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The course attracts both typical early 20s students and French government spies on day release
University professor Xavier Crettiez admits that he doesn't know the real names of many of the students on his course.
This is a highly unusual state of affairs in the world of academia, but Prof Crettiez's work is far from standard.
Instead, he helps train France's spies.
"I rarely know the intelligence agents' backgrounds when they are sent on the course, and I doubt the names I'm given are genuine anyway," he says.
If you wanted to create a setting for a spy school, then the campus of Sciences Po Saint-Germain on the outskirts of Paris seems a good fit.
With dour, even gloomy-looking, early 20th Century buildings surrounded by busy, drab roads and large, intimidating metal gates, it has a very discreet feel.
Where it does stand out is its unique diploma that brings together more typical students in their early 20s, and active members of the French secret services, usually between the ages of 35 and 50.
The course is called Diplôme sur le Renseignement et les Menaces Globales, which translates as Diploma of Intelligence and Global Threats.
It was developed by the university in association with the Academie du Renseignement, the training arm of the French secret services.
This came following a request from French authorities a decade ago. After the 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, the government went on a large recruitment drive within the French intelligence agencies.
It asked Sciences Po, one of France's leading universities, to come up with a new course to both train potential new spies, and provide continuous training for current agents.
Large French companies were also quick to show an interest, both in getting their security staff onto the course, and snapping up many of the younger graduates.
Prof Xavier Crettiez says that fighting financial crime is a now key job for spies
The diploma is made up of 120 hours of classwork with modules spread over four months. For external students – the spies and those on placement from businesses – it costs around €5,000 ($5,900; £4,400).
The core aim of the course is to identify threats wherever they are, and how to track and overcome them. The key topics include the economics of organized crime, Islamic jihadism, business intelligence gathering and political violence.
To attend one of the classes and speak to the students I had to be vetted first by the French security services. The theme of the lesson I joined was "intelligence and over-reliance on technology".
One of the students I speak to is a man in his 40s who goes by the name Roger. He tells me in very precise, clipped English that he is investment banker. He adds: "I provide consultancy across west Africa, and I joined the course to provide risk assessments to my clients there."
Prof Crettiez, who teaches political radicalisation, says there has been a huge expansion in the French secret services in recent years. And that there are now around 20,000 agents in what he called the "inner circle".
This is made up of the DGSE, which looks at matters overseas, and is the French equivalent of the UK's MI6 or the US's CIA. And the DGSI, which focuses on threats within France, like the UK's MI5 or the US's FBI.
But he says it's not just about terrorism. "There are the two main security agencies, but also Tracfin an intelligence agency which specializes in money laundering.
"It is preoccupied with the surge in mafia activity, especially in southern France, including corruption in the public and private sectors mainly due to massive profits in illegal drug trafficking."
Other lecturers on the course include a DGSE official once located in Moscow, a former French ambassador to Libya, and a senior official from Tracfin. The head of security at the French energy giant EDF also runs one module.
The private sector's interest in the diploma is said to be continuing to grow. Big businesses, especially in the defence and aerospace sector, but also French luxury goods firms, are increasingly keen to hire the students as they face relentless cybersecurity and spying threats as well as sabotage.
Recently graduates have been snapped up by the French mobile phone operator Orange, aerospace and defence giant Thales, and LVHM, which owns everything from Louis Vuitton and Dior to champagne brands Dom Perignon and Krug.
Twenty eight students are enrolled in this year's class. Six are spies. You can tell who they are, as they are the ones huddled together during class breaks, away from the young students, and not too overwhelmed with joy when I approach them.
Without saying their exact roles, and with arms crossed, one says the course is considered a fast-track stepping stone for a promotion from the office to field work. Another says he gets fresh ideas being in this academic environment. They signed the day's attendance form with just their first names.
One of the younger students, Alexandre Hubert, 21, says he wanted a deeper understanding of the looming economic war between Europe and China. "Looking at intelligence gathering from a James Bond viewpoint is not relevant, the job is analysing risk and working out how to counteract it," he tells me.
Another class member, Valentine Guillot, also 21, says she was inspired by the popular, fictional French TV spy drama Le Bureau. "Coming here to discover this world which I didn't know anything about except for the TV series has been a remarkable opportunity, and now I am very keen to join the security services."
Students Alexandre Hubert and Valentine Guillot were happy to be photographed
Nearly half of the students in the class are in fact women. And this is a relatively recent development according to one of the lecturers, Sebastien-Yves Laurent, a specialist on technology in spying.
"Women's interest in intelligence gathering is new," he says. "They are interested because they think it will provide for a better world.
"And if there is one common thread amongst all these young students it's that they are very patriotic and that is new compared to 20 years ago.
If you are keen to apply to get on the course, French citizenship is an essential requirement, although some dual citizens are accepted.
In a recent class photo some students chose to stand with their backs to the camera
Yet Prof Crettiez says he has to be wary. "I regularly get applications from very attractive Israeli and Russian women with amazing CVs. Unsurprisingly they are binned immediately."
In a recent group photo of the class you can immediately tell who the spies are - they had their backs to the camera.
While all the students and professional spies I met are trim and athletic, Prof Crettiez is also keen to dispel the myth of James Bond-like adventure.
"Few new recruits will end up in the field," he says. "Most French intelligence agencies jobs are desk bound."
On January 3, 2026, the Government of Canada published the proposed Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Regulations in the Canada Gazette, Part I. This triggers a 30-day public consultation period, ending on February 2, 2026.
These regulations provide the necessary technical and administrative details to implement the Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act (FITAA), which creates a mandatory registry for individuals or entities acting on behalf of foreign powers.
Transparency: To move foreign influence activities out of the shadows and into a public-facing registry.
National Security: To help security agencies distinguish between legitimate diplomatic/trade influence and covert, "malign" interference.
Public Trust: To reassure Canadians that efforts to influence their democratic and governmental processes are being monitored.
Safety Clause: The Commissioner can withhold information from the public registry if there are reasonable grounds to believe its disclosure would pose a threat to an individual's personal safety.
Data Retention: Information in the registry must be retained for 20 years after an arrangement ends.
Compliance Agreements: The regulations allow the Commissioner to enter into agreements with non-compliant parties to correct issues, potentially reducing or waiving fines.
The government estimates the system will cost approximately $25.9 million over ten years to maintain. About 1,000 small businesses are expected to be affected, primarily those involved in government relations or advocacy for foreign clients.
You have until February 2, 2026, to submit your feedback. The government is specifically looking for input on:
The definition of "Public Office Holder."
What specific information should be visible to the public.
The fairness and structure of the enforcement and penalty system.
https://gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p1/2026/2026-01-03/html/reg1-eng.html
Jody Thomas retired in 2024 as national security and intelligence adviser to the Prime Minister. She is now a senior adviser with Counsel Public Affairs.
Patrick Lennox is an associate fellow of the Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary, and a former national security practitioner.
The 2025 federal budget seeks to prepare us for a more Machiavellian world. That’s evident in its historic investments in national defence and security – an additional $81.8-billion over the next five years – and its pledges to push us to the NATO target of devoting 2 per cent of GDP to defence spending in 2025-26.
But spending big is one thing. Spending wisely and with a clear purpose beyond reaching an arbitrary benchmark is another.
The stewards of this investment must ensure that it makes Canada significantly more self-reliant and resilient in the face of a deeply destabilized world. There are many elements to this, but an essential one appears missing from the government’s plans: the establishment of a foreign human intelligence service for Canada.
Opinion: Canada needs a foreign human intelligence service
Historically, Canadian governments have resisted calls to create such a service. The prevailing view on the matter is that Canada hasn’t suffered from a lack of a foreign intelligence capability to date, so there’s no obvious need to build one. It would be a costly, difficult and risky endeavour. The juice, in other words, wouldn’t be worth the squeeze.
But if we’ve never had the juice, how would we know? That’s the problem with the dominant view on this. We don’t know what Canada has been missing when it comes to a foreign intelligence capability because we never took the steps necessary to find out.
It’s true that Canada has been able to coast along without this capability to this point. We have relied on our Five Eyes partners to share their products collected and analyzed for their own purposes with us. Our diplomats have filled gaps through their reporting. We’ve excelled at foreign signals intelligence and allowed CSIS to collect security intelligence abroad. But in the storm of the current geopolitical environment, this approach is quickly becoming a glaring vulnerability. Our sovereignty and resilience demand that we discover and know for ourselves what’s happening to us in the world.
As the budget notes in its introductory paragraph, the “nexus between energy security, economic security, and national security is clearer than ever before.” This complex national security landscape, the economic and hybrid warfare our adversaries are waging, and the unstable relationship we have with the United States – whose foreign intelligence capability we have long been reliant upon – leave us exposed like never before. Sticking our heads in the sand and hoping the storm passes is not an acceptable strategy.
In a world as fluid, noisy and unstable as we are in now, not having an all-source intelligence capability to support crucial policy decisions is a major disadvantage. It risks undermining the government’s entire generational investment by leaving us vulnerable to blind spots, deception and manipulation by both our adversaries and allies alike.
Opinion: I, spy: Does Canada need a foreign intelligence service?
Therefore, establishing a foreign human intelligence capability should be a priority. The government could build a stand-alone agency or expand the capabilities and mandates of existing ones. Both would be costly and time-consuming, especially the former; both would be disruptive for a bureaucracy that’s facing deep cuts. But as the government has said about major projects and defence investments, the fact that a challenge is hard should not be an excuse for inaction or complacency.
Canadians have had this conversation before, and both Liberal and Conservative governments have entertained the idea in the past. This time, however, must be different. The budget’s talk of “generational investments” to “meet the moment” and “build Canada strong,” as well as its large increases to defence spending, signal a level of ambition required to finally break through our past indecision. We hope that the bureaucracy is already considering the issue, putting viable options on the table for the government to pursue. If they aren’t, the Prime Minister should insist they do. We shouldn’t let this question fade away again without serious consideration.
Setting up a foreign human intelligence capability would be a massive undertaking. It would test the limits of Canadian ingenuity and guile. It would be one of the hardest things this country has ever done. It would be fraught with risk and put us in uncomfortable moral territory. And it would necessitate a fundamental rearchitecting of Canada’s security and intelligence community. But it would prepare Canada for our fast-changing, increasingly self-interested world, which is ultimately what the Carney government’s generational investment is all about.
Pillar Society's new Canadian Espionage Cases section under Intel Briefs offers a comprehensive history of major public Canadian spy cases, from the Gouzenko Affair to the most recent ongoing CAF Matthew Robar case.
This curated resource delivers exclusive timelines and insights for national security enthusiasts.
Canadian Espionage Cases HERE
Called ‘I, Spy: An intelligent take on national security’, this 20-30 minute video will delve into some of the most urgent issues in national security around the world. Whether it is terrorism, espionage, sabotage, foreign interference, transnational repression or other threats to global stability, Phil will go where necessary to provide reliable, accurate data, pick apart mis- and disinformation and discuss why this matters. This podcast will be available to subscribers only and there will be a very modest fee attached.
Master Warrant Officer Matthew Robar arrives to court in Gatineau, Dec. 15
Globe and Mail Dec 19, 2025 Mark MacKinnon Robert Fife Steven Chase
The arrest of a Canadian Armed Forces intelligence operator on espionage charges appears to have its origins in another murky episode that has vexed the country’s military establishment for more than a year. The operator, Master Warrant Officer Matthew Shawn Robar, was arrested and charged Dec. 10 with multiple offences related to passing highly sensitive government secrets to what court documents released this week refer to as a “foreign entity.” He was released from custody Monday under strict conditions. The court documents show that the allegations relate to events that began in late 2023 and 2024. At the time, the documents say, MWO Robar was assigned to interview “several individuals who wanted to report concerns related to the CAF,” meaning the Canadian Armed Forces. During one of those meetings, the documents say, “one of these individuals told Robar that he should speak with the Foreign Entity.”
The Globe and Mail reported this week, citing a source, that the country MWO Robar is accused of leaking information to is Ukraine. The court documents do not identify the foreign entity or the foreign intelligence service that had allegedly been engaged in conversations with MWO Robar. Three separate sources with direct knowledge of the initial events have told The Globe that in 2023 MWO Robar was assigned to interview and assess the concerns of a group of Canadian military officers who said they were targeted for threats after making internal allegations that Postmedia reporter David Pugliese was serving the interests of the Russian state via his coverage of the war in Ukraine – an assertion he denies. The CAF members were specifically concerned about Mr. Pugliese’s reporting on alleged mismanagement inside a pair of charities, Mriya Aid and Mriya Report. The charities were set up by a group of pro-Ukrainian volunteers that included several serving members of the Canadian Armed Forces. Mriya Aid raises money online that it uses to purchase and deliver non-lethal military aid, as well as humanitarian assistance, to Ukraine. It was chaired by Lieutenant-Colonel Melanie Lake, a former commander of Operation Unifier, the Canadian military mission to train the Ukrainian armed forces, an effort that ended at the start of the Russian war. The affiliated Mriya Report, which raised money to provide medical assistance to Ukraine and also operated a pro-Ukrainian YouTube channel, was founded by Captain Joe Friedberg. Both Lt.-Col. Lake and Capt. Friedberg declined to comment when contacted for this article. Sources say the soldiers involved with Mriya Aid asserted that the reporting on their charity was just the latest example of what they alleged was a years-long trend in which Mr. Pugliese’s articles suited the Kremlin’s aims – in this case, by undermining Canadian support for Ukraine.
That assertion is based largely on a controversial seven-page file – which appears to have been handpicked from a larger dossier – purportedly showing that the Soviet-era KGB had considered recruiting Mr. Pugliese in the late 1980s. The purported KGB documents are the focus of a fierce but whispered debate in Ottawa over the authenticity and provenance of the files. The sources who talked to The Globe say that as early as 2023, at least two CAF members had endured death threats, suspected home break-ins, or other forms of harassment after receiving copies of the alleged KGB dossier. MWO Robar was assigned to interview the officers and assess the level of risk they were facing, the sources said. The Globe is not naming its sources out of concern they could face repercussions for speaking about the case. Mr. Pugliese is a veteran defence writer, whose in-depth reporting and relentless coverage of mismanagement and spending controversies involving military commanders and bureaucrats has made him an unpopular figure within Ottawa’s defence and security establishment. Nothing in seven pages that have been made public proves that Mr. Pugliese accepted any tasks from the Soviet embassy or was even aware of the KGB’s apparent interest in him. Mr. Pugliese has said the claims that he is “some kind of Russian agent” are fabricated and that the dossier is full of “factual errors and falsehoods” that were used to smear him. “I understand my articles anger the Canadian Forces and DND leadership, but it is the role of journalists to hold those in power to account,” he said in a statement to The Globe Thursday. “If what you have determined is true, then yes, I believe there needs to be a full public accounting, not one hidden behind the secrecy that can shield the actions of the federal government, the Canadian Forces and the foreign intelligence service.” Among those interviewed by MWO Robar in connection with the case was former Conservative cabinet minister Chris Alexander, who used parliamentary privilege to make the alleged KGB dossier public during an Oct. 24, 2024, appearance before the Commons committee on public safety and national security. Mr. Alexander told The Globe this week that he was contacted by MWO Robar on Oct. 8, 2024, shortly after he first received the dossier naming Mr. Pugliese. “My only contact with MWO Robar was a single conversation in which he made it clear he was looking into threats and other hostile activities that had been undertaken against those who had received the documents … and those people included members of the Canadian Armed Forces,” Mr. Alexander said. “Everyone involved in the case assessed these threats and this harassment to have been orchestrated by Russia,” Mr. Alexander said. He added that MWO Robar “100 per cent” shared the assessment that Moscow was behind the threats allegedly directed at the Canadian officers making assertions against Mr. Pugliese. In his statement, Mr. Pugliese said MWO Robar never contacted him. Neither CAF or the Department of National Defence reached out to “inform me” that the intelligence officer had been asking questions about him, he said. “I believe that the allegations that are being made against me are designed to specifically discredit me and prevent my further investigation into the alleged misuse and misappropriation of Canadian Forces/DND funds and resources,” he said. On Oct. 21, 2024, MWO Robar was temporarily relieved of his duties at the Canadian Forces National Counter-Intelligence Unit pending an internal investigation. The court documents made public this week say MWO Robar repeatedly sought permission to co-operate with the unnamed foreign entity on an unspecified “Project.” His requests were refused, but MWO Robar allegedly proceeded to co-operate with the foreign entity anyway. It is unclear whether controversy surrounding Mriya Aid, Mriya Report and Mr. Pugliese is related to the “Project” that is the source of the main charges against MWO Robar, but they do seem to be what brought him into contact with Ukrainian officials. A series of messages seen by The Globe show that senior staff at the Ukrainian embassy in Ottawa were aware of the alleged KGB dossier and were aiding efforts to prove its veracity. Neither the military prosecutor, Major Max Reede, or Major Carlos Da Cruz, the defence counsel for MWO Robar, responded to requests for comment on whether the case against the accused is related in any way to Mr. Pugliese. On Monday, the military prosecutor and defence counsel told the court that the actions of the accused do not amount to the serious national-security threat posed by former Canadian Armed Forces intelligence staffer Jeffrey Delisle. Mr. Delisle was charged in 2012 with passing secrets to Russia and sentenced to 20 years in prison.
Maj. Reede told the court that Mr. Robar is not a flight risk and was “not motivated by personal or financial gain or to cause harm.” Maj. Da Cruz said Monday that the Delisle case was “serious,” and “We are not dealing with something like this here.”
The Globe asked Ukraine’s ambassador to Canada, Andrii Plakhotniuk, for comment on whether embassy staff had ever talked to MWO Robar, whether it shared the alleged KGB dossier with any Canadians, what role it played in trying to verify the dossier and how the Ukrainian government viewed the charges against the intelligence operator. The Globe also asked him about media reporting that Ukraine was the recipient country of the allegedly leaked information.
In response to queries from The Globe, embassy press officer Marianna Kulava did not address the specific questions.
“With respect for the important work of the mass media, we would like to note that the Embassy of Ukraine in Canada does not comment on allegations or information attributed to anonymous or unidentified sources,” Ms. Kulava wrote in an e-mailed statement Thursday.
“As the Embassy has not received any official information or requests from the relevant Canadian authorities on the issues raised in your articles and e-mails to us, we will not make any statements or comments.”
The seven pages of alleged KGB files, dated between 1984 and 1990, purport to show the Soviet KGB taking an interest in a young Mr. Pugliese, who was then just beginning his journalism career.
In the first document – a handwritten note on yellowed paper dated Aug. 7, 1984, and signed by A.V. Merezhko – Mr. Pugliese is assigned the code name “Stuart.” The paper says “Stuart” is to be “studied with the perspective of possible operative use.”
One of the most recent documents, dated April 6, 1990, notes that Mr. Pugliese had by then started working at the Ottawa Citizen. The author, V. I. Semeniuk, was seeking permission from Moscow for Stuart “to be made the subject of a series of operative agent measures towards additional study and verification of the possibility of use in interests of Directorate ‘S’.” Directorate S was a KGB program that managed long-term, deep-cover sleeper agents in the West.
The file also includes a $600 expense claim “for work on the Stuart case.”
There are no documents dated later than 1990. The Soviet Union collapsed in December, 1991.
Andriy Kogut, the director of archives for Ukraine’s SBU security service, the successor agency to the KGB in independent Ukraine, told The Globe this week that the names and dates on the documents corresponded with serving KGB officers at the time.
He said that while it would be “wrong to assert anything” regarding the authenticity of the file, the documents would have been difficult to forge without “real documents or perfect and deep knowledge from within the KGB.”
Handwritten numbers atop each of the seven documents suggest that the complete file was at least 33 pages long, leaving open the question of what happened to the other 26 pages.
In his statement Thursday, Mr. Pugliese said there needs to be an accounting of what transpired.
“If what your sources are saying about MWO Robar is accurate, then this is outrageous and undemocratic and further proof that the Canadian Forces needs more, not less, journalistic scrutiny.”
LONDON, Dec 15 (Reuters) - Russian President Vladimir Putin is dragging out negotiations over Ukraine, while Russia is seeking to bully critics with tactics from sabotage attacks to buzzing airports with drones, the head of Britain's MI6 spy agency said on Monday.
In her first public speech since becoming the head of Britain's Secret Intelligence Service, Blaise Metreweli said Russia posed an "aggressive, expansionist, and revisionist" threat that still sought to subjugate Ukraine and harass NATO members.
Blaise Metreweli is the first female chief of MI6
Talks between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy and U.S. President Donald Trump's envoys resumed in Berlin on Monday, after the U.S. side said a "lot of progress" had been made on ending the conflict.
Metreweli cast doubt on how much Putin himself wanted peace.
"I find it harrowing that hundreds of thousands have died, with the toll mounting every day, because of Putin's historical distortions and his compromised desire for respect," said Metreweli, who in October became MI6's first female chief - a role known by the codename "C" - in its 116-year history.
"He is dragging out negotiations and shifting the cost of war on to his own population," she said in her speech at the agency's London headquarters.
She said Russia should be in no doubt about Britain's "enduring" support for Ukraine and that "the pressure we apply on Ukraine's behalf will be sustained".
Putin has repeatedly said he is ready to talk peace, but that if Ukraine refuses an agreement then Russia's forces will advance further and take more Ukrainian territory.
Metreweli also accused Russia of using tactics "just below the threshold of war", including cyberattacks on critical infrastructure, drones buzzing airports and military bases, "aggressive activity" above and below the sea, arson and sabotage, and propaganda operations.
"The export of chaos is a feature not a bug in the Russian approach to international engagement, and we should be ready for this to continue until Putin is forced to change his calculus," she said.
Russia regularly denies accusations that it is behind drone incidents or cyberattacks affecting Western countries. It also denies any plans to attack NATO, which has been providing weapons, intelligence and other assistance to Ukraine since Moscow's 2022 invasion.
Metreweli was previously MI6's head of technology, known as "Q", and much of her speech focused on the peril posed by technological innovations, such as artificial intelligence, biotechnology and quantum computing.
It meant power was becoming more diffuse and unpredictable, shifting from states to corporations, and sometimes to individuals, she said.
"AI-powered robots and drones are brilliant for scaled manufacturing but devastating on the battlefield. Discoveries that cure disease can also create new weapons," she said.
"And as states race for tech supremacy, or as some algorithms become as powerful as states, those hyper-personalised tools could become a new vector for conflict and control."
Faced with these challenges, she said MI6 would take on a more active, operational role, "hustling to make things happen".
"We will take calculated risks, where the prize is significant and the national interest clear," she said. "We will never stoop to the tactics of our opponents. But we must seek to outplay them."
Richard Knighton, head of Britain's armed forces, will also call in a separate speech on Monday for a "whole society" approach to defence in the face of growing uncertainty and threats, and highlight an increased probability of Russia invading a NATO country.
From The Globe and Mail Reporter: Steven Chase Published 2025-12-11
A member of the Canadian Armed Forces’ intelligence-collection unit has been arrested and charged with passing highly sensitive government secrets to a foreign entity, the military announced Thursday.
Master Warrant Officer Matthew Robar, a member of the Canadian Forces Intelligence Command, has been charged with multiple offences under both Canada’s foreign interference and security of information laws as well as the National Defence Act and the Criminal Code.
The arrest and charges stem from a joint operation between the Canadian Forces Military Police and the RCMP that the two organizations described Thursday as a probe into “foreign interference and security of information.”
This case emerges at a time of heightened concerns about foreign interference from Russia, China, Iran and India, and other countries. A lengthy public inquiry into foreign interference tabled its final report at the start of 2025.
The accusations could invite scrutiny of how effectively Canada safeguards not only its own military secrets but those of allies shared with Canadians through the Five Eyes network, which includes the United States, Britain, Australia and New Zealand.
Among the charges are “communicating special operational information” and “breach of trust in respect of safeguarded information” under the Foreign Interference and Security of Information Act, the military and RCMP said in a joint statement.
The first charge is under Section 17 (1) of the act, which deals with communicating “special operational information to a foreign entity or to a terrorist group.” The act says everyone who commits an offence under this subsection is “guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for life.”
Special operational information under the Foreign Interference and Security of Information Act refers to highly safeguarded government data revealing confidential sources, military plans for armed conflict, covert intelligence methods and vulnerabilities, targets of secret investigations, identities of undercover agents, military advantages or vulnerabilities, protective measures like encryption, or similar intelligence from foreign entities or terrorist groups.
This designation protects some of Canada’s most sensitive operational secrets, including signals intelligence capabilities – interception of electronic communications to gather information – as well as countermeasures.
The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) on Thursday declined to reveal which foreign country or foreign entity was allegedly involved in this case, or divulge specific details on the allegations.
None of the accusations have been proven in court.
The Forces and the RCMP said the investigation began in 2024 and “focused on the unauthorized disclosure of safeguarded information to a Foreign Entity.”
They said should the charges proceed to prosecution, “they will be tried in the military justice system by court martial.”
Other charges laid against MWO Robar include three counts of “Conduct to the Prejudice of Good Order and Discipline” under the National Defence Act, firearm storage charges as well as one count of “feigning disease” under the National Defence Act.
Canadian military legal rules published online say a charge of feigning disease or infirmity “should be laid only where the accused exhibits appearances resembling genuine symptoms which, to his knowledge, are not due to such disease or infirmity, but have been induced artificially for purposes of deceit, for example, simulating fits or mental disease.”
The Canadian Forces Intelligence Command oversees multiple divisions and it’s unclear where MWO Robar worked. The Canadian Forces Joint Imagery Centre provides imagery and imagery intelligence, the military’s website says. The Canadian Forces National Counter-Intelligence Unit “identifies, investigates and counters CAF threats by foreign intelligence services, individuals and groups engaged in terrorism, espionage, sabotage, subversion, or organized criminal activities that impact DND/CAF security.” The Mapping and Charting Establishment provides geospatial information and Joint Task Force X provides “strategic, operational and tactical human intelligence resources.”
Brigadier-General Vanessa Hanrahan, Canadian Forces Provost Marshal, praised the efforts of her staff in a statement accompanying the charges.
“The protection of national security relies on collaboration and precision. The success of this operation demonstrates the strength of joint policing efforts and what can be achieved when agencies and organizations work together toward a common goal.”
MWO Robar is not the first Canadian Forces intelligence staffer to be charged with communicating secrets to a foreign entity.
Nearly 14 years ago, a then-Canadian naval intelligence officer, Jeffrey Paul Delisle, was arrested and charged with passing secrets to a foreign entity. He later pleaded guilty to spying for Russia and went to prison.
Stephanie Carvin, a national-security expert at Carleton University, said the Delisle espionage hurt Canada. “There was serious concern and damage done with the Jeffery Delisle breach and that raised considerable concern about information security and Canada’s reputation,” she said. ”There’s the potential for that to happen here as well, depending on the severity of the case."
That being said, Prof. Carvin added, many militaries have experienced similar incidents like this in recent years. “Canada is by no means the exception.”
Mr. Delisle, who spied for Russia, had volunteered his services to Moscow, walking into the Russian embassy in Ottawa in 2007 and offering to betray his country for cash.
For nearly five years, Mr. Delisle stole highly classified and secret information from a treasure trove of material at his work and shipped it to the Russians.
The former sailor, who was arrested in January, 2012, smuggled out information from top-secret Canadian military facilities using a memory stick hidden in his pocket.
Mr. Delisle was paid by wire transfer for the first four years. At first he was paid $5,000 but this quickly dropped to about $2,800 a month and then finally $3,000 every 30 days. This continued until about five months before he was caught, when the Russians changed how they paid him.
Young journalists exposed Russian-linked vessels circling off the Dutch and German coast. This article is definitely worth the time to read. It demonstrates the continued and increasing Russian threat facing the West. Part of the current hybrid warfare. This is what they quoted from official sources pertaining to the sailors on the vessels:"Russian intelligence services deploy so-called low-level agents for espionage, sabotage, and other disruptive measures. These ‘pocket money agents’ or ‘disposable agents’ operate for small sums in the interest of hostile intelligence services without belonging to them. They’re used for comparatively simple operations. Unlike regular staff, they’re expendable—exposure is accepted as a cost of doing business.”
Similar occurrences on the North American coasts???
See the full story HERE
A man who spent a decade and a half working as a Chinese spy has shared details of some of his missions with Radio-Canada, including what he knows about a Chinese dissident who died in B.C. in 2022.
"From 2008 to 2023, my real job was to work for China's secret police. It's a means for political repression," said "Eric," who was interviewed in the suburbs of Melbourne, Australia. "Its main targets are dissidents who criticize the Chinese Communist Party."
Eric shared a variety of documents — including financial records, secret money transfers and the names of spies — with journalists from the Australian Broadcasting Corp. and the Washington-based International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, of which CBC/Radio-Canada is a partner.
The records give an unprecedented glimpse at the inner workings of China's overseas spy operations.
Eric was willing to be filmed and photographed but didn't want Radio-Canada to use his real name. The interpreter hired to translate from Mandarin also asked not to be named, out of fear of reprisal.
Chinese artist Hua Yong staged a protest in Beijing's Tiananmen Square on June 4, 2012, where he punched himself in the nose and then used his blood to write '6-4,' representing the date of the 1989 massacre. Hua died mysteriously in November 2022. (Hua Yong/Twitter)
Eric explained that he was once a pro-democracy activist, having joined the underground Social Democratic Party of China. But he said he was forced into spy work after receiving a visit from the police one day.
For 15 years, Eric worked for the 1st Bureau at China's Ministry of Public Security, a unit that specializes in surveillance of dissidents abroad. He previously told the Australian Broadcasting Corp. that he spied on a Japanese-based cartoonist and a YouTuber exiled in Australia. Often, he said, his cover was working for real companies in the countries where he was deployed — companies that collaborated with China's secret police.
For example, while on assignment in Cambodia, his cover was with the Prince Group, a multibillion-dollar conglomerate with interests in real estate and financial and consumer services. (The company did not reply to messages from Radio-Canada.)
In 2020, Eric said he was tasked with snooping on a dissident named Hua Yong, an artist and hardcore opponent of China's Communist Party who eventually ended up on B.C.'s Sunshine Coast.
After staging a protest in Tiananmen Square in Beijing in 2012, Hua was arrested and sent to a re-education labour camp. He was eventually released but arrested again in 2017 for documenting mass evictions in a working-class Beijing neighbourhood.
By March 2020, Hua was in exile in Thailand. Eric said Chinese authorities wanted him captured, but they felt he was out of reach there. So Eric's handler instructed him to lure Hua to Cambodia or Laos — countries that have close ties with China.
Eric's assignment was delivered to him via voice message on one of several messaging apps he and his handlers used over the years. It was one of thousands of audio and text exchanges, including his communications with his bosses, that Eric held on to.
Among them are Eric's handler's messages to him in Mandarin about Hua:
Listen to my request below. It's about Hua Yong. The higher-ups find him quite annoying and want to deal with him.- Eric's handler
(The latter phrase could also be translated as "want to get rid of him.")
Eric said he talked with his bosses about different ways to entice Hua to go to another country where China's secret police could get at him. Ultimately, Eric came up with a strategy: He started chatting with Hua on social networks, then moved to encrypted messaging apps. In a conversation on the app Telegram, Eric suggested they set up a resistance group and try to build a following.
To gain Hua's confidence, Eric invented a fake anti-Communist rebel group called the V Brigade and started posting about it on social media.
In a video posted to YouTube in September 2020, Eric is wearing a three-hole balaclava and camo and is seen firing blanks. He announces: "Hello, everyone. I'm here with V Brigade to introduce today's topic: How to individually prepare for armed revolution and armed struggle."
The ruse worked.
Chinese ex-spy 'Eric' invented a fake anti-Communist rebel group called the V Brigade to gain Hua's trust and posted this promotional video for it on YouTube, in which Eric can be seen firing a blank gun. (V Brigade/YouTube)
"This is awesome!" Hua wrote to Eric, as the two became revolutionary comrades and even met up in Bangkok at one point.
But in early April 2021, the Chinese secret police lost track of Hua. A brief scramble ensued. Eric reported to his handlers that Hua appeared to have gone to Turkey and then Paris.
Then on April 6, Hua posted on social media that he was in Canada. He invited Eric to join him and become the spokesperson for a revolutionary group. Eric's handlers ordered him instead to return to China and keep tabs on his target from afar.
Hua ended up moving to Gibsons, B.C., where he took up crab fishing and kayaking, his own social media posts show.
In the fall of 2022, Hua was out paddling when his kayak nearly capsized after a luxury yacht passed near him.
"For him, this was a mere accident. But to me, it looked like an orchestrated murder," said Li Jianfeng, a former judge in China who also served prison time there before being granted refugee status in Canada.
Li said he helped Hua escape to Canada.
Hua fled to Canada in April 2021 and later moved to B.C. and took up kayaking. He died while kayaking not long after this photo was taken, in November 2022.
A couple of weeks later, on Nov. 25, 2022, Hua went out for another paddle, but this time he didn't come back. After a night of searching, his body was found along the shore of an island off the Sunshine Coast.
The RCMP saw no foul play at the time. But the force didn't appear to know then that Hua was in the crosshairs of a covert operation by China's secret police.
"I fully understand the modus operandi of the Chinese Communist Party," Li told Radio-Canada in an interview, referring to his former job in China's justice system. "They would stage an accident to murder someone. Yes, I don't have direct evidence to prove his murder."
Li said he put together a dossier with several different leads and sent it to the RCMP.
Guy Saint-Jacques, Canada's former ambassador to China, said no possibility should be excluded. "China's regime has no shame and doesn't hesitate to use brutal means to attain its objectives."
Eric told Radio-Canada he suspects other informants were keeping an eye on Hua in Canada.
"Based on the Chinese police's commonly known operating methods, the party definitely has other agents in Canada, including spies or other special operation teams," he said. "I'm almost certain of this."
After several failed attempts to flee China, Eric finally succeeded in 2023. The former spy wanted to go to Canada to claim asylum but ended up in Australia because he was able to get a tourist visa there.
The world has a right to know what China's secret police are up to, Eric said, adding that revealing it publicly actually buys him a measure of protection.
Meanwhile, the police investigation into Hua's death isn't officially closed because three years later, the B.C. Coroners Service still hasn't completed its report, which normally takes about 16 months.
Eric said he's had no contact with Canadian police but that he did confidentially send some documents to the Hogue commission, Canada's public inquiry into foreign interference.
"There are some strange aspects to this case that demand further investigation," he said.
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