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There is a longstanding debate in the field of terrorism studies about whether terrorism “works.” In other words, does the use of terrorism and political violence help violent extremists achieve their goals and objectives, or does it merely serve to wreak havoc? On the third anniversary of the heinous Hamas terrorist attacks of October 7, 2023, it now seems that the architect of the attacks — Yahya Sinwar — advanced at least some of his goals to reshape public perception of Israel. Looking at the longer-term trends and trajectories set in motion by the October 7 attack, one could argue that some of the resulting developments have aligned with Sinwar’s objectives.
Terrorist attacks often evoke an overreaction from their target, even if that response is not the one that terrorists anticipate or even hope for. For example, by attacking the United States in such a jarring, visceral, and lethal manner on September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda evoked a full-throated U.S. military invasion of Afghanistan that toppled its benefactor, the Taliban, and sent militants scattering along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, where many high-value targets were captured and killed. Myopic political decisions soon led the United States to invade Iraq, bogging down the U.S. military and leading to overreach, controversy with partners, and a host of self-inflicted errors that negatively impacted the conduct of the war in Afghanistan. Bin Laden did not want to lure the United States into Afghanistan and the Middle East, he wanted to drive its military forces from the region permanently and reshape global perceptions of American power. Inadvertently, the invasion of Afghanistan and then Iraq produced prolonged and costly wars that steadily eroded the international goodwill the U.S. enjoyed in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 while weakening domestic support and national cohesion at home.
Sinwar’s plan for October 7 was not the same as bin Laden’s; his goal was not to chase away an occupying army, but rather to inflict maximum damage on Israel and spoil any prospects of normalization between Israel and its Arab neighbors, especially normalization plans that would move ahead without the establishment of a Palestinian state. The Hamas attacks of October 7 were devastating, with acts of terrorism beyond the pale. Approximately 1,200 Israelis were killed, and hundreds of hostages were taken back to Gaza. Israel responded with a scorched-earth counterinsurgency campaign that leveled Gaza and killed tens of thousands of Palestinians, many of whom were civilians, while destroying much of the infrastructure in the territory and imposing a blockade of the Strip that caused a widespread humanitarian disaster.
Just as the September 11 attacks did, the attacks of October 7 set off a domino effect, precipitating a region-wide chain of events that are still playing out today. The conflict, rather predictably, spilled across borders and spread to Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, and Iran, engulfing the region in conflict and further destabilizing large swaths of the Middle East. Like Osama bin Laden, Sinwar had no issue with sacrificing the lives of civilians on all sides of the conflict who he knew would inevitably be impacted by the attack he engineered. Terrorist attacks often lure their targets into overreaching, and it seems that Israel failed to learn the lesson of the American costly strategic missteps following the 9/11 attacks.
Israel’s military campaign across the Middle East has succeeded in weakening Hamas, Lebanese Hezbollah, and other members of Iran’s ‘Axis of Resistance.’ Of course, Israel was well within its rights to respond to the attacks of October 7. Many of Israel’s staunchest supporters believe that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have fought a moral war. Many observers of the conflict disagree. The fallout and ensuing humanitarian crisis in Gaza have led to accusations of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity — labels that many dispute, even as tensions rise and the conflict in Gaza continues and reverberates in countries across the globe. The International Criminal Court (ICC) issued warrants for the arrest of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Israeli Minister of Defense Yoav Gallant, which in turn saw the United States impose sanctions against the ICC.
Several years of conflict and the devastation wrought by conflict have led Israel’s standing in the world to plummet, a dynamic supported by myriad public opinion polls that reveal the increasing polarization under the leadership of Netanyahu. A Pew Research Center poll from June showed that “most people across 36 countries have negative views of Israel and little confidence in Netanyahu.” More specifically, across three dozen countries, a median of two-thirds of adults has an unfavorable view of Israel, while one-quarter hold a favorable view. In Muslim-majority countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Türkiye (in addition to the West Bank and East Jerusalem), views are particularly negative. In Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain, around half of adults or more say they hold a very unfavorable view of Israel.
Even in the U.S., where Israel has historically enjoyed a foundational level of public support and military assistance from the government, perceptions of Israel have changed in the aftermath of the response to October 7. Another Pew Research Center poll, this one from July and focused on Americans’ views of Israel, showed that “the American public’s attitudes toward both the Israeli people and the Israeli government have turned more negative in the past few years.” Views by demographics are even more jarring, especially when broken down by age and political affiliation, with younger Democrats the most opposed to Israel, but an emergent ‘anti-Israel’ camp is present among young Republicans too. According to Pew, “the youngest Democrats are slightly more likely to view Hamas than the Israeli government favorably.” While that may come as a shock to many, it still has significant political implications within the United States. The American Israel Public Affairs Committee, or AIPAC, has also become a lightning rod of controversy in American domestic politics, now under scrutiny for its outsized role in funding American political candidates and their campaigns.
So not only has Israel’s image suffered globally and in the United States, but the attacks of October 7 and the aftermath have also negatively impacted the legacy of Netanyahu and caused significant political upheaval within Israel ahead of elections being held at the end of the month. The same leader who adopted the attitude that while he may not be loved, his job is to keep Israelis safe, no longer has that same claim to fame. After the attacks of October 7, and reportedly warnings issued by both the United Arab Emirates and Egypt, Netanyahu has become something of an international pariah. These responses have collectively clouded Netanyahu’s prospects for reelection later this month, with speculation over whether Netanyahu and his Likud party will be able to secure a majority bloc in Israel’s Knesset.
Another byproduct of the attack has been a global uptick in anti-Semitism. Some of this has been homegrown, and some, especially more recently, externally directed. Iran has ramped up its use of so-called ‘disposable agents,’ organized through a shadowy new front group known as Harakat Ashab al-Yamin Islamiya (HAYI), active throughout Europe. The war in Gaza has been cited as a grievance by numerous individuals accused of conducting terrorist attacks in the West, so the threat emanates from both the bottom up, in some societies, and from the top down, with Iranian-orchestrated attacks using the gig economy to destabilize Western societies. There have even been several Hamas-related terror plots disrupted in Europe over the past several years, while Hamas supporters in the U.S. have been arrested for material support offenses and on terrorism financing charges.
Part of the objective of terrorism is to inflict psychological pain and undermine faith in governments’ ability to protect their citizens and catalyze fissures in society. Sinwar spent years in an Israeli jail, learned Hebrew, and studied Israel’s domestic and foreign policies. He clearly understood the importance of the timing of the attack and the various pressure points within the U.S.-Israel relationship, which is now at somewhat of a historic nadir. This is an outcome Sinwar could have only dreamed about, even as it may do little to help usher in the prospects of a Palestinian state.
There is a lot that Sinwar got wrong. He miscalculated the level of support from Iran and its proxies in the immediate aftermath of the attack. Some have argued that the Iranians were caught by surprise, even as Tehran supported Hamas with training, equipment, and strategic guidance. Initially, the Iranians blinked and seemed unprepared to support Hamas, before eventually joining the fray. Three years after October 7, the Axis of Resistance has been severely degraded and is far from the victor that Sinwar perhaps imagined, as the Al-Aqsa flood has dried up and the situation for Palestinians in the West Bank is now more dire than it was three years ago. Sinwar also miscalculated on using the hostages as leverage, a tactic he believed would bring a quick end to the fighting before entering a period of negotiations.
Terrorism is not a tool used to create, but rather to destroy. In that sense, it can be an effective asymmetric approach to achieving certain destructive objectives. The Hamas terror attacks of October 7 caused turmoil within Israeli politics and placed additional strain on the country’s relationships with the international community. It also led to a decline in Israel’s image among Americans. While these may have been second-order effects, they shape the current reality. There is one more thing Sinwar may have undermined — the opportunity for a Palestinian state, the prospect of which lies in tatters, alongside everything else destroyed by the attacks and the subsequent reprisals.
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