chinese institutions, it directly contradicts the security posture of its most important strategic ally. This invites direct retaliatory measures from Washington, effectively neutralizing the economic gains the Carney government hopes to achieve. The failure to address intelligence warnings thus threatens to isolate Canada within its own geographic and security alliances.

That’s also where Carney’s weaknesses lie. Carney built a career, as well as a political mandate, on his economic management, based on his central banking expertise. His policy frameworks prioritize quantifiable economic outcomes. He applies these exact principles to foreign policy decisions. He evaluates international relationships based on their potential to yield export growth and attract foreign direct investment, besides improving domestic employment metrics.

The application of this purely macroeconomic logic to international relations creates a critical failure to analyze state behaviour. Foreign adversaries do not operate strictly as profit-maximizing entities. They deploy capital, manage trade access, subsidize industries, and use corporate structures as instruments of state power. When the Canadian government evaluates a foreign trade agreement purely on its tariff reductions and export volume potential, it fails to account for the accompanying intelligence risks and security vulnerabilities.

Carney must confront the reality that his foreign policy and economic strategy are fundamentally incompatible. Trade expansion requires openness and integration, while national security requires vigilance and restricted access. A government cannot effectively implement both strategies simultaneously with the same foreign entity. This produces public policy that is structurally flawed and inherently unsafe for citizens.

Canada’s geography, supply chains, and energy infrastructure tie it to the US in ways that cannot be rapidly undone. Carney’s bid to shape a new trade order is less about replacing the US than about buying insurance against American volatility. But that insurance comes at a premium: the exposure to Chinese intelligence operations targeting Canadian knowledge workers. Carney must decide whether Canada is willing to pay it.

By Charlotte Van Campenhout - Reuters

BRUSSELS, July 28 (Reuters) - A Canadian woman of Chinese origin accused of spying while working as an intern at NATO's military headquarters in Belgium will remain in pretrial custody for another month, a spokesperson for the Belgian Federal Prosecutor's Office said on Tuesday.

The Federal Prosecutor's Office declined to give further details about the woman, who is suspected of espionage on behalf of a third country and of membership in a criminal organisation.

The prosecutor's spokesperson added that the suspect now has 24 hours to lodge an appeal. 

The woman ​worked as an intern at NATO's Supreme Headquarters Allied ​Powers Europe (SHAPE) in the Belgian city of Mons.

An intelligence source said the woman is in her 30s and not a student. They also said she had been close to completing her internship, prompting authorities to accelerate the investigation.

Neither NATO nor Belgian authorities have specified what the suspect's work at NATO involved.

Responsibility for conducting security checks on interns lies with their countries of origin, which in this case was Canada.

The Canadian government did not immediately reply to a request for comment.

Minister of Public Safety Gary Anandasangaree said during a press briefing on Monday that Canada "will continue to investigate the processes we have and the security screening".

"In this particular case, I think it's important to get to the bottom of what happened," he said.

SHAPE ​is NATO's top military headquarters, the base of Allied Command Operations, ‌which ⁠is responsible for planning and carrying out all operations of the 32-member transatlantic security alliance.

The suspect had come to the attention of SHAPE's security services, which reported ​her to Belgian ​intelligence officials after observing her behaviour, ⁠according to the prosecutor's statement.

A ​SHAPE spokesperson said ⁠there was no indication that NATO or SHAPE operational readiness, command and control arrangements or ongoing tasks had been affected.

(Reporting by Charlotte Van Campenhout, additional reporting by Andrew Gray in Brussels, Maria Cheng in Ottawa 

Kristy Nease · CBC News · Posted: Jul 20, 2026 4:00 AM EDT

Former federal scientist Dennis Lu, 65, was the subject of three briefings by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) to Lu's employer, Natural Resources Canada, according to court records. In May CSIS took the rare step of disclosing one of its own documents in court to set the record straight about how it came to be involved in the file.

The country's top spy agency says Natural Resources Canada approached it with concerns about former federal scientist Dennis Lu more than two decades ago, not the other way around — and has made a rare disclosure of one of its documents in court to set the record straight, CBC News has learned. 

There are also new details about part of the reason for a 23-month delay between the last Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) briefing about Lu to his employer in February 2021 and the start of Natural Resources' internal investigation into Lu in January 2023.

Lu's security clearance was eventually revoked and an RCMP investigation resulted in criminal charges of breach of trust and unauthorized use of a computer.

It's alleged that he used his access to the Natural Resources network to copy a total of more than 2,500 documents onto a USB key and external drive.

He faces trial in Ottawa's Superior Court by a judge alone in January.

This spring, a Department of Justice lawyer addressed court on behalf of CSIS "just to clarify" how the entire file on Lu began more than two decades ago.

"It wasn't CSIS flags per se, it was a government tip-off," Sheldon Leung said.

The lawyer's comments came during a pre-trial motion brought by Lu's defence team in its fight to access to hundreds of pages of third-party records that it said were relevant to the case — access it won for most of the documents.

Hosted Chinese delegation

Leung then read part of a CSIS document that the spy agency wanted the judge to see, dated Nov. 20, 2000 — the same year as CSIS's first briefing to Natural Resources about Lu.

"On Nov. 14, 2000, a source provided the following unsolicited information regarding a visiting delegation. According to source one, Mr. Dennis Lu, research scientist at [Natural Resources'] Advanced Combustion Technology branch (ACT), had invited a visiting Chinese delegation without the knowledge of his operational manager," the document reads.

"It was only after the fact, when questioned, that Lu provided the following information about the delegation to [his department's] security officials and his manager."

But Leung read no further, saying only that the rest of the CSIS document contained details about a meeting and some potentially sensitive government information.

This spring, a federal lawyer addressed court on behalf of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service 'just to clarify' how the entire file on Lu began more than two decades ago. (Sean Kilpatrick/The Canadian Press)

'Resource constraints'

During a separate pre-trial motion brought by the defence this summer about whether the investigation breached Lu's privacy, Brad Lanthier, a former chief security officer at Natural Resources, testified about the team he first joined in November 2022, 21 months after the last CSIS briefing about Lu.

Under examination-in-chief by assistant Crown attorney Tim Radcliffe, Lanthier said the team had recently been separated from the IT department and wasn't set up to take a large investigation on.

"There were severe, I would say, resource constraints in terms of our ability to conduct anything more than traditional risk investigations at that point in time," said Lanthier, now the RCMP's director general of national communications.

"It took a little bit of time [before the investigation formally began in January 2023]," he said. "The security function was just kind of getting up and going."

Lanthier testified that soon after he arrived, he was briefed about Canada's Task Force on Science and National Security, whose "primary goal was to safeguard science and to protect it from intellectual property theft, with a focus on foreign actor interference."

'A significant amount of risk'

He also learned about the Chinese government's Thousand Talents Program, which aims to bring scientists and researchers from all over the world to China, as well as the country's intelligence law, which can be used to compel citizens to share information with China to benefit its national security and economy.

As for Lu, Lanthier was told by colleagues that CSIS had briefed Natural Resources about him multiple times, that he was taking an extended leave without pay in China, and that he had asked his supervisors for permission to teach in China.

Taken together with the foreign interference threats from China, Lanthier said he believed there was "a significant amount of risk." So he asked IT staff to search Lu's emails for specific keywords, with CSIS providing input on what the search terms would be.

Lu was not granted permission to teach in China, and his access to Natural Resources' network was cut off while he was on leave because there would have been no need for him to access it, Lanthier told court.

Lu's access to Natural Resources Canada's network was cut off while Lu was in China during his leave of absence ahead of retirement, court heard.

Wrote MP to get network access back

Then Lu returned to Canada and asked for his network access to be reinstated — moves that were "surprising" to the federal department, Lanthier said, because Lu's original plan had been to transition into retirement during his leave in China.

Lu's request for network access was therefore denied, Lanthier said, and Lu's reaction to the denial raised further suspicions.

"I believe Mr. Lu used a few different avenues, including writing his MP, requesting his access back. At that point the risk [in my opinion] had escalated significantly given the travel, given the change in plans, and given the what appeared to be determined request to get access back," Lanthier testified.

"We were then informed that Mr. Lu had in fact amended his leave, so therefore, just like any employee, we had no choice but to give him his access back. But we did request [IT to conduct] daily activity reports [about] Mr. Lu."

He allegedly copied 2,414 documents off a Natural Resources shared server on July 7, 2023, and a further 188 documents on Aug. 9, 2023.

His security clearance was then revoked, Lanthier said.

Lanthier personally referred the case to the RCMP on Aug. 17, 2023. Based on "the sheer volume of files that had been transferred," Natural Resources then had to conduct a damage assessment to determine what was taken, whether it was of value, and whether other government departments would be affected, he said.

A USB key was one of two devices Lu allegedly used to copy Natural Resources documents off of the federal department's shared drive.

Searched 16 years of emails, phone use

In cross-examination, Reem Zaia, one of Lu's defence lawyers, pointed out that many countries have talent programs, including Canada, and that Canada's Policy on Sensitive Technology Research and Affiliations of Concern came into effect in May 2024 — almost a year after the documents were allegedly copied.

Lanthier acknowledged no evidence was found that Lu was a member of China's Thousand Talents Program and said he didn't know exactly what CSIS's concerns about Lu were — aside from affiliations with the Chinese government — when the investigation into Lu was ordered and conducted.

Zaia also read aloud part of a document outlining the testimony Lanthier had been expected to give, which said that "the fact-finding review [into Lu] identified some associations and correspondence with individuals from a country of a concern [China], but it was not definitive based on the narrow search conducted at the time."

That "narrow search," as Zaia pointed out and Lanthier acknowledged, included 16 years of Lu's work emails — received, sent and/or deleted — from January 2007 to 2023. It also covered all communications to and from his work cellphone — calls, messages and/or texts — across the same 16 years.

No instructions to exclude Lu's private information were made, court heard.

Co-operative agreements with China

Lanthier also didn't dispute that:

• Natural Resources security categorization standards allowed employees with security clearance such as Lu to store protected A-, B- and C-level documents on USB keys and external hard drives (A-level documents could cause injury to an individual, organization or government if compromised; B-level documents could cause serious injury; and C-level documents could cause extremely grave injury).
• A report found that about 1,100 Natural Resources employees were using USB keys in 2023.
• The standard operating procedure at Natural Resources allowed some staff 24/7 access to the federal department's network even if they had retired, according to a senior director of operations in an interview with RCMP. (Lanthier told Zaia he wasn't aware of that procedure, but had no reason to doubt it.)

He also wasn't aware that Natural Resources had a memorandum of understanding with China's National Energy Administration.

It took effect in June 2017, lasted five years, focused on energy, and "encouraged participants to promote technical and policy co-operation, including the exchange of experts and information as well as joint research," Zaia said.

Prime Minister Mark Carney, back left, and Premier of China Li Qiang, back right, look on as Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Tim Hodgson, front left, and Wang Hongzhi, Director of the National Energy Administration in China, front right, sign a memorandum of understanding to co-operate on energy in Beijing on Jan. 15, 2026.

(There had been a previous memorandum between Natural Resources and China's National Energy Administration regarding nuclear energy in 2014. A new memorandum between the departments to strengthen energy co-operation took effect in January this year.)

Pre-trial motions in Lu's case are ongoing. Four weeks have been set aside for Lu's trial next year.

Former senior CSIS intelligence officer Dan Stanton told a Capitol Hill briefing that foreign states are using criminal organizations to target diaspora groups because it gives them plausible deniability.
Greg Mercer - The Globe and Mail 
2026-07-15

A former senior CSIS intelligence officer warned U.S. congressional representatives and staff in Washington Tuesday that foreign states such as India are increasingly using transnational criminal groups to outsource surveillance, coercion, intimidation and lethal violence.

Dan Stanton, who spent 32 years in Canada’s spy agency and is now director of the national security program at the University of Ottawa, told a Capitol Hill briefing that this country’s experience with transnational repression shows hostile countries are using criminal organizations to target diaspora groups because it gives them plausible deniability.

Mr. Stanton’s remarks to U.S. politicians and their aides come a week after U.S. officials and the head of the RCMP announced a series of charges and arrests across three prominent India-based gangs – including the leaders of the Bishnoi gang, which authorities say ordered the assassination of B.C.-based Sikh separatist Hardeep Singh Nijjar three years ago.

 Mr. Nijjar’s death sparked a diplomatic fallout between Ottawa and New Delhi, after then-prime-minister Justin Trudeau told Parliament in 2023 that there was credible evidence Indian government agents had orchestrated the killing.

In 2024, the Mounties warned that Indian government agents were linked to multiple homicides, extortions and other violent criminal activities, and Ottawa expelled India’s high commissioner and five other diplomats. In May, CSIS said India remains one of the main perpetrators of foreign interference and espionage in the country.

India has denied any role in the Nijjar plot, and refuted allegations it’s involved in transnational repression or interference in Canada. Prime Minister Mark Carney, trying to expand trade with the country of 1.4 billion, said he raised Canada’s concerns about foreign interference when he met with Prime Minister Narendra Modi in New Delhi in March.

A 2024 U.S. Department of Justice indictment accused an Indian government intelligence officer, Vikash Yadav, of using hired gunmen to arrange Mr. Nijjar’s killing, as well as a failed plot against his New-York based lawyer. India now says Mr. Yadav was a “rogue operative” who has gone missing and can’t be extradited to the U.S. to face prosecution.

U.S. investigators say the gunmen sent Mr. Yadav a video of Mr. Nijjar’s dead body, as proof of his killing, which he then shared with Nikhil Gupta, who he had hired to arrange the assassination of lawyer Gurpatwant Singh Pannun. Mr. Gupta had pleaded guilty in that plot and is to be sentenced in September.

The Globe and Mail previously reported that Canadian national security officials were presented with evidence that Indian consular staff in Vancouver supplied information to assist in the assassination of Mr. Nijjar, a man India labelled a terrorist for his role in a campaign to create a breakaway state in Punjab called Khalistan.

Mr. Stanton told The Globe that relying on plausible deniability offered by gangs is part of the same playbook used by states such as Iran, Russia and China when they seek to suppress their critics living in Western countries.

“I just want to signal that this is a growing problem, and India is one of the main actors,” he said. “The ones doing the really messy, dirty work have a certain criminal history, and so when they’re caught, the state that’s behind it, or their intelligence service, has that firewall because they can say, ‘They’re just criminals.’”

 Mr. Stanton, speaking as part of a panel that include Representative Jim McGovern and U.S. national security experts, offered the only Canadian perspective in the room. He told the crowd that when he began working in counterintelligence, it was a world of spies and double agents. Today, countries have to defend against the new threat of transnational criminals, who sometimes wittingly or unwittingly do the work of foreign powers, he said.

“The problem is that our institutions in Canada are still organized for a world where espionage and organized crime were separate disciplines,” he said. “Today they’re increasingly intertwined, requiring police and intelligence agencies to operate across legal authorities and mandates that were never designed for this kind of hybrid threat. That’s the intelligence and law-enforcement challenge of our time.”

India began a more aggressive approach to national security following the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks, he said. Under Mr. Modi, the country has concluded that extradition and international legal processes are inadequate, and it increasingly embraced the “direct neutralization” of those it regards as terrorist threats outside its borders, he said.

“The problem is that our institutions in Canada are still organized for a world where espionage and organized crime were separate disciplines,” he said. “Today they’re increasingly intertwined, requiring police and intelligence agencies to operate across legal authorities and mandates that were never designed for this kind of hybrid threat. That’s the intelligence and law-enforcement challenge of our time.”

India began a more aggressive approach to national security following the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks, he said. Under Mr. Modi, the country has concluded that extradition and international legal processes are inadequate, and it increasingly embraced the “direct neutralization” of those it regards as terrorist threats outside its borders, he said.

Canada, along with the U.S., has been slow to recognize this shift, and needs to understand how serious of a problem foreign interference inside our borders has become, he said.

“We’ve done everything we can with terrorism, espionage, political interference and cyberthreats, but we really, our governments and countries haven’t really done much in terms of addressing transnational repression,” he told The Globe.

Mr. Pannun, a close associate of Mr. Nijjar’s in the campaign for an independent Khalistan, said last week’s indictments of Indian gang members don’t absolve India of involvement in the murder-for-hire plots, even though they were silent on any government involvement. He called for international sanctions against the Indian state.

“The Bishnoi indictment cannot be viewed in isolation. It must be read together with the U.S. murder-for-hire prosecution targeting me. Together, these two cases strip away all plausible deniability, exposing the lethal, dual-track transnational assassination apparatus operated by the Indian government,” he said in a statement.

“Justice cannot stop with the jailed gangsters, the triggermen, or the intermediaries. The trail of evidence leads directly to the highest echelons of the Indian government.”