A Bug Sitting At A Desk
Every so often problems with the intelligence culture in Ottawa come crashing into the open. By intelligence culture, I am talking about a process to ensure well-informed and well-crafted intelligence is greeted by decision-makers with respect and understanding. I mean the ability of the intelligence community, with its many independent actors, to arrive at an agreed picture of a threat, the ability to disseminate its threat intelligence, the ability of decision-makers to receive and read it, and, because reading is never enough, finally the good judgement of decision-makers in deciding what it means and how to apply it to policy and action, including in any public discussion. It’s a complex process that often suffers from divides between intelligence and its consumers, each failing to fully understand the other across the secrecy and professional experience barriers.
The intelligence-policy maker gulf is not unique to Canada, but it is often said that the Canadian intelligence culture lacks maturity and sophistication. That’s probably too blanket a statement, but there are clear challenges in the de-centralized architecture of Canadian intelligence, its competing centres of authority (CSIS, CSE, RCMP, PCO, DND, GAC, Public Safety), its relative weakness when it comes to intelligence assessment, and the presence of an intervening layer of political staffers who inhabit in growing numbers Minister’s officers and, above all, the PMO, and whose grasp of intelligence may be deficient. Political staffers may feel, as might their bosses, that they know best, or even have better sources. At the top we have a new Prime Minister, without political background, whose response to intelligence remains an enigma.
Problematic intelligence culture on recent display.
During a background briefing to the media on the eve of Mark Carney’s trip to India, a “senior” (unnamed) Canadian official is reported to have made a series of remarkable statements. They are reported to have said that the government believed that Indian government transnational repression and foreign interference had ceased and is quoted as saying “if we believed that the government of India was actively interfering in the Canadian democratic process, we probably would not be taking this trip.” This senior official cited the new channels for engagement with India on national security issues, and appeared to argue that because of these channels, there could be confidence “that the activity [foreign interference and transnational repression] is not continuing.” [1]
A media story by CTV correspondent, Annie Bergeron-Oliver, who also attended the briefing, has a slightly different account of the statements made, citing two separate government officials, both of whom emphasised the engagements with India on security matters and the mechanisms in place “to detect and disrupt threats.” The CTV story also quotes one of the unnamed officials as saying “I really don’t think we’d be taking this trip if we thought these kind of activities were continuing…” [2] The language quoted is slightly different from that in the Globe story cited above, but the message is the same.
Over at CBC News, Evan Dyer also quoted one official as saying “I think we could say we’re confident that the activity is not continuing,” adding that, “If we believed that the government of India was actively interfering in the Canadian democratic process, we probably would not be taking this trip.” [3] Word perfect with the quote in the Globe and Mail story.
There is no public transcript of the background briefing, so no way of checking what was actually said and in what context.
In response to these media reports, two former National Security and Intelligence Advisers to the PM, Jody Thomas and Vincent Riby, both expressed doubts about the prognosis. Jody Thomas is quoted as saying “It would be lovely to know that all of the threats and the interference have ended. That would be a really positive thing…” “but it would surprise me.” [4] Vincent Rigby, while supporting the Carney trip to India as an example of “pragmatic diplomacy at its best,” urged political leaders not to make security intelligence a footnote and not to dismiss the concerns of the Sikh community in Canada. [5]
Media reporting on these statements by government officials have sparked outrage in the Sikh community and denunciation from some Liberal MPs. Sukh Dhaliwal, who represents the Surrey-Newton riding in BC, with a large Sikh population, called the claims of the cessation of Indian government foreign interference “totally irresponsible” and asked for heads to roll. He wants an investigation into “the judgement and responsibilities exercised by the individual who made these remarks,” adding that their “conduct and suitability for their role must be reviewed.” [6]
A coalition of Canadian Sikh groups have issued an ultimatum to a list of 20 MPs and to the leaders of the three major federal parties, demanding that there be a full disclosure of all intelligence on transnational pressure campaigns, the continuation of a parliamentary study into Indian government interference, and a public inquiry into the 2023 murder of Sikh activist Hardeep Singh Nijjar. [7] Their anger is palpable, but their demands unlikely to be met. Intelligence will not be released and the RCMP continues its criminal investigation into the Nijjar murder, foreclosing any public inquiry.
What do you do with a hot potato? Catch it, and dance to avoid being burned. There has been lots of that on display, including statements from both the Public Safety Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, from PMO and from CSIS.
Here is the Public Safety Minister, Gary Anandasangaree’s, version of the dance. One day after the background briefing, he stated that “there are certainly issues around safety and security of Canadians that we continue to engage in.” He added, “what I’m suggesting is that there’s still more work to do, and we will do that work.” [8]
PMO’s version: a reminder that Canada and India have established regular top-level channels on security and law enforcement. “Canada will continue to take measures to combat any forms of transnational repression, transnational organized crime and any contravention of the Criminal Code or rule of law on Canadian soil.” [9]
Foreign Affairs Minister Anita Anand: “We are raising the issues relating to public safety and security and will do that on this trip [to India]…We need to be at the table to raise the concerns relating to transnational repression, to the rule of law.” [10]
CSIS. The security dialogue with India is an important step. According to the CSIS spokesperson, “CSIS takes all allegations of foreign interference and transnational repression seriously and we consider threats in a country-agnostic way. This hasn’t changed.” [11] Country-agnostic? Code-word meaning can include India.
As the government searches for the (Orwellian) memory hole to consign the message from the background briefing into the flames, what can we learn from this incident about the intelligence culture in Canada? First, it must be said that we don’t have the full picture of who exactly made these statements, who authorized them to make these statements, and on what intelligence basis the statements were made. This will all probably go into the memory hole.
But what is concerning is the question of who is authorized to speak, on or off the record, for the assessments of the Canadian intelligence community about transnational threats. There is only one official that holds that responsibility. It rests in the office of the National Security and Intelligence Adviser. [12] It is the duty of the NSIA to speak on behalf of the intelligence community to government decision-makers and to the PM. The NSIA is also responsible for transparency efforts—getting the intelligence community message out to the public.[13] That is the nature of the job. It can involve some tough calls when the community may be divided in its views or when, as will be true in many cases, the intelligence picture is far from complete or clear. It can involve some head-butting with senior officials in the Prime Minister’s Office, who may want to convey a different, more politically convenient message. Tant pis. The NSIA must be the final and over-riding voice on the threat picture. That is not to say that a PM or his Ministers must be dictated to by the intelligence community’s assessment of threats, only that they must pay attention and be respectful of the intelligence message.
This should never have been hard in the context of the PM’s trip to India. The message that should have been conveyed is that we have an ongoing security dialogue with India, itself a break-through, that we continue to monitor foreign interference threats and will not hesitate to call them out, that the security of Canadians will always be a top priority, and that “guardrails” will always be in place, as PM Carney has said in relation to deal-making with China, when we negotiate trade pacts with foreign countries. Easy.
But here’s the rub. We are in an interregnum when it comes to the NSIA. The current office holder, Nathalie Drouin, is leaving the job shortly to take up a post as ambassador to France. [14] Rumours swirl about a replacement but no announcement has been made. [15]
There is also the question of whether the Cabinet National Security Council, chaired by the PM, is being used effectively to ensure that the government is getting the best strategic intelligence picture available.
To ensure a strong intelligence culture in Canada, you need a strong NSIA, heading a strong intelligence machinery, you need high-quality intelligence reporting flowing regularly to Cabinet and the PM, you need a Cabinet table where intelligence is discussed and any temptation to intelligence politicisation set aside. You need a system where professional officials sit above political staffers.
The suggestion from the background briefing on Indian foreign interference is that all is not well with Canadian intelligence culture. Let’s hope it doesn’t reflect a bug deep in the system.
