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Pillar Society Ottawa/Gatineau President appears before the House of Commons on the threat posed by Chinese EVs

April 17, 2026 2:29 PM | Anonymous

On April 16, Pillar Society Ottawa/Gatineau President Neil Bisson appeared before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Industry and Technology to provide a national security perspective on Canada’s electric vehicle policies, specifically as they relate to Chinese EVs.



This was not about electric vehicles.
It was not about competition or innovation.

It was about national security.

During his remarks, he framed the issue the same way he did throughout his career as an intelligence officer:

Motivation. Suitability. Access:

Motivation: The People’s Republic of China continues to conduct cyber espionage, foreign interference, and influence operations to advance its strategic interests.

Suitability: Canada has already taken action in the past, banning certain technologies and addressing risks tied to surveillance systems and digital platforms.

Access: This is where the concern becomes critical. Modern EVs are not just vehicles; they are data collection platforms on wheels, continuously gathering geolocation, behavioural, and environmental data.

Now ask yourself:
What happens when tens of thousands of these connected systems—built within an environment where companies are legally required to cooperate with state intelligence—are integrated into Canada’s transportation networks and electrical grid?

That is not a hypothetical.
That is a policy decision being made right now.

Once that level of access is established, it becomes incredibly difficult to detect—and even harder to reverse.

Neil Bisson’s opening statement begins at 11:16 in the link below:

https://parlvu.parl.gc.ca/Harmony/en/PowerBrowser/PowerBrowserV2/20260417/-1/44749

Comments

  • April 19, 2026 11:47 AM | Anonymous
    Opening Statement – House of Commons Standing Committee on Industry and Technology

    Good morning, Mr. Chair, and members of the Committee.

    Thank you for the invitation to appear today.

    My name is Neil Bisson. I am a retired intelligence officer with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the Director of the Global Intelligence Knowledge Network, and the President of the Ottawa-Gatineau Chapter of the Pillar Society—an organization comprised of former Canadian intelligence professionals dedicated to supporting the Canadian Intelligence Community and advancing national security awareness in Canada.

    I am here today to provide a national security perspective on Canada’s electric vehicle policies, as they relate to Chinese EVs.

    At the outset, I want to be clear.

    This is not a discussion about electric vehicles themselves, nor is it about limiting competition or innovation.

    This is about understanding the national security implications of introducing Chinese EVs into Canada’s critical infrastructure ecosystems including communications, transportation and the electrical grid.

    During my career as an intelligence officer, I assessed three central components of every source: motivation, suitability, and access. Motivation reflects intent, suitability reflects capability, and access determines whether the information is obtainable.

    As I continue through my opening statement, I will demonstrate how Chinese Electric Vehicles can be used by the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party CCP against Canadian national security interests.

    CSIS and CSE reporting consistently identify the PRC as an enduring and sophisticated threat, conducting widespread cyber espionage and influence activities against government, academia, private industry, and civil society to advance its strategic military, political, and economic objectives.

    This reflects clear and sustained motivation by the PRC and its proxies.

    According to the CSE, the PRC operates one of the world’s most extensive intelligence systems, using advanced cyber capabilities to target government systems, critical infrastructure, and research sectors. This includes compromising thousands of devices within Canada, targeting innovation for intellectual property theft, engaging in transnational repression, and using disinformation and artificial intelligence to influence democratic processes.

    The Government of Canada has already recognized the national security risks associated with PRC-linked technologies. Huawei and ZTE were barred from Canada’s 5G networks after intelligence agencies warned their integration could provide potential backdoor access to sensitive government, commercial, and personal data. Canada has also acted against surveillance technology, ordering Hikvision to cease operations following concerns its systems could enable covert surveillance, access video feeds, and collect biometric data at scale.

    In addition, PRC-linked digital platforms have been used to influence Canadian society, with officials identifying a coordinated information campaign on WeChat during a recent federal election that sought to shape narratives and influence voters through inauthentic amplification.

    Taken together, these examples demonstrate the PRC’s suitability at exploiting telecommunications infrastructure, surveillance technologies, and digital platforms operating within Canada.

    This brings us to access.

    China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law requires companies to cooperate with state intelligence services, meaning access held by those companies can ultimately become access for the state.

    Modern electric vehicles are highly connected, software-defined platforms that continuously collect and transmit large volumes of data — including geolocation, driver and passenger behaviour and communications, environmental mapping, and external camera recordings.

    In effect, each Chinese manufactured EV is an extraordinary source of valuable data, the potential eyes and ears of the PRC, and we are on the verge of importing and dispersing tens of thousands of them across Canada.

    Chinese EVs will also be connected to the electrical grid through smart charging systems, home energy integration, and emerging bi-directional technologies becoming part of a broader, interconnected energy ecosystem.

    Any system that is connected to critical infrastructure and capable of external communication introduces potential avenues for exploitation. Including data collection, system access, or disruption.

    The PRC has already targeted Canada’s energy sector.

    In Quebec, a Hydro-Québec researcher was recently charged for allegedly sharing sensitive battery research with PRC-linked entities.

    Open-source reporting indicates that some Chinese electric vehicle manufacturers integrate technologies developed within the same state-directed ecosystem, including software platforms, advanced sensors, and connected infrastructure.

    The issue is not whether a single vehicle poses a threat, but whether Canada is prepared to introduce tens of thousands of connected, Chinese-developed systems into our transportation networks, built and operated within an environment where the CCP has demonstrated both the motivation and capability to conduct espionage and foreign interference.

    Providing this level of access — particularly as these systems integrate with broader networks, including our energy grid — introduces new and potentially long-term vulnerabilities.

    Once access is established, it becomes difficult to detect — and even harder to reverse.

    The decisions made concerning the importation of Chinese EVs will determine whether Canada manages this risk — or introduces significantly more of it.
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