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CSIS: same old, same old Or, let’s try something new Wesley Wark May 4, 2026 The headline from the recent annual report from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service was…same old, same old. [i] · On-going foreign interference by the usual bad actors, China, India, Russia. (No mention of the U.S.A, or the potential national security threats posed by the Alberta separatist movement.) · On-going domestic violent extremism getting more complicated to detect and more ideologically scrambled, even zeroed out. In response, CSIS had to add a new category (alongside religious, ideological and political), “nihilistic violent extremism” (NVE). · Lots of foreign espionage directed against Canada, especially by Russia and by China. Someone at CSIS has a sense of humour, as they have nicknamed the Chinese intelligence services…wait for it, PRICS. · Attention continues to be paid by the Service to economic and research security and to the Arctic The annual report got some one-day coverage in some of the mainstream media (Globe and Mail, Global, National Post) but stirred no editorial attention at the Toronto Star or CBC. No political party jumped on it. No Parliamentary committee promised to study it. There was no statement from the Public Safety Minister or the PM. That’s life for CSIS—a fitful presence in the public consciousness, the same expansive menu of threats, the same high and unending workload. Fortunately for the Service, they escaped most of the government’s budget reduction scalpel/axe and are only required to cut back by 2%. This, we are told, they can manage without losing workforce, which is their engine. So, if there are no real surprises in the most recent edition of the CSIS Public Report, maybe we should turn to the question of changes that would allow CSIS not just to slog along, but to be a more effective, high-performance intelligence service operating for a middle power that wants to lead the world. Assuming, of course, that the threat environment is not going to turn sunny any time soon. To be that leading middle power in a broken international system, Canada needs more foreign intelligence, a lot more. To that end CSIS should be given a clear mandate (which would require a change to some of the oldest and untouched sections of the CSIS Act) to allow it to collect foreign intelligence in accord with the government’s intelligence priorities. This should become job #1 for CSIS. To free up resources and strategic bandwidth to become a foreign intelligence service, there are onerous functions that CSIS should be set free of. I would include in that list: security screening, immigration screening and national security review of foreign direct investment conducted as part of the Investment Canada Act. Whoa there, you say. Surely these are all important tasks. Absolutely, but CSIS is drowning in them. Have a look at the stats in the 2025 Public Report. CSIS received no less than 129,130 security screening requests in 2025. CSIS ingested 438,000 referrals for security screening of immigration files CSIS was involved in national security review under the ICA of 1106 investment proposals [ii] The CSIS work on security screening and immigration screening should be turned over to a new, separate agency tasked only with screening and able to apply specialised expertise and data tools, including AI (with a knowledgeable human in the loop). Call it, just to be fancy, Canada’s SAS, “Special Agency for Screening.” National security review of foreign investment should be part of a new, specialised and stand-alone economic intelligence agency which would work closely with the Department of Finance, Industry Canada, and Global Affairs Canada, but would be the government’s centre of expertise (we don’t have one on economic intelligence at the moment). Surely this idea would appeal to you know who… While we are at it, axe the ITAC (now reverted to its original 2004 name as Integrated Threat Assessment Centre). Redeploy its analytic assets primarily to Public Safety and, for the relatively recent ITAC mission of detecting threats to politicians, to the RCMP (where it belonged in the first place). Get CSIS out of cyber security and enforce a no duplication rule with the federal government’s lead on cyber security, which is the Communications Security Establishment. In this very new-look CSIS hen house, foreign intelligence would rule the roost. That’s the way it should be in future. And yes, we would need to make sure that the RCMP could truly handle the intelligence collection, analysis and law enforcement mission required by domestic threats and violent extremism. [i] Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Public Report 2025, May 1, 2026, https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/csis-scrs/images/2025/public-report/Public%20Report_EN_2025_DIGITAL.pdf
CSIS: same old, same old Or, let’s try something new
The headline from the recent annual report from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service was…same old, same old. [i]
· On-going foreign interference by the usual bad actors, China, India, Russia. (No mention of the U.S.A, or the potential national security threats posed by the Alberta separatist movement.)
· On-going domestic violent extremism getting more complicated to detect and more ideologically scrambled, even zeroed out. In response, CSIS had to add a new category (alongside religious, ideological and political), “nihilistic violent extremism” (NVE).
· Lots of foreign espionage directed against Canada, especially by Russia and by China. Someone at CSIS has a sense of humour, as they have nicknamed the Chinese intelligence services…wait for it, PRICS.
· Attention continues to be paid by the Service to economic and research security and to the Arctic
The annual report got some one-day coverage in some of the mainstream media (Globe and Mail, Global, National Post) but stirred no editorial attention at the Toronto Star or CBC. No political party jumped on it. No Parliamentary committee promised to study it. There was no statement from the Public Safety Minister or the PM.
That’s life for CSIS—a fitful presence in the public consciousness, the same expansive menu of threats, the same high and unending workload. Fortunately for the Service, they escaped most of the government’s budget reduction scalpel/axe and are only required to cut back by 2%. This, we are told, they can manage without losing workforce, which is their engine.
So, if there are no real surprises in the most recent edition of the CSIS Public Report, maybe we should turn to the question of changes that would allow CSIS not just to slog along, but to be a more effective, high-performance intelligence service operating for a middle power that wants to lead the world. Assuming, of course, that the threat environment is not going to turn sunny any time soon.
To be that leading middle power in a broken international system, Canada needs more foreign intelligence, a lot more. To that end CSIS should be given a clear mandate (which would require a change to some of the oldest and untouched sections of the CSIS Act) to allow it to collect foreign intelligence in accord with the government’s intelligence priorities. This should become job #1 for CSIS.
To free up resources and strategic bandwidth to become a foreign intelligence service, there are onerous functions that CSIS should be set free of. I would include in that list: security screening, immigration screening and national security review of foreign direct investment conducted as part of the Investment Canada Act.
Whoa there, you say. Surely these are all important tasks. Absolutely, but CSIS is drowning in them. Have a look at the stats in the 2025 Public Report.
CSIS received no less than 129,130 security screening requests in 2025.
CSIS ingested 438,000 referrals for security screening of immigration files
CSIS was involved in national security review under the ICA of 1106 investment proposals [ii]
The CSIS work on security screening and immigration screening should be turned over to a new, separate agency tasked only with screening and able to apply specialised expertise and data tools, including AI (with a knowledgeable human in the loop). Call it, just to be fancy, Canada’s SAS, “Special Agency for Screening.”
National security review of foreign investment should be part of a new, specialised and stand-alone economic intelligence agency which would work closely with the Department of Finance, Industry Canada, and Global Affairs Canada, but would be the government’s centre of expertise (we don’t have one on economic intelligence at the moment). Surely this idea would appeal to you know who…
While we are at it, axe the ITAC (now reverted to its original 2004 name as Integrated Threat Assessment Centre). Redeploy its analytic assets primarily to Public Safety and, for the relatively recent ITAC mission of detecting threats to politicians, to the RCMP (where it belonged in the first place).
Get CSIS out of cyber security and enforce a no duplication rule with the federal government’s lead on cyber security, which is the Communications Security Establishment.
In this very new-look CSIS hen house, foreign intelligence would rule the roost. That’s the way it should be in future. And yes, we would need to make sure that the RCMP could truly handle the intelligence collection, analysis and law enforcement mission required by domestic threats and violent extremism.
[i] Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Public Report 2025, May 1, 2026, https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/csis-scrs/images/2025/public-report/Public%20Report_EN_2025_DIGITAL.pdf
Neil Bisson, President of the Ottawa-Gatineau Chapter of the Pillar Society and Director of the Global Intelligence Knowledge Network, recently spoke with Jeremie Charron of CTV News to discuss findings from the latest Canadian Security Intelligence Service Annual Report.
A key concern highlighted in the report is the increasing involvement of youth in counter-terrorism investigations. According to CSIS, 1 in 10 such investigations now involves individuals under the age of 18, with some as young as 13.
In the interview, Neil outlines how online environments—driven by constant connectivity, algorithmic exposure, and peer-driven influence—are creating conditions where vulnerable and impressionable youth can be targeted and radicalized by extremist actors.
This emerging trend underscores the need for greater awareness across communities, including parents, educators, and policymakers.
The interview starts at the 9 minute mark: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CpWM6zet5S0
The SOUFAN Center - IntelBrief
Wednesday, April 22, 2026
Bottom Line Up Front
The Iran War has renewed a global focus on energy security and supply chain chokepoints — from the Strait of Hormuz to the Malacca Strait. In addition, increased Russian and Chinese activities in the Arctic, along with U.S. President Donald Trump’s posturing around Greenland, are accelerating the focus on exploration and militarization in the High North, including use of the Northern Sea Route for shipping as well as exploration of oil, gas, and mineral deposits. Taken together, this has intensified the geopolitical competition for resources, energy security, and frontier exploration. Antarctica, however, remains a frequently overlooked frontier where strategic competition is quietly taking shape, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is making important inroads that could pay dividends down the line.
Antarctica is governed by the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS), established in 1959, which designates that the continent should be used only for peaceful and scientific purposes. The ATS explicitly prohibits “any measures of a military nature, such as the establishment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of military maneuvers, as well as the testing of any type of weapons.” The ATS, via the 1991 Protocol on Environmental Protection (commonly referred to as the Madrid Protocol), also regulates the extraction of resources: “any activity relating to mineral resources, other than scientific research, shall be prohibited.” There are currently 29 consultative parties to the ATS and 29 non-consultative parties. In order to be recognized as a consultative party and thus be privy to decision-making, the country must be “conducting substantial research activity” on the continent. The PRC obtained its consultative status in 1985.
Apart from the restrictions included in the ATS, the conditions of Antarctica have historically presented constraints on opportunities for economic and military activity. With over 98 percent of Antarctica currently ice-covered, the inaccessibility — coupled with the harsh climate and limited infrastructure — has rendered scale and cost efficiency of permanent human settlement and industrial development extremely difficult. Climate change may, however, change that in the future. The continent is believed to hold significant resource deposits, including copper, iron, gold, silver, platinum, and cobalt. A 2026 study published in the scientific journal Nature Climate Change suggests that Antarctica may hold between 12-25 million metric tons of copper deposits. Some estimates suggest 500 billion tons of oil and 300-500 billion tons of natural gas may exist on the continent. As Dr. Anne-Marie Brady, an expert on Antarctica and Chinese foreign policy stated: “Many oil-poor states regard Antarctica’s potential mineral resources as part of the solution to their medium-term energy needs.” As the ice melts, more land may become available for mineral and resource exploration. And by 2048, any consultative party to the ATS can request to hold a conference to review the Protocol currently prohibiting non-scientific activity of mineral resources, effectively calling into question the long-term durability of the ATS amidst intensifying strategic competition and the exploration for resources.
Yet, real challenges for future commercial mineral exploration remain, including viable transportation and permanent commercial infrastructure — which could be solved with scientific and technological advancements. A more immediate important resource in Antarctica is related to fisheries and krill. Krill is a cornerstone of the Antarctic ecosystem, but it is also important for aquaculture feed and pet food, as well as the production of human supplements like Omega-3.
In addition, the continent is valuable for its environment, which can be utilized for scientific research, but it can also be utilized for satellite ground systems, radio and space weather monitoring, as well as potential signal intelligence-related capabilities. As such, PRC activity in Antarctica has increased in the 21st century. The PRC currently has three permanent research stations (ChangCheng, Zhongshan, and Qinling), two seasonal stations (Kunlun and Taishan), while planning for another seasonal station, likely in 2027. When completed, it would become the fourth Chinese station established in Antarctica over the last two decades. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has a stated goal of being a “polar great power” by 2030 and has, to this end, invested heavily not only in technology and infrastructure, such as icebreakers — leading it to outpace the U.S. fleet — and satellites, but also on diplomacy and governance norms to expand its influence in the Arctic and Antarctica.
While much of the PRC’s activity in Antarctica, since first setting foot there in December of 1984, has been scientific in nature — ranging from meteorology and geomagnetism to marine hydrology — there are concerns that some activities may be employing dual-use technology. The 2022 U.S. Department of Defense report on Military and Security Developments involving the PRC assessed that Beijing’s strategy for Antarctica “includes the use of dual-use technologies, facilities, and scientific research, which are likely intended, at least in part, to improve PLA [the People’s Liberation Army] capabilities.” The report noted that ChangCheng, Zhongshan, Kunlun, and Taishan can operate as reference stations for Beijing’s BeiDou satellite navigation network (the PRC alternative to the U.S. GPS system). The Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) noted in a 2023 report that the Qinling research station will also include a satellite ground station that can be dual-use, and that the “station’s position may enable it to collect signals intelligence from U.S.-allied Australia and New Zealand and could collect telemetry data on rockets launching from newly established space facilities in both countries.”
The U.S. continues to monitor Antarctic developments — including a January 2026 inspection of the Zhongshan station under the ATS — and cooperate with allies such as Australia and New Zealand. However, uncertainty about budget cuts that may impact U.S. scientific operations in Antarctica could place a heavier burden on U.S. allies. The PRC appears to operate with the understanding that a sustained physical presence and scientific leadership in Antarctica will be the primary currency of influence. This is positioning Beijing not only to possess infrastructure and data capabilities in the future, but also to carry diplomatic weight to influence any future governance norms of the continent. Specifically, should the treaty regime weaken over the next two decades, the PRC will seek to position itself to secure early-mover advantages.
https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief/
https://www.canada.ca/en/security-intelligence-service/corporate/publications/csis-public-report-2025.html
Iran's Use of Information Warfare in the Conflict against the U.S. and Israel
Friday, April 24, 2026
One of the most surprising aspects of the current war with Iran has been the Iranians’ effective use of information warfare against the United States and Israel. Iran has waged information warfare in myriad ways, with some efforts dedicated to confusing its adversaries, and some earmarked for domestic consumption. Other aspects have been extremely unorthodox yet arguably effective, including AI-generated videos mocking President Trump and his administration. The Joint Chiefs of Staff publication “Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Campaigns and Operations,” defined information warfare as “the integrated employment of IRCs [information related capabilities] in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own.” But in an era of memes and deepfakes, information warfare is more expansive in its means, methods, and motivations.
Iran's approach to information warfare has evolved over time. At its core, the overarching message has been one of ‘Death to America,’ and portraying the United States and Israel as the 'Great Satan' and the ‘Little Satan.’ More than anything, this rallying cry was a multi-decade effort, dating back to the 1979 Islamic Revolution, to rally around the flag and seek to create a unifying narrative in opposition to the United States and Israel. Iran's information warfare was thus focused inward, with propaganda and media operations concerned with domestic public support for the regime. Iran also spent time, energy, and resources exporting its revolution abroad, and thus, conducted operations in and through the information environment that highlighted its role as the benefactor to Shia militia groups in Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen, while also promoting the Palestinian cause, an effort that won Iran some hearts and minds in the Sunni Arab and non-Persian corners of the Middle East.
In the current conflict with the United States, Iranian information warfare has adopted several dimensions. First, Iran has attempted to shape the narrative and impact global public opinion by portraying the U.S. and Israel as warmongering nations hellbent on destroying Iran and all of its people. Statements by U.S. and Israeli leaders have played into this messaging, with some of President Trump's posts on his social media site Truth Social highlighted as proof by the Iranians that the U.S. will stop at nothing short of complete destruction: “A whole civilization will die tonight, never to be brought back again. I don’t want that to happen, but it probably will.” AI-generated videos have mocked President Trump, pointed out his administration’s mishandling of the Epstein files, and highlighted previous American wars, portraying the United States as militant and an unchecked aggressor and destabilizing force in the world. Other videos have focused on an errant American missile strike that hit an Iranian girls’ elementary school in Minab, mistakenly killing as many as 175 people, most of them children. Official Iranian media has also focused on this incident extensively in its reporting.
Perhaps the most popular and viral videos produced by the Iranians are the Lego videos depicting different scenarios featuring members of President Trump’s cabinet, including the President himself, but also Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and FBI Director Kash Patel. These videos have been produced by an entity known as “Explosive Media,” and have been promoted by the Iranian regime, though it is unclear what the relationship is, if any, between the media outlet and the current leadership in Iran. What is clear, however, is that whoever is helping produce these videos has a keen understanding of American pop culture. The videos have spread across Instagram, TikTok, and other popular social media platforms, going viral in some cases, and featuring catchy lyrics and music, including American-style hip-hop and rap music.
In some cases, the videos have been aimed at populations in other countries, promoted in an effort to demonstrate kinship or solidarity. For example, one video was aimed at espousing goodwill toward the people of Lebanon during Israel’s bombardment of Beirut and other parts of the country. According to Al Jazeera, the team behind Explosive Media, responsible for producing these videos, is approximately ten people, ranging in age from 19 to 25 years old. Information warfare means contesting the information environment and competing in the war of ideas, where narratives are formed and opinions are shaped.
Iranian embassies have also been used to peddle some of the country’s most successful information narratives. Embassies — especially those located in African countries — have gone viral on platforms like X for posting memes reacting to statements by President Trump and White House officials. The Iranian Embassy in South Africa has been especially prominent. In late March, it posted an image of a child’s toy steering wheel sitting in a car’s passenger seat in response to Trump’s March claim that the United States could potentially control the Strait of Hormuz alongside Iran. Iran’s embassy in Zimbabwe has also become a notable source of these reaction memes. Yesterday, it responded to Trump’s lengthy Truth Social post on birthright citizenship by writing, “not sure anyone read all of it yet. Does it have anything to do with us?” These accounts also engage with one another, often reinforcing a shared effort to portray Trump and his administration as absurd or unserious. According to the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, posts from these local embassy accounts have amassed hundreds of millions of views during the first 50 days of the conflict and helped recast Iran’s image for global audiences “toward that of an irreverent, witty underdog confronting the United States.”
The modern information warfare domain includes AI-generated content, disinformation and fake news, influence campaigns, propaganda, and both offensive and defensive cyber operations. According to an analysis by the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) at Reichman University in Israel, during last summer’s Twelve Day War between the United States and Israel, on one side, and Iran, on the other, Tehran’s AI-generated images were centered around five distinct narratives: the perception of widespread destruction across Israel; ridicule directed at Israeli leadership while glorifying then Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei; projecting Iranian dominance over Israel, with footage of military preparations for missile launches; “daily strike” fakes allegedly showing Iranian missile or aircraft attacks on Israeli targets; and fake news validated by AI-generated videos. Even putting out fake videos with images depicting attacks on Israel (when the videos could be from other parts of the world) is intended to confuse the enemy and inflict psychological damage on Israeli civilians, while polluting the information environment.
The United States has not performed well in the information environment, with President Trump failing to make a coherent case for war to the American public. In several cases, administration figures, including Secretary of State Marco Rubio, have suggested that Israel and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu helped steer the United States into this conflict. President Trump himself has offered myriad reasons for launching the war, though the President never made the case before Congress, and his objectives for what would constitute a clear American victory have shifted throughout the course of the war. Iran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz has been a constant feature of the information warfare environment, with various handles trolling President Trump, especially in the wake of his profanity-laced tirade on social media on Easter Day.
CTV- Article by Judy Trinh
https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/article/trial-of-ex-mountie-william-majcher-accused-of-working-for-china-begins/
VANCOUVER – In his policing career, William Majcher infiltrated terror groups and drug cartels and was put on an assassin’s hit list.
With a university degree in commerce, the former Mountie often went undercover as an expert who could help criminals launder their money.
In 2021, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) acting on information from Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), issued a national espionage alert warning all its members about Majcher.
He had retired 14 years earlier from the force and moved to Hong Kong, but investigators believed he had been turned by the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
In July 2023, Majcher came back to Canada “voluntarily” to clear his name, instead he was arrested when he landed at Vancouver International Airport.
The former Mountie faces one charge under the Security of Information Act, a law used to prosecute foreign interference.
The 63-year-old is accused of engaging in “preparatory acts,” such as planning to use threats and violence to pressure a Chinese national Hongwei “Kevin” Sun to return to China to face punishment for alleged fraud.
After waiting nearly three years, Majcher’s trial will be heard in the Supreme Court of British Columbia in Vancouver. The case will be tried in front of Justice Martha Devlin and is scheduled for one week.
“Bill has been stuck in Canada. He’s been separated from his family and children. And his position has always been – ‘I’m not guilty. I’m innocent and I want to have my day in court,’” Ian Donaldson, Majcher’s defence lawyer said, adding that his client has elected for a judge alone trial.
Investigators believe Majcher participated in China’s notorious Operation Fox Hunt, Sky Net and anti-corruption campaigns launched by President Xi Jinping. Under the program, the PRC would recruit police officers, private investigators and lawyers in foreign countries to help track down fugitives suspected of financial crimes. Human rights group say Fox Hunt was also a guise used by Beijing to find and silence its critics in the Chinese diaspora.
For the past few months, the prosecution and the defence have been arguing over what evidence can be presented in court. Since Majcher has elected for trial by judge alone, several preliminary rulings have been made public which gives a sense of the defence strategy and of the strength of the crown’s case.
“I’m a patriot not a traitor,” Majcher previously said in an exclusive interview with CTV News. “I challenge almost anybody who be watching this to put themselves at the kind of risks that I’ve put for my country and for our allies.”
After he retired from policing, Majcher moved to Hong Kong where he founded a company, EMIDR, which specialized in helping Chinese firms recover stolen assets. Beijing was also one of his clients.
The RCMP began investigating Majcher in 2021 under Project Severo. The crux of the Crown’s case against Majcher rests on an email from 2017, obtained by the F.B.I. and provided to the RCMP in 2023.
In the 2017 email exchange with Ross Gaffney, EMIDR’s Director of the Americas – Majcher, references negotiations to establish terms of engagement to help recover part of a RMB 2.9 billion fraud against a bank in China’s Jilin Province.
According to court documents, the email states the “fraudster is now a major real estate mogul in Vancouver” with over $100 million in assets.
Majcher writes that the Chinese Police are close to issuing a global arrest warrant, and that he hopes to get a copy so that “we can impress upon the crook that we hold the keys to his future.”
The presumed Vancouver target, Kevin Sun, is not identified in the email.
“There’s no genuine evidence that anyone was after Kevin Sun,” says Donaldson, Majcher’s lawyer.
In the same message to Gaffney, Majcher talks about trying to locate two women in California to establish their assets so that China’s Public Security Bureau can make decision about whether to pursue them for asset recovery. He says the Chinese government wants EMIDR to teach and train their police on how to use “covert methodologies” to investigate international financial crime.
Majcher writes that he and another colleague are developing a “Concept Paper” for the Chinese to establish a “storefront” to run money laundering sting operations. The stings would be initiated on a government-to-government basis under a mutual legal assistance treaty.
Donaldson says the email doesn’t show anything nefarious only that Majcher was “earning a living.”
“His career has been about combatting money laundering. It has nothing to do with Fox Hunt or Sky Net.”
Donaldson was unable to persuade Justice Devlin that the FBI emails should not be entered into evidence, however the defence was successful in arguing that Majcher’s warrantless arrest at the airport was unconstitutional.
The lead investigator on Project Severo was Staff Sergeant Nicolas Ferland, a member of the INSET team which probes terrorism cases and foreign interference. On July 16, 2023, Ferland was notified by CBSA that Majcher would arrive in Canada from Hong Kong within two days. During the preliminary trial, Ferland testified that the investigation was “a bit premature” yet the team decided to arrest Majcher without a warrant.
Justice Devlin found that when Majcher arrived at Vancouver International, the RCMP did not have probable grounds to arrest him. At that time, investigators knew that Kevin Sun was wanted for financial crimes in China and that he had purchased large amounts of real estate in Canada.
They also knew that one of Majcher’s associates in Vancouver, Kim Marsh, also a former Mountie, wanted to investigate Sun.
Fourteen RCMP officers would carry out a search warrant at Marsh’s home which the judge also found was invalid. Marsh was initially labelled a co-conspirator in the case, but has never been charged. He’s now become a Crown witness.
Justice Devlin also slammed the INSET team for relying on second-hand information from an Australian television documentary in which Majcher was featured, instead of doing its own interviews.
In the documentary Majcher admitted to being an “economic mercenary” who worked with the Chinese government.
But the judge says the narrative put forward by Ferland at that time “leaves too many gaps” to reasonably infer that Majcher had “any involvement with Mr. Sun.”
“The investigation simply had not collected sufficient credible, and compelling information,” stated Justice Devlin in her ruling.
“It follows that Mr. Majcher’s warrantless arrest was unlawful. I find that his arrest on July 18, 2023, violated his right not to be arbitrarily detained.”
Court documents also reveal that Majcher, after leaving the RCMP, did provide intelligence to CSIS while he was living in Asia.
Majcher believes he first came under suspicion after the arrest of Huawei chief financial officer, Meng Wanzhou which triggered China’s retaliatory detention of Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig. In 2019, he self-reported to CSIS that he had been hired by a Chinese think tank to research the extradition process in the Wanzhou case.
Majcher says he offered to provide intelligence on the Chinese, instead he was accused of betraying Canada.
His lawyer, Ian Donaldson accuses the Mounties of “tunnel vision.”
“Bill is a patriot, but when a police force gets an idea firmly embedded in their minds – they follow that track and ignore all sorts of off-ramps. Some call this tunnel vision.”
Produced by The Kirsch Group
https://kirschgroup.com/the-enemy-in-the-blanket-are-iranian-sleeper-agents-the-real-problem-here/
It is Ontario premier Doug Ford’s “personal opinion” that Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) “sleeper cells” are present and active in Canada. In a recent press conference, he stated that these sleeper cells may have been behind a series of March 2026 Toronto synagogue shootings, as well as a handgun attack on the US Consulate in downtown Toronto. Premier Ford added that police and intelligence agencies must “weed these people out and hold them accountable.” A few days later, American media echoed Ford, alleging that up to 1,000 Iranian sleeper agents are “embedded” in Canada, where they pose “an urgent security threat” to the United States.
In old-time espionage parlance, sleeper agents refer to people who are infiltrated by a hostile power into a target country without diplomatic or official cover. Often, they are native speakers of the target country’s language, with extraordinary cultural knowledge and sensitivity. Once in place, they go dormant, building a life for themselves that makes them largely indistinguishable from most other citizens or residents of that country, until they are activated.
Given the expense and complexity involved in infiltrating, supporting and activating them, sleeper agents and sleeper cells are exceptional components of espionage, or terrorist, tradecraft. The 9/11 hijackers were not “sleepers,” despite being characterized that way. They were operatives with a specific and limited assignment who entered the United States on their own passports. Rudolf Abel, born and raised in England before relocating to the Soviet Union, was smuggled into the United States by Soviet Intelligence in 1948. He lived and worked as an artist and photographer in Brooklyn, New York while coordinating and managing Soviet espionage operations against the United States. At the time of Abel’s arrest in 1957, then CIA Director Allen Dulles said that he wished that he had at least three people as thorough, and as competent, as Rudolf Abel working for him in Moscow.
In the aftermath of Premier Ford’s comments, senior RCMP officials said that the Force did not “have any information to provide…on any sleeper cells that may or may not exist in Canada.” CSIS, meanwhile, assesses the threat from Iran and its proxies as “medium.” This means that a violent extremist attack related to Iran remains a “realistic possibility.” However, the attack is most likely to come from a lone actor, “inspired by conflict in the Middle East.”
In many respects, this does not seem to square with Iran’s status as one of the world’s most prolific sponsors of terrorism. Hamas, Hezbollah, the Yemen-based Houthi movement, and various Shi’ite militia groups in Iraq, are all part of Iran’s extensive proxy network. Historically, Iran is highly adept at using this network to spread mayhem across the region and, in some cases, around the world. In 2024, Argentina’s highest criminal court ruled that Iran was directly responsible for the “political and strategic design” of a Hezbollah bombing, 30 years earlier, of a Jewish community centre in Buenos Aires that left 85 people dead, and 300 injured.
More recently, both Europe and the United States have dealt with the outcomes of Iranian use of local criminal networks to target journalists, politicians, and Jewish, Iranian and Kurdish activists. In 2023, a member of a local Hells Angels chapter assisted the Iranian government in recruiting the attacker of a synagogue in Bochum, Germany. And two years later, Iran recruited two Russian organized crime figures to kill an Iranian journalist and human rights activist in New York. In Canada, where Iran features on a list of countries believed to be involved in foreign interference activities, authorities uncovered an alleged plot to assassinate human rights activist and former Justice Minister Irwin Cotler.
If not true sleeper agents, what constitutes the threat from Iran? At least two Iranian terrorist proxies, Hezbollah and Hamas, raise funds in Canada. This goes back to at least the 1990s, when the RCMP uncovered highly lucrative Hezbollah-controlled tobacco smuggling networks between the United States and Canada. By 2025, both groups were involved in money-laundering and drug trafficking networks, and the theft and export of high-end automobiles. There are also indications that IRGC officials are present in Canada, and that they are involved in active intimidation and harassment of anti-regime activists in Iranian diaspora communities.
For Iran and its proxies, Canada is strategic space. It is close to, but not part of, “the Great Satan;” it offers all of the conveniences of the modern world, including an efficient financial system connected to international networks; opportunities for various forms of high profit crime; freedom of movement and expression; and a large Iranian diaspora community, with everything that means in terms of fundraising, influence, and leverage through intimidation or deception. The Iranian regime is nothing if not pragmatic, and Iranian operatives and proxy players in Canada are likely to be focussed on those kinds of opportunities. Right now, Canada as the “peaceable kingdom” is probably more valuable to Iran than it is as a terrorist target.
Ill-advised statements about sinister Iranian “sleeper cells,” presumably awaiting the signal to “wake up” and wreak havoc in Canada, do very little except stoke paranoia and a peculiar kind of xenophobia. In the post 9/11 period, anti-Muslim rhetoric placed an unequal onus on ordinary Muslims, even those who were Canadian citizens and permanent residents, to “prove” their loyalty to Canada and to “Western values,” and to repudiate what were euphemistically referred to as “barbaric cultural practices.” A generation before, in the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution and the US embassy hostage crisis, Islam and Muslims became synonymous with terrorism and militancy, at least in the popular imagination. Even prominent political and media figures took sophomoric delight in the obvious mispronunciation of Shi’ite. So, the invocation of sleeper cells achieves nothing but linking an entire diaspora community to the possibility of terrorist violence, even though many, if not most, members of that community are opposed to the current Iranian regime. Rooted in suspicion and distrust, this kind of societal discord plays directly into that regime’s psyops and foreign interference strategies.
As above, American media and American political figures have been quick to seize on the Iranian sleeper cell narrative. This too is highly reminiscent of the decade and more after 9/11, when received American wisdom stated that the hijackers had entered the United States from Canada, exploiting fundamental weaknesses in Canadian immigration and intelligence protocols. This was by no limited to the realm of conspiracy theory: Hilary Clinton, Janet Napolitano, and John McCain were among the respected American political figures who insisted that this was true. Given this history, there is a high likelihood that the 1,000 Iranian sleeper agents supposedly “embedded” here will become a massive stick with which to beat Canada, which is still reeling from the aftershocks of the US administration’s assertions about fentanyl and the porous Canadian border.
None of this diminishes the actual threat of violence associated with the current conflict in Iran. But just as relatively few of the “ISIS-inspired” terrorist attacks in Canada and the United States involved actual ISIS fighters, Iranian-, Hamas-, or Hezbollah-inspired attacks are more likely to be carried out, not by actual operatives, but by contractors, sympathizers, or people inspired or swayed by ideological messaging without necessarily understanding it – what Vladimir Lenin is said to have characterized as “useful idiots.”
In 1989, for example, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini issued a fatwa (Islamic religious ruling) condemning Indian-British novelist Salman Rushdie to death for his “blasphemous” portrayal of the Prophet Muhammad in his novel, The Satanic Verses. The fatwa was carried out in 2022, not by an Iranian agent, but by a disgruntled Lebanese-American at an event in Chautauqua, New York. Rushdie survived. On the other hand, Ayman Ghazali, who drove a makeshift truck bomb into a Michigan synagogue and Jewish day school in early March, was acting under the “direction and control” of Hezbollah, according to the US Justice Department. Intelligence indicates that his brother was a Hezbollah commander who had recently been killed in an Israeli airstrike.
Whether carried out by an agent of the Iranian state, a proxy, a sympathizer, or a useful idiot, terrorist violence is still terrorist violence and the CSIS “realistic possibility” assessment must be taken seriously. Likely targets include anti-regime activists, including Canadian political figures and elected officials, as well as American targets of opportunity.
Since the events of October 7, 2023, antisemitic violence and the deliberate targeting of Jewish people, businesses and institutions has proliferated, internationally and here in Canada. With the ramping up of Iranian eliminationist rhetoric vis-à-vis Israel, the threat to Jewish, Israeli and so-called “Zionist” targets should be considered extreme.
On April 16, Pillar Society Ottawa/Gatineau President Neil Bisson appeared before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Industry and Technology to provide a national security perspective on Canada’s electric vehicle policies, specifically as they relate to Chinese EVs.
This was not about electric vehicles. It was not about competition or innovation. It was about national security. During his remarks, he framed the issue the same way he did throughout his career as an intelligence officer: Motivation. Suitability. Access: Motivation: The People’s Republic of China continues to conduct cyber espionage, foreign interference, and influence operations to advance its strategic interests. Suitability: Canada has already taken action in the past, banning certain technologies and addressing risks tied to surveillance systems and digital platforms. Access: This is where the concern becomes critical. Modern EVs are not just vehicles; they are data collection platforms on wheels, continuously gathering geolocation, behavioural, and environmental data. Now ask yourself: What happens when tens of thousands of these connected systems—built within an environment where companies are legally required to cooperate with state intelligence—are integrated into Canada’s transportation networks and electrical grid? That is not a hypothetical. That is a policy decision being made right now. Once that level of access is established, it becomes incredibly difficult to detect—and even harder to reverse. Neil Bisson’s opening statement begins at 11:16 in the link below:
https://parlvu.parl.gc.ca/Harmony/en/PowerBrowser/PowerBrowserV2/20260417/-1/44749
OTTAWA — An internal Canadian Security Intelligence Service memo says allowing the spy agency to collect foreign intelligence overseas would capitalize on its “existing footprint and expertise,” but might also invite a host of problems.
The memo says giving CSIS the capabilities of a foreign human intelligence service — like the American CIA or Britain’s MI6 — could create governance, accountability and privacy concerns about what constitutes a threat, and about the prospect of targeting Canadians.
The Canadian Press used the Access to Information Act to obtain the memo, which was drafted by CSIS in advance of a roundtable meeting organized by academics last June.
Those invited to the three-hour roundtable at the University of Ottawa included current and former senior intelligence officials and academics with an interest in security and international affairs.
CSIS spokesperson Magali Hébert confirmed that the spy service’s director, Dan Rogers, attended the meeting.
Former national security and intelligence adviser Vincent Rigby, one of the organizers of the roundtable, said the time is right to revisit the question of expanding Canada’s foreign intelligence-gathering, given the perilous state of the world and a growing need for economic information.
“We do not have a reliable ally to the south right now,” Rigby said in an interview. “Some would even suggest that we have a hostile state actor in the United States, and so we can’t rely on them for intelligence necessarily.”
Wesley Wark, a senior fellow at the Centre for International Governance Innovation, attended most of the roundtable. He said he was struck by how open and — in some cases — fully supportive people at the gathering were about the idea of Canada launching a foreign intelligence service.
“The tenor of the discussion was, we should be taking this question seriously. We should be exploring it,” he said. “It was the most hopeful discussion that I’ve ever attended in all my years in thinking about this question.”
The Communications Security Establishment, Canada’s cyberspy agency, collects foreign intelligence through electronic means, while Global Affairs Canada, National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces contribute some reporting, the CSIS memo notes.
CSIS is permitted to gather intelligence in Canada and abroad about security threats such as terrorism and espionage. It’s allowed to gather foreign intelligence — information about the activities, capabilities and intentions of foreign people, organizations and states — only within Canada, not overseas.
The memo says that in “an uncertain geopolitical context,” Canada’s demand for such foreign intelligence might grow.
“Canada can only learn and act so much through its current collection and authorities, and has historically relied on allied partnerships for certain foreign intelligence reporting,” the note says.
Many of Canada’s G7 and Five Eyes allies collect foreign human intelligence abroad, and take action to advance their interests, the memo adds.
It says introducing a Canadian foreign human intelligence capability abroad would position the government to advance Canada’s geopolitical, security, economic and other interests globally.
Rigby said the key step is to decide what sort of intelligence Canada might need its officers and sources to gather abroad, and how to go about it.
“Let’s have an in-depth analysis within government, a public debate, and then make a decision,” he said.
The memo identifies three main options for launching a foreign intelligence capability. Ottawa could create a dedicated new foreign human intelligence service, or develop foreign intelligence capabilities at CSIS that eventually would be transferred to a new organization, or permanently assign expanded foreign intelligence capabilities to CSIS.
A new foreign human intelligence service would have a clear mandate and accountability standards, and would fit well into foreign policy structures led by Global Affairs Canada, the memo says.
It also says a standalone agency would be very costly and setting it up would require much initial effort that would delay its operation for years. This option would also be “highly disruptive” to current security and intelligence community work, the memo says.
On the other hand, fostering foreign intelligence capabilities at CSIS with an eye to handing them off later could be accomplished through simple and “minimally disruptive” legislative amendments, while taking advantage of CSIS’s existing strengths, the memo says.
The downside of this approach would be a long, drawn-out process that would occupy much of the intelligence community’s energy “for at least the next five years,” it says.
Assigning expanded foreign intelligence capabilities to CSIS would have advantages similar to the incubation model, the memo says.
The perceived disadvantages — including concerns about governance, accountability, privacy and “mandate overlap” — appear to stem from the fact that CSIS would have to juggle its traditional security intelligence role with a new foreign intelligence one.
Each of the three options must be accompanied by resources to minimize disruption to existing mandates and work, the memo says.
Hébert said any CSIS advice on the evolution of Canada’s intelligence capabilities or its governing legislation “would be provided to the government as protected advice.”
Various proposals for a Canadian foreign intelligence service have been debated since the end of the Second World War.
A recently published paper by former intelligence analyst Alan Barnes explained how the decades-long discussion has been coloured by input from close allies, budgetary concerns and internal federal rivalries.
The debate also has touched on fears that Canada’s nice-guy, fair broker image could be tarnished by engaging in subterfuge abroad.
“That’s exactly why I think you need a public debate, and you need to clearly explain to Canadians what a foreign human intelligence service in Canada would be and what it wouldn’t be,” Rigby said.
“I don’t think that we should have a foreign intelligence service that is toppling countries in Latin America, or going around and indulging in other unsavoury acts,” he added. “We’re not trying to replicate the CIA, we’re not trying to replicate MI6. This is going to be a made-in-Canada solution.”
Mark Carney’s Liberals have not promoted the idea of a new foreign intelligence service as a means of helping Canada carve a more independent path in the world in the face of highly strained relations with the United States.
Carney said last September that a new national security policy would be released “in due course.” The government has yet to release such a strategy.
Wark said roundtable participants agreed that creating a foreign intelligence service would be a political decision.
“It will require a prime minister to lean in on this and decide this is something that Canada has to do,” he said.
Wark added that a foreign intelligence capability would not only move Canada away from dependence on the United States but help it build intelligence partnerships with other countries, providing a rationale as to “why they would want to co-operate with us.”
This report by The Canadian Press was first published April 10, 2026.
Jim Bronskill, The Canadian Press
Global News - Stewart Bell - April 1, 2026
A protester holds a sign with the image of slain Sikh leader Hardeep Singh Nijjar at Indian consulate in Vancouver, June 24, 2023
Foreign governments are continuing to harass and intimidate Canadians but proving it in court is a challenge, the RCMP said in a statement clarifying controversial remarks by the commissioner.
“What we can say is that the RCMP is aware of complaints of intimidation and harassment against certain communities across Canada,” the RCMP told Global News in the statement.
“The RCMP, and the broader government of Canada, is also aware that foreign states are engaging in such activities in Canada,” the police force added in response to questions.
The statement was released after Global News asked the RCMP to explain Commissioner Mike Duheme’s comments two weeks ago about Indian transnational repression.
In a March 19 broadcast, Duheme told CTV “We have people that are intimidating people, harassing people, but connecting the dots to a foreign entity, regardless of the country, we don’t have that.”
The remarks, the latest in a series of seemingly contradictory comments from the government about India’s activities in Canada, were condemned by critics.
A Canadian Sikh organization said the commissioner had left the impression the RCMP was walking back its accusations about India’s illicit targeting of Canada’s South Asian community.
But in its follow-up statement, the RCMP said the difficulty has been linking specific incidents against Canadians to a foreign state, with evidence that can be revealed in the criminal courts.
“Investigations are ongoing,” the RCMP said. “However, based on criminal intelligence currently held by the RCMP related to transnational repression, establishing a direct link to a foreign entity with information that can be disclosed in a criminal proceeding is a complex process.”
A former Canadian Security Intelligence Service official said the statement was revealing and pointed to the longstanding difficulties in using intelligence information in criminal prosecutions.
“The commissioner is acknowledging a lack of criminally admissible evidence linking foreign states to transnational repression in Canada. That is not the same as an absence of information,” Dan Stanton said.
“CSIS may hold relevant intelligence on current activity, but it is not under any statutory obligation to disclose that intelligence to the RCMP,” added Stanton, author of a forthcoming book on foreign interference.
“The Service would share some intelligence if their investigative target crossed the threshold of criminal activity and the RCMP believes it would further their evidence collection.”
An especially challenging aspect of foreign interference, transnational repression occurs when overseas governments, or those acting for them, use harassment, threats and violence to silence critics abroad.
The RCMP statement did not name specific countries, but CSIS has identified China, India, Russia and Iran as the main states conducting espionage and foreign interference in Canada.
Asked about the commissioner’s comments, CSIS said that “transnational repression and foreign interference remain persistent threats in Canada.”
“CSIS assessment of the main perpetrators of foreign interference and espionage against Canada remains unchanged.”
National security agencies believe the government of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has been engaged in election meddling, disinformation and foreign interference in Canada.
India has mostly targeted the Khalistan movement that seeks independence for the country’s Sikh-majority Punjab, labelling activists as terrorists and demanding their prosecution or extradition.
In 2023, India allegedly escalated its tactics when it contracted the Lawrence Bishnoi gang to assassinate key members of the Khalistan movement, starting with B.C. Sikh leader Hardeep Singh Nijjar.
In October 2024, the RCMP went further, accusing the Indian government of orchestrating an array of violence in Canada. Six Indian diplomats were expelled for their suspected involvement.
“As shared on October 14, 2024, the RCMP observed organized crime elements being used in acts of transnational repression,” the RCMP said in its recent statement.
“A number of investigations related to these findings remain ongoing. For reasons of operational integrity and security, no further details can be provided until charges are laid and the matters become public,” it said.
“The RCMP is committed to combating foreign interference in all its forms and will not tolerate intimidation, harassment, or the targeting of diaspora communities or individuals in Canada.”
India denies the allegations, despite evidence that it also tried to kill one of Nijjar’s associates. The FBI disrupted the plot, which the U.S. says was carried out by India’s Research and Analysis Wing intelligence branch.
Critics have accused Prime Minister Mark Carney’s government of overlooking India’s activities as it seeks a trade deal with the Modi government to offset the impact of a U.S. trade war.
On the eve of Carney’s official visit to India, one of his officials told reporters that India was no longer targeting Canadians, prompting a backlash from within the Liberal ranks.
Following the RCMP commissioner’s remarks to CTV, World Sikh Organization president Danish Singh accused the government of “playing word games to shield the government of India.”
“Sikh Canadians continue to face intimidation, surveillance, and threats linked to Indian state actors and their proxies,” he said.
“We are aware of multiple recent incidents, including cases where Sikh activists have received ‘duty to warn’ notifications from Canadian law enforcement. We are aware of individuals being surveilled and intimidated.”
Stewart.Bell@globalnews.ca
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