THE INTEL BRIEF
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Observations from Wesley Wark.
NATO countries are planning for an Arctic security force, to be called “Arctic Sentry.” [1] Its purpose (nor necessarily stated as such) is to demonstrate to the Trump administration that the alliance is serious about defending the Arctic and has the capacity to do so, without the US resorting to a takeover of Greenland, or any other Arctic “piece of ice,” as Trump calls it (think the Faroe Islands, or Iceland (which Trump gets mixed up about), or maybe the Canadian Arctic).
Canada will be called on to play a lead role in Arctic Sentry as the world’s second largest Arctic nation by land-mass, with a critical stake in the security of the region and in the well-being of its inhabitants. It will be joined, among others, by the Nordic members of NATO—Finland, Sweden, Norway, and the Kingdom of Denmark, all of whom have their own big stake in securing what is being called NATO’s northern and western flank.
While Canada is in the midst of a ten-year plan to modernize and re-equip its military, Arctic Sentry needs force commitments now.
What can Canada offer? More than many Canadians, and perhaps even our NATO allies, might appreciate.
First, there are intelligence assets to be shared, including Arctic-focused signals intelligence, long a prime Canadian mission, from the Communications Security Establishment (CSE). The most recent CSE annual report noted that they issued 196 reports on Arctic security in 2024-2025. This stream of reporting will need to be shared with Arctic Sentry partners.
Canada also possesses some unique space platform assets, including the Radarsat “constellation” mission, a trio of small synthetic aperture radar satellites launched in 2019 that can provide coverage of the polar regions. Though operated by the civilian Canadian space agency for wide-ranging earth-observation purposes, the satellites also provide data to the Canadian military for analysis. The Constellation mission could be fine-tuned to meet the needs of Arctic Sentry.
Canada also possesses long-range maritime patrol capabilities, in the Aurora CP-140 plane. The airframe is old, dating back to the early 1980s, but the plane has been updated with modern sensor capabilities and was deployed as part of the anti-ISIS coalition in 2016-2017. [2] The Auroras, numbering 14 in total, are split between detachments at Greenwood, in Nova Scotia and Comox in B.C.
A replacement for the aging Aurora was announced in November 2023. [3] The government selected the Boeing P-8A Poseidon aircraft (between 14 and 16 of the planes). Deliveries are meant to begin this year.
Canada could also, of course deploy CF-18s for air interdiction patrols around Greenland. Three CF-18s were recently reported to have been deployed to the US Pittufik space base in Greenland on an unspecified NORAD exercise, so there will be familiarity with the operating environment. [4]
For operations at sea in or near Greenlandic waters, the RCN could call on one or more of its new class of Arctic and Offshore patrol vessels (AOPS).[5] There are six of these ships in total available to the RCN. The first, HMCS Harry deWolf, was commissioned into service in June 2021 and conducted a circumnavigation of North America, including a transit through the North West Passage.
The AOPS, while lightly armed, are not warships; they are not designed for combat, but as the name suggests, they are operated as patrol vessels to conduct surveillance, and are rated as “Polar Class 5” ships in terms of ice-breaking capacity. Not heavy-duty ice-breakers, but the designation means they can operate year-round in medium 1st year ice, and their reinforced hulls can break ice at depths of 1 metre at 3 knots. Some critics were a little harsh in calling these ships “slush breakers.” Their capacity would allow them to navigate offshore around much of Greenland. Where they can’t go, it is unlikely that surface adversary ships would be present. They could complement the Danish frigates that are regularly deployed to Greenland. The AOPS can also carry surface or sub-surface drones and can deploy a helicopter, including the Cyclone type, from its hangar deck.[6]
Submarines?—that will have to wait until the mid-2030s, and depends on which manufacturer the Government of Canada selects. [7]
As for land forces, while the Arny is currently stretched by its commitment to lead the NATO multinational brigade in Latvia, it could deploy small contingents to Greenland for exercises and training. These deployments could even involve the Rangers reserve forces, in particular, the 1st Canadian Ranger Patrol Group, some 2,000 strong, which operates across the Canadian North and Arctic. [8]
Altogether then, Canada has important assets across many force domains that it could contribute to Arctic Sentry.
Let’s see how it is built out.
Canada is uniquely unprepared for the dire national-security crisis we are now in
Andrew Coyne
Prime Minister Mark Carney, centre, during a tour of a Canadian Forces Base in Trenton, Ont., in August, 2025.
It is doubtful any country has ever been in quite the national security dilemma Canada now finds itself in: with so much land and so few people to defend it; wedged between two expansionist superpowers, one of which was until very recently our best defence against the other, but which has since become more or less aligned with it.
The dilemma is particularly acute in light of our charmed history. A country that had always considered itself invulnerable to attack – because of the oceans that surround us, because of the forbidding climate in our North, because of the Americans – wakes up to discover that it has suddenly become peculiarly vulnerable.
We have no experience with this, psychologically. Other countries have long lived in the shadow of invasion, past or potential. Canada is unique, not only in the degree of our exposure, but in our utter unpreparedness to deal with it. It had literally never occurred to us until now that we might be a target.
That psychological unpreparedness is reflected in our security arrangements. Again, what is striking is not just how weak they are, but how uniquely weak. We are an outlier among nations in almost every respect: not only with regard to national security narrowly defined – the military, intelligence and police forces – but in the broader sense of our ability to withstand coercive pressure: things like economic resiliency, political cohesion, and, increasingly, state capacity.
Carney says Canada too reliant on U.S for security as he announces major boost in military spending
Let’s go down the list. Canada has, by any measure, the weakest military of any major democracy, certainly one with comparable security needs, alliance responsibilities, and international pretensions. In the most recent fiscal year for which we have actual data, we spent 1.47 per cent of GDP on defence (we may or may not reach the 2 per cent of GDP the Carney government has promised for the current fiscal year). That put us 27th out of what were then 31 NATO members.
We spend less, relative to GDP, than any other G7 country. We spend less than non-NATO democracies like Australia, South Korea and India. You can find countries that spend less than us. But they are smaller, and strategically sheltered: surrounded either by friendly buffer states, as in the case of Spain, Portugal and Belgium, or by oceans, as with the small island states of Ireland, Iceland or New Zealand.
Spending is only one measure. With 68,000 active forces (plus 27,000 reserves) we field the smallest military relative to population of any comparable democracy. A single brigade-level commitment (such as the current mission in Latvia) is about all we can manage. Our forces are chronically underequipped, flying aircraft that are 40 years old or more, sailing rusted-out ships and second-hand submarines, beset by key ammunition and logistical gaps.
The procurement system, what is more, is so bureaucratic, politicized and overspecified – often with requirements that have nothing to do with military capacity and everything to do with regional-development boondoggles and industrial-strategy fantasies – that there is real doubt whether Canada is even capable of getting the money we have promised to spend out the door on a timely basis.
But what did it matter? What did any of it matter? Not only were we invulnerable, but we had, so we imagined, no natural predators. We were so nice, so inoffensive. Many Canadians even imagined we were some kind of neutral power, never considering that in the real world neutral powers are typically armed to the teeth. Because, unlike Canada, they cannot rely on other countries coming to their defence.
Then there is intelligence. Canada is the only major democracy without a strategic foreign-intelligence capacity. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) does its best, but it is primarily confined to domestic intelligence-gathering; while that limitation has been partially relaxed in recent years, its foreign activities are still restricted to countering direct threats to Canadian security – such as terrorism, foreign interference, and so on – rather than the broader national-interest objectives served by other countries’ intelligence agencies. The Canadian Security Establishment (CSE), likewise, is limited to signals intelligence – valuable, but limited.
Opinion: How Canada can move away from its ‘whack-a-mole’ national security strategy
In the world we are now in – a world in which war is conducted not just by overt military attacks but by economic coercion, weaponized migration, and disinformation campaigns; a world in which we cannot necessarily depend on the intelligence provided by our “allies” – that is not enough. We need our own full-service foreign-intelligence service, comparable to the CIA or MI6 – or, for that matter, to similar services across the democratic world.
The situation is even worse when it comes to the national police force: the invaluable supplement to the intelligence services, who cannot arrest or present evidence at trial against anyone. No other country saddles its national police force with as many conflicting responsibilities as the RCMP: supplying not only a national police service, but, depending on the province, local and provincial as well (two-thirds of RCMP personnel are contracted out), in addition to border enforcement and protective services. We need a dedicated national police force, comparable to the FBI or Britain’s National Crime Agency – or, again, to other democratic countries.
But as we have lately begun to learn, national security is not only a matter for the military, intelligence or police forces. States can also exercise coercive pressure economically. How does Canada stand up on these measures? Not well. With 75 per cent of our exports going to the United States, we have the highest concentration of trade with one country of any major democracy, with the possible exception of Mexico.
There were good reasons for this. Not only is the United States the world’s largest single consumer market, and not only is it next door, but it speaks the same language as most of us, has a similar culture, similar laws, and so on. So long as the United States had a normal government with normal views of international relations, it was a risk worth taking. But this is not a normal government. (No, John Turner was not “right”: His argument was that free trade itself would inevitably lead to our absorption, not that “some day a complete madman will occupy the White House.”)
We are economically vulnerable in lots of other ways. We have arguably the most dispersed population of any major country, measured not only by overall population density (only Australia’s is lower), but by the distance between city centres, and by the small number of links between them, laid out as we are along a single, relatively narrow axis along the border. With so few choke points, it is comparatively easy to disrupt our roads and rail lines, our pipelines, or our electricity links.
This is perhaps unavoidable. What is not is the degree to which we have contributed to our own balkanization through policy – notably, through the proliferation, 159 years after Confederation, of hundreds of interprovincial trade barriers. The result: We have arguably the least integrated national economy in the developed world. Just 18 per cent of Canada’s GDP is accounted for by interprovincial trade, versus the 65 per cent of our GDP that is traded internationally.
Not only do these take a heavy toll economically – the latest estimate by the IMF puts this at 7 percentage points of GDP, every year – but they contribute to our lack of internal political cohesion. In virtually every other federation on Earth, the task of striking down internal trade barriers is assigned to the federal government. Notionally, it is in Canada, too. The difference is that in most other federations the federal government actually does it. Only in Canada is the task left to negotiations between the provinces – as if between sovereign states.
The result is not merely repeated failure, but to instill the very message that the talks were supposedly intended to counteract: that there is no common national interest, but only our distinct provincial interests, separate and incompatible, to be zealously guarded at all costs. Can a country with no common national interests really be said to be a common national community – that is, a nation?
Or can there be a nation without a functioning national Parliament? Researching my book, The Crisis of Canadian Democracy (at better bookstores everywhere!), I was struck, again, by how often we were – quantifiably, in many cases – the outlier: with the weakest Parliament, the most ferocious party discipline, the largest (and therefore weakest) cabinets, the most powerful Prime Minister, the most disproportionate (and therefore regionally divisive) electoral system, and so on.
A political community is formed, in part, by common political institutions, of recognized legitimacy and effectiveness. As Parliament’s relevance dwindles, participation rates decline, until the debate becomes not whether Parliament is answerable to the people, but whether there is any longer a people to answer to.
A last, perhaps most telling point of weakness: We are one of the very few countries on Earth that provides for its own dismemberment and destruction. The constitutions of most other democracies declare, expressly or by implication, that they are permanent and indissoluble. The United States does it. France does it. So do Germany, Italy, Spain, Brazil, Mexico and Ukraine, among a long list.
Canada, almost uniquely, does not – with entirely predictable results: the constant threat of secession, punctuated by repeated referendums, now approaching the reductio ad absurdum of simultaneous referendums in two provinces, with the gleeful support of the Trump administration. As I’ve said in other contexts: Leave a loaded gun lying around, someone is bound to pick it up – especially if it can be used to blackmail the rest of the country.
We have framed the national-security debate, in short, too narrowly. National unity is a matter of national security. The economy is a matter of national security. Democracy is a matter of national security. On all these fronts and more, Canada has left itself exposed and vulnerable, to a degree no other democratic state would tolerate.
We have been almost suicidally complacent. We thought no bad things could ever happen to us – or that if they could, we did not have to do anything to stop them. Not if it involved sweat, or sacrifice, or saying no to anyone – even to those who were trying to break apart the country. We need to think again.
In 2026, intensified geopolitical competition and rivalries will influence and shape the global threat environment. In parallel, non-state armed groups driven by religious, ethnic, and hard-line ideologies will threaten both governments and social harmony in various countries around the world.
Insurgent and terrorist entities will mount attacks in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Latin America and the West in 2026. Based on the monitoring of terrorist communiques and reporting by government sources, while over 95 per cent of the attacks will occur in conflict zones of Sudan, Mali, Somalia, Libya, Nigeria, Afghanistan and Pakistan, isolated attacks will happen in North America, Europe, Australia and New Zealand.
Several major Western cities scaled back or cancelled New Year’s Eve celebrations for 2025-2026 due to heightened security and public safety concerns, as well as recent local tragic events. Nonetheless, the primary theatres of terrorism will be in the Global South, notably in Asia, the Middle East and Africa.
The fewer attacks staged in the West will draw global attention like the family-based attack in Bondi Beach in Sydney in December 2025. As long as migrant and diaspora communities are not integrated, extremism will linger in the physical and digital spaces, radicalising communities, and the West will suffer from periodic attacks in 2026.
The epicentre of global terrorism has shifted out of the Middle East into Africa and Asia. Nonetheless, threat groups remain active in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. Iran’s Axis of Resistance – Shi’ite groups in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, as well as Sunni groups in Gaza – failed to deter Israel from attacking Iran.
To contain Israel, Iran seeks to restore its ring of fire by renewing support to Lebanese Hezbollah and Yemeni Ansarallah, both severely weakened by Israel in recent times. Except for Iran, a state sponsor of both Shi’ite and Sunni threat groups, Middle Eastern governments have publicly rejected terrorism. Following the devastating war in Gaza after the Hamas-led attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, there is a considerable erosion of public support or appetite for violence.
The West will see the steady rise of both the extreme right and the extreme left, leading to intermittent attacks. The rise of far-right political parties will enable far-right extremism in 2026 and in the foreseeable future. Due to enhanced security and intelligence cooperation in the West, most attacks by the far left and the far right, and Islamist groups will be detected and disrupted in the planning and preparation phases. The FBI in the US disrupted coordinated bomb attacks across five locations in Los Angeles on New Year’s Eve. The Turtle Island Liberation Front – a far-left, pro-Palestine, anti-government, and anti-capitalist group has 939 followers, and its Instagram features images with the phrases “Death to America” and “Peaceful Protest Will Never Be Enough”.
As in 2025, most attacks in 2026 will be in the Global South. According to information gathered by counter terrorism databases, around 60-70 per cent of the terrorist attacks will occur in African countries. Islamic State and Al Qaeda affiliates in Africa remain the deadliest terrorist organisations in 2026.
Unless the war between Israel and Hamas and its allies resumes, based on my own interviews with counterterrorism practitioners and terrorist leaders in custody, around 15-20 per cent of attacks will be in the Levant and the Gulf. In 2026, attacks by Tareek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) targeting Pakistan will surpass the attacks by Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) and Islamic State Pakistan Province (ISPP).
Al Qaeda-aligned TTP attacks mounted from Afghanistan could prompt a war between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Similarly, attacks by Pakistan and India could prompt a war between the two nuclear powers. Extremism is on the rise in Bangladesh. With Bangladeshi Islamists and the Afghan Taliban exchanging visits throughout 2025, there will be calls for implementing Shariah, and minorities in Bangladesh, notably Hindus and Christians, will suffer more attacks in 2026.
Most South and Central Asians are recruited by ISKP, both when in their own countries and in the diaspora. With Central Asian governments regulating the religious space, the potential for radicalisation and recruitment in-country has diminished. Nonetheless, Central Asians working overseas have been enlisted by both the Islamic State and Al Qaeda to mount attacks in Russia, Europe, and elsewhere.
The threat in Southeast Asia has diminished, but the remnants of the Islamic State and Al Qaeda continue to operate. Two foreign terrorist fighters visited Mindanao in the Philippines for three weeks in November 2025 in the lead-up to the terrorist attack in Bondi Beach. Manila has maintained its efforts to integrate the identified Islamist elements and supporters into the mainstream community.
In Indonesia, the counterterrorism force, Detachment 88, dissolved Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), both an Al Qaeda and an Islamic State affiliate. A game changer in the fight against terrorism, JI supreme leader Para Wijayanto and Detachment 88 Intelligence Chief Ami Prindani worked together to remove the region’s biggest threat after two decades of JI attacks.
The Malaysian Special Branch dismantled an Islamic State in Bangladesh network in Johor, bordering Singapore. At the same time, other threat groups based in Bangladesh and Myanmar continue their subversive activities overseas through their respective labour diaspora communities.
In a rapidly evolving global and political landscape, all nations require an unblinking eye to prevent and preempt threats from seeding, taking root, and manifesting, harming the state and hurting its citizens. Public spaces in urban settings, especially open facilities, will be vulnerable to mass fatality and mass casualty attacks.
The threat will come from state and non-state actors, including lone-wolf attackers. In addition to disinformation and misinformation operations, states will also engage in attacks on information infrastructure.
The threat of cyberattacks by both state and non-state actors will rise, compelling nations to secure their online domains. With threat groups setting up dedicated digital entities, including an Al Qaeda digital command, governments will need to partner with community organisations and stringently regulate the digital space, including punitive measures against tech companies if necessary. With a fourth to a fifth of the attacks being perpetrated by youth and children, governments will need to address online radicalisation in 2026.
Unless all governments collaborate to mitigate common security threats, risks, and challenges, threat actors will continue to exploit gaps, loopholes, and weaknesses in the global security systems.
Religious spaces should be tightly regulated, hate preachers and their institutions should be investigated, charities and their donors should be monitored, and protests and campaigns instigating violence should be banned. In partnership with community leaders, government leadership must focus on promoting moderation and coexistence.
Terrorism will remain the preeminent national security threat to most countries throughout 2026. Driven by extremist ideologies, terrorism will damage social cohesion between ethnic and religious communities. The focus of governments should shift from downstream counterterrorism to upstream counterterrorism to preempt and prevent attacks.
Terror is not only a tool exploited by non-state actors, but also by state actors, mainly through their partners and proxies. As they need plausible deniability, hostile governments will employ criminal organisations to conduct terrorist attacks. The crime-terror nexus and its infrastructure must not be left unattended. The challenge posed by politico-religious ecosystems of threat groups, networks, cells, and personalities should be tackled with urgency and strategic oversight.
Rohan Gunaratna is Professor of Security Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. He served as Head of the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) at RSIS from February 2004 to December 2018.
Rohan Gunaratna: Engage terror detainees to minimise relapse
Drew Thompson Jan 26, 2026
I
I was genuinely surprised and frankly shocked by the announcement on Saturday that Central Military Commission (CMC) Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia is under investigation and presumably detained. I should not have been surprised. Hundreds of senior People’s Liberation Army (PLA) officers have been investigated, detained and imprisoned since Xi came to power in 2012.
Corruption is endemic in the PLA giving Xi Jinping a perpetual and universal anti-corruption tool to purge politically suspect officers from the ranks. I have been hearing rumors since 2023 that he was being investigated, but I always assumed and even hoped that he would escape Xi’s endless purges. For five years Zhang was in charge of the PLA’s procurement enterprise which involves large budgets and presumably large kickbacks. PLA officers reportedly pay superiors for promotions with variable pricing depending on the rank and potential profitability of the position. Zhang’s predecessor and successor were both punished for corruption.
I assessed that Zhang Youxia’s combat experience, his self-confidence, intellect and life-long commitment to the defense of China and the Communist Party would protect him. I thought that his life-long relationship with Xi Jinping would be his insurance. Even their fathers were friends. I thought that some financial impropriety would be overlooked because of his abilities and relationship with Xi.
Mostly, I was rooting for him to survive the purges because I liked him.
General Zhang Youxia spent a week in the United States in May 2012 as part of a delegation led by Defense Minister General Liang Guanglie, hosted by then Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta. Zhang was Shenyang Military Region Commander at the time, one of over ten general officers on the delegation with Defense Minister Liang. In 2012, I was the Director for China, Taiwan and Mongolia in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, responsible for planning and organizing the delegation’s visit to the United States. I accompanied them on the trip including meetings in the Pentagon and tours of military bases on the East and West coasts.
I got to know Zhang Youxia on that trip, and I liked him.
Some legends in this picture – Dave Stilwell, then Defense Attaché in Beijing (who went on to become Assistant Secretary of State after retiring from the Air Force); Peter Lavoy, Principle Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense; Jim Miller, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy; Secretary Panetta and the late Deputy Secretary of Defense Ash Carter. I can not remember the name of the US-side’s translator in that meeting. General Zhang Youxia is sitting to Defense Minister Liang’s right out of the camera’s view. At General Liang’s left is one of the PLA’s most capable staff officers and English translators, then-Major Xie Kangmin. I was in the back or out in the hall. The sharp eyed observer will note that DepSec Carter brought a folder with a classification coversheet into the meeting. Don’t ask me why.
Zhang Youxia was different than most other PLA generals I encountered. The PLA is a political organization – it is the armed wing of the Communist Party – it is not a national army sworn to protect the constitution or the country. Officers’ careers are primarily determined by their political reliability and interpersonal relationships. Loyalty and ideology is more important than warfighting ability. Critical thinking and independent thought can be a liability, rather than an asset in the PLA. This is the PLA’s culture. Class struggle was the defining feature of Mao’s society and army so officers came from worker-peasant families, had little education and many were illiterate. That legacy has vestiges today. I encountered many senior PLA officers who were not well educated. They could be intelligent, but you could tell by their strong accents, vocabulary and discussions they were neither intellectual nor worldly. Some senior officers were very good at spouting the Party line by memory at length but could say little else.
Zhang Youxia stood out. Had seen combat and been humbled by it. He is educated, intellectual, intuitive. He would see something on display and understood its importance and value, and probably also understood why we were showing it to him.
I worked closely for years with my counterparts, the younger PLA staff officers responsible for US-engagement. We bonded over many, many meetings at all hours in Washington and Beijing, including travelling delegations like the one Zhang Youxia joined. There was healthy mutual respect between the China Desk in the Pentagon and the America’s Desk in the PLA HQ. My counterparts staffing the PLA delegations of course had their own relationships with their generals. It was always fascinating to me how they responded to and supported their own senior leaders. Some PLA generals needed hand-holding, spoon-feeding, lots of ego stroking, and those normally had little substance to offer in discussions. Their staff officers served them, but I could see they had less respect for those generals. I always guessed those officers paid for their positions and had proven the Peter Principle.
Zhang Youxia was different. He had an aura of competence around him. The other PLA generals and staff officers could see it, and they respected him for it. They stood up faster and straighter when he entered a room. They gave him their best. It wasn’t just that he was one of the few remaining officers to have fought (and lost) the brief war with Vietnam in 1979, or that he went to kindergarten with Xi Jinping, but he had that going for him too.
Zhang Youxia talked with me that week more than any other PLA general on a delegation. He was inquisitive, thoughtful, respectful. He had high empathy. He wasn’t afraid to talk to foreigners unlike some other senior officers who were often afraid or unable to engage. (Maybe my Chinese was too terrible for them to listen to). He treated his own staff officers with respect, and I suppose he was treating me the same way. I was impressed that he would engage me in conversation because it was unusual.
When we visited Fort Benning, Zhang became animated. We offered the opportunity for him to see static displays of some weapon systems, and the opportunity to fire a few. Many PLA officers are essentially focused on administrative and political roles, not warfighting. Many have never fired a gun and would hesitate before engaging non-commissioned officers on a firing range. Not Zhang. He jumped at the chance to fire a machine gun. He focused on all the static displays and asked the briefers good questions about US technology and doctrine (don’t worry, everything was unclassified!) Many generals don’t know what questions to ask a briefer because their staff didn’t give them questions in advance. Seeing Zhang Youxia tour a military base and absorb what he was offered revealed an intellect that stood out from his peers.
General Zhang leaped at the chance to test fire an M240 machine gun. (I went straight for the .50 cal!)
He thoroughly enjoyed the “weapons orientation” experience. These are my personal photos taken at Fort Benning, GA. I gave copies to him.
My hope – for the sake of stable US-China military-to-military relations and cross-Strait stability - was that Zhang Youxia would stay at the top of the CMC and remain Xi Jinping’s closest military advisor. I think he was the one active duty PLA officer who could give Xi the best, most objective advice about PLA military capabilities including the PLA’s shortcomings, and crucially the human cost of military conflict. I think he could assess US and Taiwan military capabilities objectively and explain to Xi Jinping what the military risks and costs of an operation to take Taiwan would be. A sycophant with no combat experience has to tell Xi what Xi wants to hear. Zhang’s intellect, experience and his relationship with Xi made honesty and objectivity possible, and that makes him an exception among PLA generals.
Zhang Youxia is on the edge of the photo, eyeballing the system on display, while General Liang looks at the briefer. I was exhausted after a week of travel and meetings which explains my bloodshot eyes and the bags under them. I was also a bit angry in this photo because a PLA attaché travelling with us had just done something naughty but inconsequential, so I was using my deterrence face so he wouldn’t do it again. You have to set boundaries.
For a US deterrence strategy to be effective we need Xi Jinping to be surrounded by competent generals who will give him objective advice. The sole remaining general on the CMC is Zhang Shengmin, a career political commissar. Leaving aside the governance and operational risks of Xi being advised by and trying to command a million-man army through a one-man committee, I worry about the consequences of someone other than Zhang Youxia providing Xi Jinping with military advice.
Without Zhang Youxia on the CMC, the risk of miscalculation goes up.
Having worked on US-China relations in some way most of my adult life, that makes the potential consequences of an investigation and likely detention of Zhang Youxia a personal disappointment.
There is another layer to my personal feelings about Zhang Youxia’s demise.
In October 2023, South China Morning Post reporter Minnie Chan was visiting Beijing for the Xiangshan Forum when she disappeared. She was researching rumors that Zhang Youxia and Zhang Shengmin were being investigated at the time.
It is no secret that she and I were in regular contact. I was quoted in many of her articles about the PLA, providing my analytical assessment of whatever issue or fact she was researching and reporting on. She was a friend too. She knew the PLA as well as any outsider and we could compare notes all day. I usually learned more from her than she from me. We would sometimes speak on the phone, and sometimes text. Soon after she disappeared, all but one of her texts to me were deleted. I don’t know if she deleted them or if it was whoever is holding her and took control of her phone.
A month before her disappearance we were discussing whether or not Zhang Youxia and Zhang Shengmin were being investigated. She was certain. In September 2023 when I asked, “Do you think Zhang Youxia and Zhang Shengmin are in trouble and being investigated?” She responded succinctly, “Yes”.
That one word text is the only one in the string that was not deleted.
I don’t know why Minnie was detained and is still in custody. She had many Mainland sources and contacts and worked on many stories, so I have no idea if her investigation into investigations of Zhang Youxia and Zhang Shengmin in 2023 was the cause of her being disappeared.
My hope is now that the investigation of Zhang Youxia is public, Minnie can be released and can go back to producing excellent articles that provided accurate, authentic perspectives of China’s military and defense strategy so we can better understand China and reduce the risk of misperception.
I fear she has been forgotten.
I want my friends back.
Zhang Youxia inspecting an MRAP at Camp Lejeune in North Carolina, May 2012. I am flanked by three PLA officers I greatly respect. L to R: Rear Admiral Li Ji, deputy director of the PLA’s foreign affairs office; Maj Gen Xu Nanfeng, Defense Attaché in Washington, and then Senior Colonel Huang Xueping, director for the Americas in the foreign affairs office.
By Martin Green, January 26, 2026
A cacophony of national security trends and threats are rightly a central part of Canada’s current public discourse.
There is a refreshing consensus on the imperative of Canada’s defence and national security missions, and therein having the strong “intelligence” collection and analysis capabilities that our leaders—and Canadians—must have to be strategically competitive, secure, and resilient.
As a military brat, and during my time as a senior national security and intelligence official, I often wondered why Canada didn’t have a dedicated human foreign-spy agency. Putting aside the fanciful notions of a Canadian 007 or Mission Impossible, the short answer is that we are a part of the 21st-century “great game.” But we need to better use our existing capabilities and authorities domestically and internationally.
As Prime Minister Mark Carney’s government articulates a new and welcomed vision for defence and national security, a decades-old discussion of this country having its own Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or Secret Service (MI6) type spy organization has been percolating.
The renewed impetus for this appears to be that the United States under President Donald Trump is no longer a reliable partner—partly true. And, that Canada needs to focus on and bolster its national security apparatus in the face of growing nefarious trends and threats—true. I don’t think, however, that these are compelling reasons for Canada to embark on such a disruptive, time consuming, and costly machinery change. Urgency dictates that we prioritize, consolidate, and build on what we have.
Trump’s first presidency raised a lot of eyebrows in the world’s intelligence communities. His contempt for his own intelligence community and attempts to politicize them were at best counter-intuitive and unsettling. The U.S. spy community—who are, by and large, dedicated and professional—was stirred (not shaken) by this development, and they remained relatively unscathed with trusted foreign partnerships intact.
Trump 2.0, fuelled by a four-year break and a belligerent National Security Strategy, has politicized and weaponized almost every aspect of the American government. Leadership across the U.S. intelligence community has been decapitated and replaced with an almost tragicomical array of lap dogs.
This is unquestionably disturbing for the G7, Five Eyes, NATO members, and other partners. It is particularly so for Canada, as we have been a net beneficiary of our unique and historic integration with the behemoth American national security, intelligence, and military apparatus. As troubled, divisive, and deplorable as the Trump administration appears to most Canadians (and, I believe, the majority of Americans) it is inconceivable that either country would or should attempt to fully decouple or bifurcate from these partnerships. There is simply too much at stake and in our common interests.
While Canada should always be diversifying economically and bolstering our sovereign national security capabilities, it is unrealistic and foolhardy to think the two countries can fully disengage. While our relationship with the U.S. has permanently changed and remains fraught, out of pragmatic necessity a “quantum of solace” will eventually be restored.
As a lagging middle power, Canada needs to take a realistic review of our place in the world and articulate a national security strategy. We also need to ask ourselves some hard questions before embracing a new human foreign spy agency.
What are we fixing? What are the gaps we are trying to fill? Who and what are we targeting? Do we envisage ourselves having a paramilitary organization like the CIA or MI6? What would the return on investment actually be? Have we fully utilized open-source intelligence with our covert capabilities and authorities? Are all levels of government, the private sector, and the Canadian public well enough informed on national security trends and threats? The answer to all of these questions is: no, not really.
Canada already has significant networks and assets (both public and private) at home and abroad. We also know that the home game is paramount. We have the essential ingredients in our national security ecosystem for enhanced foreign intelligence collection and analysis. This is where we need to start. What is required are the leaders, the clear direction, and the support for calculated risks that will enable our national security practitioners to succeed.
We are clearly in a time of multiple crises and we are at a crossroads. We need to keep our eye on the ball. The priorities are rebuilding our defence mission and bolstering our economic security. So, when it comes to a bricks and mortar foreign spy agency, never say never, but now is certainly not the time.
Martin Green is a senior adviser at Global Public Policy in Ottawa, and is a senior fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute. He is a former assistant secretary to cabinet, intelligence assessment at the Privy Council Office.
Years ago, I purchased the first-generation Roborock robot vacuum from Chinese company Xiaomi. Almost immediately, I noticed it was sending an extraordinary amount of encrypted data back to China. The official explanation: "Floor map models" and other "support features."At the time, I was working in the intelligence community. When I raised my concerns, I was met with a familiar response: "You're just being paranoid."Fast forward to 2026, and the "paranoia" is looking more like foresight. Modern Chinese robot vacuums have evolved into persistent surveillance devices, continuously uploading high-resolution floor maps, Wi-Fi credentials, and GPS locations to mainland PRC servers. LiDAR sensors can be hijacked as acoustic eavesdropping tools, reconstructing conversations with 91% accuracy, while documented camera vulnerabilities allow for live video feeds without user consent.Despite this, it might surprise you to know that I still use my Roborock after two battery replacements. It remains the best robot vacuum I have ever owned. You might ask why I would keep such a device in my home.The reality is that I'm not a collection priority for the PRC state. If I am, excellent; they are simply wasting their resources listening to Real Housewives reruns and watching me walk around my house with no pants. Beyond that, because almost everything is made in China, we often have very little choice in the matter. As we face even greater threats, such as PRC-made electric vehicles entering our marketplace, the goal is not necessarily total avoidance, but rather understanding the risks and mitigating them.I still let my robot clean, but I've revoked its "clearance." I don't allow it any internet or network access, sacrificing a few smart features for peace of mind.
Pillar Member - Ryan Zorn
President CyberAGroup
For more tech / security stories head over to : www.cyberagroup.com
Pillar member and Director of the Global Intelligence Knowledge Network - Neil Bisson - sits down with Marc La Ferrière, a retired CSIS intelligence officer, Pillar Society member, and author of the novel Escalating Fury.
Marc reflects on his atypical 30-plus-year career with CSIS, which spanned the pre-9/11 era through to modern intelligence operations. He discusses what first sparked his interest in intelligence work, his time in regional roles in Vancouver, his experience in training and internal security, and how he moved back and forth between operational and non-operational positions over the course of his career.
The conversation then turns to what led Marc to start writing. He explains the catalyst behind his first book, an autobiography, and how that project eventually pushed him into fiction. Marc opens up about the realities of being a self-published author, including the challenges, discipline, and creative demands of the process.
Neil and Marc dive into his novel Escalating Fury, where Marc shares what inspired the story, how his intelligence background shaped the narrative, and how he developed the book’s main character, Zak Power. Marc also walks listeners through his writing technique, how he structures his work, and when readers can expect the next installment in the series.
As a bilingual Canadian author, Marc also discusses the advantages and challenges of writing in both official languages, and how working in both French and English has shaped his creative approach.
This episode offers a rare behind-the-scenes look at the transition from intelligence officer to novelist — and how real-world intelligence experience informs fictional storytelling.
Check it out on Buzzsprout: https://www.buzzsprout.com/2336717/episodes/18578453
or
Youtube: https://youtu.be/flvpycbKlvY
Connect with Marc & Get His Books Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/marc.lafury Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/marclafury/ LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/marc-la-ferri%C3%A8re-943634205/ Marc is frequently out and about in the Ottawa–Gatineau region and is often happy to meet in person — which means you may be able to purchase a copy of his books directly from him and get a personally signed copy.
Where to get Marc’s books:
Escalating Fury (ebook):https://librairielouisfrechette.ca/fr/Produit-24965-Escalating-Fury-Neuf-Format-Regulier
All available titles: https://www.booksellers.ca/catalogue?s=Marc%20La%20Ferrière&sort=pertinence
This Public opinion research report presents the results of an online/telephone survey of 2,045 Canadians between January 9 and 22, 2025.
Cette publication est aussi disponible en français sous le titre : Attitudes du public à l’égard du Service canadien du renseignement de sécurité (SCRS)
https://publications.gc.ca/site/eng/9.949166/publication.html
At the beginning of Donald Trump's second administration, one of his most important goals announced during his 2024 campaign was his plan to expand the influence of the United States by annexing strategic and or mineral rich countries such as Panama, Greenland and or Canada – notwithstanding that the latter two countries belong to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
Historically such rhetorical threats from our largest trading partner and benign ally, is not a “new thing”.
The underpinnings of our relations with the USA, is not a marriage but like some marriages, is for the most part, predicated on mutual security requirements and economic prosperity. Deeply entrenched in the United States national security psyche lives an ideology that over the years has promoted the acquisition of and or the annexation of neighbouring countries and territories - as a strategy by which to control the political narrative of the Western Hemisphere thereby solidifying its position in the future “world order”.
Manifest Destiny: The term manifest destiny was coined by newspaper editor John O’Sullivan in 1845 who used the term to justify the USA’s territorial expansion across North America asserting that it was a God given right to spread democracy and American ideals from the Atlantic to the Pacific.
In 1783, following the Treaty of Paris, the United States was composed of 13 former colonies stretching from Canada (British colony) in the north to Florida (Spanish colony) in the south and to the Mississippi River in the west. Over the next 115 years, the United States acquired twenty-nine (29) large and small territories. Today, the USA is composed of fifty (50) states and 14 territories. The following is a short list of the more significant acquisitions / annexations.
War of 1812: Canada’s first taste of imperial expansionism occurred in the early 1800’s - a biproduct of a greater conflict in Europe between Great Britain and Napoleonic France which would ultimately determine dominance over Europe. Post 1783 (American Independence) Great Britain remained dominant over the world’s oceans and the British Royal Navy’s encroachment on American maritime rights had a serious impact on American trade and commerce. With Great Britain tied up in a war with France, President Madison decided to seize the opportunity and declare war on Great Britain on June 18, 1812. Hoping to get a quick win in their fight with Great Britain, America decided to invade Canada and use its conquest as a bargaining chip to win concessions from Great Britain especially as it relates to maritime issues. At the time, the population of Canada was approximately 500,000 compared to 7.7 million people in America. Former President Thomas Jefferson assumed the conquest of Canada would be “a mere matter of marching”. Most Americans believed that they would be welcomed as liberators from British rule.
In 1812 American armies invaded Canada at three points and all three attempts ended in failure. A similar prolonged invasion occurred in 1813 with America achieving some success in the West (Lake Erie).
In 1814, the United States armies found themselves on the defensive following Napoleon’s defeat. Great Britain quickly shifted attention to its protracted conflict with America. The Royal Navy started transporting battle hardened troops to Canada while at the same time increasing its blockade of American ports. Battles were won and lost on the great lakes and at key forts along a joint frontier.
With the cost of the war wearing thin on Great Britain and the American economy teetering on ruin both sides eventually agreed to a cessation of the conflict. On December 24, 1814 Great Britain entered into a treaty with America. On February 17, 1815 both sides ratified the treaty (Treaty of Ghent) with the provision (quo ante bellum) that all conquered territory must be returned as it existed before the conflict.
A costly skirmish for both sides. America suffered 15,000 casualties and Great Britain suffered 8,600 casualties (British Regulars and Canadian militia). An unknown number of indigenous people also perished in the conflict as warriors or the result of starvation and disease.
Not prepared to repeat the War of 1812 with Great Britian, the United States started to search for a national strategy to deal with incursions from their imperial neighbours…
The Monroe Doctrine: President Monroe, a close ally of President Madison, was president for two terms from 1817 to 1825. James Monroe and two other statesmen were Secretaries of State and War during the War of 1812. James Monroe, more specifically, was Secretary of State and War between 1814 and 1815.
A veteran of the War of 1812, Monroe was no stranger to European hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. The Monroe Doctrine was enacted on December 2, 1823 in an annual message to Congress warning European powers (especially Great Britain, France and Spain) against further colonization or interference in the Western Hemisphere.
According to Monroe, “European powers are obligated to respect the Western Hemisphere as the United States’ sphere of interest.” (The Westen Hemisphere comprises half the earths surface including a sizeable chunk of the North Pole and Antarctica).
The Monroe Doctrine originated as a “statement of intent” not a formal law supported by the US Congress. Its implementation is arbitrary and has historically been the responsibility of the President visa vis the conduct of foreign affairs. The Monroe Doctrine has no standing in international law. (Smaller indefensible countries within the Western Hemisphere have little or no recourse if invaded by the USA).
For example, the Monroe Doctrine was first invoked in 1865 when the U.S, government exerted diplomatic and military pressure in support of the Mexican President Benito Juarez. This support enabled Juarez to lead a successful revolt against the Emperor Maximilian, who had been placed on the throne by the French President Napoleon.
Again in 1940 European creditors from a number of Latin American countries threatened armed intervention to collect debts. Citing the Monroe Doctrine, President Theodore Roosevelt promptly proclaimed the right of the United States to exercise international police powers to curb such chronic wrong doing.
The U.S. also has a long history of interventions in South America - called the Banana Wars 1898 – 1934. Santo Domingo 1904, Nicaragua 1912 and 1933, Dominion Republic 1916 and 1924, Haiti 1915 and 1934, Guatemala 1954, The Bay of Pigs (Cuba) 1961, Chile 1973, Grenada 1983, Panama 1989… and now Venezuela 2026.
Although the Monroe Doctrine was essentially established to keep European powers out of the Western Hemisphere, Roosevelt strengthened and expanded its meaning to justify the sending of American troops into any country or territory within the Western Hemisphere. Invoking the Monroe Doctrine to enable the annexation of a friendly territory or nation for hegemonic purposes is totally contrary to the purpose for which the Monroe Doctrine was created in the first place and is a violation of the principles of “rules based” order.
Comment:
The threat environment to which we have become accustomed has shifted significantly provoking serious change in the world order.
Given the emerging threats to our sovereignty, how does our intelligence community navigate its way through these unprecedented times while protecting the nation from both former allies one day and adversaries the next. (Should we be preparing for a NATO minus the USA). We need to rethink some of our legacy relationships and retool our intelligence collection strategy to include emerging threats to our sovereignty. Expediting the formation of a foreign intelligence capability, whether inside or outside the Service, should be a priority and would certainly send a message to trusted partners that we are indeed serious players within the global intelligence community.
Norm Killian - Pillar Member
Published: Australian Strategic Policy Institute - Chris Taylor
Organization: Australian Security Intelligence Organization
The Australian Parliament’s Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS) is reviewing legislation confirming the reality of an extraordinary, rarely used intelligence capability that has been part of national security law for 22 years: the Australian Security Intelligence Organization's compulsory questioning powers. The bill also hones and configures the powers for Australia’s security environment, both current and foreshadowed.
ASIO’s questioning warrants (QWs) require a person to appear before the organization and answer questions truthfully for the purpose of gathering intelligence—including by detaining that person for up to seven days. They also restrict that person’s ability to alert others to ASIO’s interest or destroy relevant material. (Questioning detention warrants, which allowed ASIO to per-emptively detain a person for questioning, were available until 2020.)
The bill currently under review, the ASIO Amendment (no. 2) Bill 2025, makes three principal changes. First, it makes the powers permanent, though this will be reviewed by the PJCIS in three years. It also expands their scope beyond the grounds of politically motivated violence, espionage and foreign interference to include all seven of ASIO’s areas (‘heads’) of security. As a result, sabotage, promotion of communal violence, attacks on Australia’s defence system, and protection of territorial and border integrity will also be grounds for QWs. Finally, it bolsters associated oversight protections, such as further limiting who can be a prescribed authority overseeing questioning.
These changes raise two key questions: Should the powers be retained permanently? And should the powers apply to all elements of security?
These powers, first instituted in 2003, have often been described publicly as a temporary measure only. However, they have been regularly prolonged—in 2006, then 2014, 2018, 2019, and 2020. Their application has also been expanded, from politically motivated violence alone to include espionage and foreign interference.
The ASIO Amendment Act (no. 1) 2025 again extended the sunsetting date for the powers to March 2027. Otherwise, they would have ceased on 7 September.
The powers are rarely used: according to the public record, ASIO has only requested a compulsory questioning warrant five times since 2006. In 22 years, 20 warrants in total have been sought and issued.
When the powers were introduced, the rationale was that terrorism presented an unprecedented and extraordinary threat to Australia, and that responding required similarly extraordinary powers. The temporary nature of the powers was an acknowledgement of this and ensured passage through the Senate. But as time has passed, it’s become increasingly clear that the adverse security circumstances in question have become the norm as threats facing Australia have broadened and been entrenched.
Importantly, since 2006, the parliament has consistently acted to retain the powers, despite calls for repeal. This demonstrates that, rather than temporary powers, these are de facto permanent powers. Rather than continue to pretend otherwise, their status should be definitively addressed.
That the powers have only been used sparingly does not invalidate them or make them redundant. Rather, they are tools for use in extraordinary circumstances where other means for intelligence collection are inapplicable. This continues to reflect the original argument for the powers, ‘as a measure of last resort’ to be ‘used rarely and only in extreme circumstances’. In addition, authoritative accounts of the use of the powers suggest that ASIO exercises the powers judiciously and sensitively.
The powers will remain subject to a robust warrant regime, even absent a sunset clause. ASIO’s annual reporting regime—mandated by the ASIO Act—requires their use to be reported publicly. This is in addition to public testimony, for example at Senate estimates.
The nature of the security environment and ongoing developments means the compulsory questioning powers should be applicable to a broad range of security threats.
Application to promotion of communal violence—‘activities that are directed to promoting violence between different groups of persons in the Australian community so as to endanger the peace, order or good government of the Commonwealth’—is apt given ongoing attempts by extremists to fracture social cohesion in Australian society. That this has included covert interference efforts by a hostile foreign actor (Iran) underscores the blurred lines between the heads of security.
But it is two other aspects of security that are particularly appropriate to be included within the potential exercise: attacks on Australia’s defence system, and sabotage.
These two security threats are closely related and increasingly pertinent. As I noted last year following Israeli intelligence’s audacious sabotage of Hezbollah’s communications network, sabotage—destroying, damaging or obstructing for military and/or political advantage—is back. This point is only reinforced by ongoing Russia-backed attacks on military capabilities and stores in Europe.
As Australia’s investment in the AUKUS program grows and as the prospect of major power conflict in our region becomes ever more concerning, the implications of this international resurgence in sabotage as a coercive tool—potentially applied to Australia’s often niche and concentrated defence capabilities—are greatly concerning. ASIO being able to respond with the same suite of intelligence collection capabilities that are available against other security threats, including extraordinary powers used only in extraordinary circumstances, will be vital.
This article is based on the author’s submission to the PJCIS inquiry into ASIO Amendment (no. 2) Bill 2025.
It has been corrected to say that questioning detention warrants were available until 2020 and to delete a reference to the ASIO Amendment (no. 2) Bill 2025 applying to them.
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